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Configurational audit deals with identifying oversights or omissions in the use of otherwise 
secure computer security controls. Over the past decade, these errors, and the system 
vulnerability they create, have featured in many successful computer system attacks. Often, 
such vulnerability is easily introduced to systems, but difficult to manually detect. 
This thesis deals with configurational audit tools, which are used detect such vulnerability; 
an overview of technical vulnerability, as well as the field of configurational audit, are 
provided. 
A configurational audit and conformance tool called NetAudit is described. This tool, 
designed for the Novell NetWare 3.lx LAN operating system, uses conformance testing as 
its primary means of detecting vulnerability. The design and implementation of NetAudit 
are described, and the effective.ness of conformance testing as a means of performing 
configurational audit is assessed. 
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T he last decade has seen a rapid adoption of computer system interconnection as a business tool. Local Area Networks, connecting hundreds or even thousands of 
organisational users, are now common business technology components. More recently, 
Global Area Networks, providing access to a range of useful services, and literally millions 
of potential customers and business partners, have experienced phenomenal growth. The 
competitive and strategic advantages of networked computer systems, combined with the 
cost-effectiveness adopting such technology, suggest that this trend can only continue. 
Nevertheless, computer system 'interconnection is a potentially hazardous practice. In 
November of 1988, a rogue worm attacked and infected thousands of computer systems 
connected to the ARPANET [19, pp.193-221]. In June 1991, an (unidentified) Californian 
magazine publisher was forced to shut down its entire network of some 1500 workstations 
because of a widespread viral infection [43, p. 115]. In August 1992, the Texas A&M 
University Supercomputer Centre was the target of coordinated attacks from an unknown 
number of Internet attackers [65]. For the first seven months of 1994, intruders 
compromised an unclassified Pentagon computer system, and "stole, altered and erased 
records" [58]. Early in February 1995, a U.S. Internet services provider, CapAccess, was 
compromised by attackers who stole passwords for up to 12,000 users [60]. 
Unfortunately, such attacks are widespread. Numerous accounts of computer security 
problems can be found in the literature, or in media reports. For a variety of reasons, even 
more incidents pass unreported. Given the attention that computer security has received in 
the last few years, it would not be unreasonable to expect that such attacks are diminishing 
in frequency. However, this does not appear to be the case. 
There are a variety of possible explanations: The current rapid rate of technological change 
means that new services appear in computer systems before the security impacts of such 
features have been assessed; design and implementation flaws in security controls may 
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render systems vulnerable to attack; and controls designed to prevent or deter attacks may 
not keep pace with the sophistication and resources of potential adversaries. 
Computer networks present a new range of threats and potential attackers. In the past, an 
attacker required a certain amount of physical access to compromise a target system; 
networks make remote attacks possible, and as an added benefit to attackers, greatly 
reduce the chances of detection. Although connecting your system to a public network 
may mean that you can access a number of vital business services, it can also mean that an 
unknown number of attackers can now access you. Even within organisations, information 
travelling around Local Area Networks is subject to eavesdropping and modification. 
Computer vulnerability has not escaped the attention of those who create operating 
systems. In recent times, commercial multi-user operating system vendors (such as Novell, 
Sun, HP, DEC and IBM), have expended considerable energy in improving the quality and 
strength of technical controls. Despite these efforts, successful attacks continue to occur. 
Often, one need search no further than the configurational vulnerability of systems in order 
to find out why these attacks are so prevalent. Configurational vulnerability occurs when 
otherwise attack resistant mechanisms enforcing system security are not used, or are used 
incorrectly. A large number of installed systems, through simple omissions or oversights in 
the use of technical controls, end up vulnerable to a broad range of attacks. 
This thesis focuses on tools that can help reduce the incidence of configurational 
vulnerability within computer systems. These tools assess the operational use of computer 
security mechanisms, and are able to point out flaws in system configuration that can lead 
to vulnerability. In later chapters, the objectives, philosophies and design of such tools are 
discussed. 
As part of this thesis, a configurational audit tool called NetAudit was developed to address 
the Novell NetWare 3.lx environment.' This LAN operating system is commonly used by 
businesses of all sizes to provide PC networking functionality. As will be shown later in 
this document, NetWare suffers from a variety of possible weaknesses in the use of security 
controls, and shares many of the same security threats as other network computing 
environments. The planning, design and an assessment of the effectiveness of this tool are 
also described in subsequent chapters. 
1 In this thesis, Net Ware 3.1 x refers to version 3.11 and 3. 12 of Novell's NetWare LAN operating system. 
18 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this research project were: 
1. To review general security issues, computer security vulnerability, and the field of 
automated configurational audit tools. 
2. To assess the NetWare 3.1x environment, with particular emphasis on possible sources 
of vulnerability within NetWare' s security mechanisms. 
3. To determine how configurational audit tools could be applied to tmprove the 
operational security of NetWare systems. 
4. To develop and evaluate such a tool for the NetWare environment. 
THESIS LAYOUT 
This thesis is divided into a total of eleven chapters, and includes a number of supporting 







Overviews the objectives of system security and the security environments 
in which system security operates. Relevant concepts from the field of Risk 
Analysis are introduced and explained. 
Examines technical vulnerability in some detail. Some general factors for 
the presence of such flaws are presented, followed by discussion of 
vulnerability and the system lifecycle. 
Introduces configurational audit tools. Objectives, policy issues, and 
hazards are discussed. 
Examines the driving philosophies that shape configurational audit tools. 
Specific tool implementation techniques are also examined. 
Presents a review of existing configurational audit tools. The approaches of 
these tools are analysed and compared. 
Introduces the NetAudit configurational audit tool. A discussion of why 
configurational audit is required for NetWare is followed by an outline of 








Explains how a set of requirements for NetAudit were developed. This 
chapter provides a high level overview of NetWare's security controls; a 
number of possible vulnerability scenarios in those controls are identified 
and explained. 
Overviews the design and implementation of NetAudit. The development of 
NetAudit' s baselines, using vulnerability scenarios from chapter 8, are 
explained in detail. 
Describes a trial project using NetAudit. The results of this project, along 
with an analysis of the NetAudit approach and tool, are presented. 
Summarises and concludes the thesis. 
The main appendices are as follows: 
Appendix A Describes techniques and sources of information that can be used to 
discover the presence of technical vulnerability. 
Appendix B Presents an in-depth analysis of vulnerability within the overall NetWare 
security environment. 




This chapter presents a contextual view of security, in which the basic 
ol~jec·tives of System Security are explained. A formalised approach to system 
security, known as risk analysis, is outlined, and the major concepts of this 
approach are described. Finally, the various classes of information systems 
security are defined and discussed. 
Figure 2 - 1 System Security Objectives 
201 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
System security is the process of ensuring that the fundamental system properties of 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability are maintained to specified standards in a cost-
effective manner. In order to understand the security process, it is first necessary to 
examine these principles in more detail. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality exists when system components are protected from unauthorised disclosure. 
A system may contain information of a private nature, of commercial value, or of 
significance to national security. Confidentiality seeks to prevent that information from 
being revealed to unauthorised parties. 
21 
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In the context of commercial organisations, confidentiality may simply consist of ensuring 
that competitors do not learn of marketing plans for the coming season. In a ntilitcu·y 
context, confidentiality could mean ensuring that foreign powers do not learn of your plans 
to invade them within the next six months. In either case, from the point of view of those 
responsible for the security of the system, such disclosures are undesirable. 
The strength of those measures required to achieve confidentiality for a particular system 
depends largely on the type of information the system stores, how attractive that 
information is to other interested parties, and the resources available to potential attackers. 
INTEGRITY 
A system can be said to posess the property of integrity if the information that it contains is 
both complete and correct. System integrity revolves around ensuring that sources of 
incoming information (data) or functionality (in the form of programs or hardware) are 
authentic, correct, consistant, and verifiable. System integrity can be adversely affected by 
deliberate or accidental modifications to any system component. 
Integrity can have a direct impact on human safety. In late 1989, a hospital in Stoke-on-
Trent, England, discovered that a computer programming error in a radiotherapy machine 
had resulted in significant underdosages being administered to patients during cancer 
treatment sessions. As a result, nearly a thousand cancer patients treated by the system 
over a period of ten years received incorrect doses of radiation. The error was only 
discovered after the radiotherapy system was decommissioned.(Risks-Forum [56]) 1 
AVAILABILITY 
A secure system must be available to provide required service and functionality to 
authorised parties within acceptable time constraints. This should be the case even under 
adverse conditions. A denial of service occurs when the system is no longer available and 
authorised users of the system are unable to acquire system resources essential for normal 
operation. In many ways, a denial of service can be just as damaging to a system as a loss 
of confidentiality or integrity. 
1 Other similar examples of medical cancer treatment systems failing clue to programming errors are given 
in [57] and [13, p.l43] 
22 
System Security Concepts CHAPTER 2 
As mentioned in Chapter one, an infamous denial of service example occurred early in 
November 1988, when a program exploiting several common Unix vulnerabilities was 
released onto the ARPANET. The self-replicating program, which later became known as 
the Internet Worm, reduced network and system speeds to a crawl as it frantically 
reproduced on as many machines as it could locate. 
The impact on system availability of this attack were two-fold: First, the worm caused 
serious and widespread system performance degradation. Second, machines infected by the 
worm had to be disconnected from the network and "cleaned", a time consuming and 
tedious process. The real cost of such a widespread denial of service was never accurately 
established (see Denning [ 19, pp.l93-200, pp.260-263]). 
Cost considerations 
Security measures must be cost effective relative to the value of the system components 
and information that they protect. Simply put, this means that the cost of ensuring system 
confidentiality, integrity and av<:~ilability must not exceed the cost of a failure to achieve 
those goals. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to assess the value of system components, 
and consequently the cost of a compromise of system security. 
2 .. 2 SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS 
System security is not restricted simply to the examination of computer hardware, software 
and data. System components in a number of other environments should be considered 
concurrently in order to achieve overall security. These environments are summarised 
below: 
• The physical security environment. 
In many cases, the most effective security measures are physical. By physically 
isolating a system from threats, attackers must expend more effort to gain access to 
system components. Components often requiring physical protection include facilities, 
equipment, personnel, media, and externally supplied services such as power and 
communications facilities. 
Physical safeguards include location, locks, fences, guards, alarms and surveillance 
systems. The location of backup media and facilities, the destruction of used media, 
and protection against natural and man-made adversaries such as flood, fire and 
earthquakes are also considered in the physical security environment. 
23 
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• The personnel security environment. 
This security environment regulates which people are authorised to access system 
resources, and what that level of access is. Where sensitive information is processed, 
background checks of key personnel may be necessary. The personnel security 
environment addresses the question of who is required to be subjected to such tests, 
and how those tests should be performed. 
People may also require protection from many of the same threats that face other 
system components. Acts of terrorism, sabotage, and vandalism all potentially involve 
some danger for personnel as well as facilities (Cooper [ 13]). 
• The regulatory security environment. 
Often, the continued operation of a computer system relies on its adherence to 
standards that are enforced and regulated by external organisations. The regulatory 
security environment is concerned with ensuring that the nature and operation of a 
system complies with any relevant regulations and laws. These include issues of 
copyright, privacy, correctness of information stored within the system, standards of 
operation, and staff conditions as outlined by the appropriate laws and regulations. 
• The hardware security envirolllnent. 
The hardware security environment deals the computer hardware components of a 
system. Issues such as the integrity and reliability of hardware, access controls for 
devices, and controlling electromagnetic (TEMPEST) emanations from these devices, 
are all considered within this environment. 2 
Safeguards within this environment include hardware redundancy (such as fault-tolerant 
systems), biometrics and smartcards for access controls, and electromagnetic shielding 
or encryption to reduce the possibility of emanation related compromises. 
• The software security environment. 
This environment addresses threats to the operating system, applications, and utilities. 
Threats to these components include Trojan horses, virii, trapdoors, worms, and bugs. 
Safeguards in the software security environment are many and varied. For instance, 
they may consist of virus and change detection systems, or extensive system testing in 
2 TEMPEST is the term given to the general field of electromagnetic emanation security. According to 
Malcolm Shore of the NZ GCSB, the phrase TEMPEST relates "to the similarity between emitted radiation 
and a bad storm." 
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an effort to locate system bugs. Management issues, such as auditing, certification and 
accreditation, and configuration control, are also important safeguards. 
• The data security environment. 
The data that resides. within a system, as well as the media upon which it is stored, 
requires protection from unauthorised disclosure, modification, tampering, and 
inaccuracies. Safeguards to protect against such threats include access controls, 
encryption, file signatures, degaussing, and physical safeguards (in the case of media). 
• The communications security environment. 
The communications security environment confronts threats that that affect 
communications between components of the system. Safeguards against 
communications threats include emanation (TEMPEST) controls for network cabling, 
encryption of data travelling on the network, and intelligent networking components 
that enforce network access and usage controls (such as intelligent hubs and routers, or 
firewall techniques). 
2m3 RISK ANALYSIS CONCEPTS 
To better understand the goals of system security, and how they are achieved, it is 
necessary to identify and define the entities involved in the security process, and the roles 
that those entities play. This section presents concepts from a field called risk analysis, a 
formalised approach to assessing system security that has been widely adopted by security 
practitioners. It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss risk analysis methodologies in 
detail; more in-depth treatments of the topic can be found in Buck [6], Cooper [13], 
Farquhar [24], or Gilbert [27]. 
A useful definition of the term risk analysis is given by Gilbert [27, section 2.2]: 
... [Risk analysis is] a procedure used to estimate the potential losses that may 
result from system vulnerabilities, and the damage from the occurrence of 
certain threats. Risk analysis identifies not only critical assets that must be 
protected but considers the environment in which these assets are stored and 
processed. The ultimate goal of risk analysis is to help in the selection of 
cost-effective safeguards that will reduce risks to an acceptable level. 
As stated, security risk analysis is used ultimately to select safeguards that will help 
eliminate or reduce the severity of risks facing the system. Risk analysis also benefits other 
security activities. For instance, a risk analysis project may help generate long term 
25 
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Figure 2- 2 Generalised model of System Security. 3 
security plans and policies [13, p.27], and can also increase the general level of 
organisational security awareness. 
Figure 2 - 2 depicts a generalised risk analysis perspective of system security. In this 
model, the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of system assets are protected by 
system safeguards. There may exist threats to those assets, which are realised by attack 
agents exploiting vulnerabilities in system safeguards. These concepts are summarised 
below. 
• Assets 
Identification and valuation of system assets is an essential risk analysis activity. Assets 
are those system entities that have some value, and for which protection measures are 
required. Assets include tangible items such as hardware, software, personnel and 
facilities; Intangibles, such as goodwill, morale, reputation and opportunity are also 
often considered system assets. 
• Threats 
A threat is a person, thing or event which poses some danger to an asset. The existence 
of a particular threat by no means implies that the threat will occur. In order to be of 
harm, the potential of the threat must be realised by an attack agent exploiting system 
safeguard vulnerabilities. Threats fall into one of two classes: unintentional (accidental) 
3 This diagram is an adaptation of Figure l of [52] 
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[lntention•I_tl>~~ -~~ _ _ _ rl:'~in~-..... -.. :~=.. 
Unauthorised system access, browsing, Human errors. 
inferencing or modifications. 
--~---·-·--------------+-----------·-.. ---" 
Interception of information. Programming errors. 
Disruption of system functionality. Electromagnetic (TEMPEST) emanations. 
Theft or vandalism of system components. Equipment failures 
Power failures. 
Communications failures. 
in regulatory environments. 
Acts of Commission or Omission. 
Table 2 - I Examples of intentional and unintentional threats. 
and intentional. Examples of each kind of threat are shown in Table 2 - l. The impact 
of a threat occurrence is usually some function of the value of the asset that the threat 
affects. 
• Safeguards 
Safeguards (or controls) are measures taken to prevent threats from occurring, or 
alternatively, to lessen the .impact of threats that do occur [6, p.85]. These are 
respectively known as preventative and control safeguards. Safeguards may be 
embodied in policy and regulatory measures, procedural measures, environmental 
measures, physical measures or technical measures. A single safeguard may provide 
protection against a variety of threats. 
Preventative safeguards attempt to prevent a threat occurrence by removing an asset 
from the reaches of a particular threat entirely. For instance, the threat of a system 
penetration by an intruder originating from an external network may be removed by the 
safeguard of physically isolating that system from the network. The general aim of 
preventative safeguards is to elevate the cost of penetration (for the attacker) to a level 
that is greater than the attacker can expect to gain from the penetration. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the attacker and the owner of a targeted asset may 
possess different ideas about the actual value of compromising that asset. 
Preventative safeguards may not totally remove the possibility of a particular threat 
occurring. In some cases, the safeguard may simply serve to reduce the frequency of a 
threat occurrence by deterring would be attackers. For example, a password protected 
4 
"Misfeasance" is the deliberate abuse of authority or trust. 
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login mechanism may deter a m~ority of "casual" attackers, but will probably not 
discourage a more determined and resourceful attacker. 
Control safeguards fall into two categories: containment or recovery. A containment 
safeguard limits the impact of a threat occurrence by damage control strategies, such as 
detecting and deflecting the attack as it is in progress, or by quickly isolating the attack 
target so as to limit damage to other systems. A recovery safeguard aims to t~tcilitate 
system continuance in the aftermath of a threat occurrence. Backups of data, 
applications, and in some cases, entire sites are typical recovery safeguards. 
• Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in, or a complete absence of, system safeguards. 
Vulnerabilities may be present in any of the physical, personnel, procedural, regulatory, 
hardware, software, or communications environments of a system. 
Detecting and assessing vulnerability is a major aspect of risk analysis. Without some 
idea of the nature of system vulnerabilities, it is difficult to assess the level of risk facing 
a system. Unfortunately, locating the presence of vulnerabilities, particularly in 
technical safeguards, is a difficult process. It is not uncommon for vulnerabilities 
introduced during system design to lie dormant for a number of years before being 
discovered and exploited. This was the case with the NetWare packet spoofing 
vulnerability that is discussed Appendix B. 
Even systems that incorporate particularly attack resistant technical safeguards can 
suffer from vulnerability. If these safeguards are not used, or are misconfigured, 
serious technical vulnerabilities may exist within the system. However, a false sense of 
security may still prevail, because the system "has the strongest protection money can 
buy". 
• Attack Agents 
An attack agent (sometimes called a threat agent, or an attacker) is an entity that 
initiates an attack on an asset within a system. By exploiting system vulnerabilities, the 
attack agent causes threats to occur. 
Attack agents can take many forms. For instance, an attacker may be human, a 
programmed agent (i.e., a virus), or a natural agent (i.e., natural disasters). The 
intention of the attacker may be malicious or accidental, depending upon the nature of 
the threat that they are in the process of realising. 
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Attackers may be internal or external to an organisation. In the case of human 
attackers, it is generally accepted within the security community that a majority of 
attacks are perpetrated by internal employees [51, p.405]. Furthermore, one study 
revealed that up to 75 percent of security violations reviewed were perpetrated by 
systems administrators, with the remainder being attributed to regular users ( 15 
percent) and outsiders ( 10 percent) [78]. 
THE RISK ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Risk is typically expressed as a function of threat likelihood and the expected impact of a 
successful attack. Exact methods of calculating risk vary according to the particular 
methodology in use, but generally a risk analysis project involves the following steps (from 
NZSITlOO [52, p.l2]): 
1. Identify system assets. 
2. Determine for each asset the type and potential frequency of threat occurrences. 
3. Determine the impact of each potential attack. 
4. Derive a risk factor for each asset, and for the system as a whole by using the 
impact and expected frequency of threat occurrences. 
This exercise produces a risk factor for each asset, assessed in relation to the types of 
threats that those assets face. By selecting and applying safeguards, the level of risk for 
each asset, and for the system as a whole, can be reduced to an acceptable or manageable 
level. Because the likely impacts of successful asset attacks are (hopefully) known, 
safeguards can be selected on the basis of how cost-effective they are relative to the risks 
that each asset faces. 
CONFIGURATIONAL AUDIT AND RISK ANAL VSIS 
Of particular importance to configurational audit is step two of the general risk analysis 
process above. In order for threats to occur, system safeguards must be absent or deficient. 
Assessing the likely frequency of threat occurrences therefore involves determining of the 
extent of system vulnerabilities. As mentioned on Page 28, misconfiguration of otherwise 
secure technical controls can lead to senous system vulnerabilities. Fortunately, 
safeguarding against these vulnerabilities can be very cost effective (usually involving 
simple reconfiguration), as long as the vulnerabilities have been detected. 
Thus, configurational audit tools may prove to be extremely useful tools for risk analysis 
practitioners. First, such tools can potentially be used during a risk analysis project to 
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assess the level of technical system vulnerability. Second, such tools can point out cost 
effective means of safeguarding against a variety of technical threats. 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the main objectives of the system security process: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. These fundamental principles guide the security 
process. 
Security environments were briefly discussed. Although vulnerability may exist in any of 
the system security environments described, this thesis mainly concentrates on flaws that 
occur in the technical (hardware, software, data, and communications) environments. 
Finally, concepts from risk analysis were presented. As discussed, risk analysis 1s 
concerned with assessing the level of system risk, and where possible, applying cost-
effective safeguards to minimise or remove potential losses from attacks. As discussed, 




V •. ULNERABILI'PY 
This chapter focuses on the notion of technical vulnerability, and the various 
general factors that are likely to il~fluence the level of such vulnerability 
within a system. The relmionship between the system lifecycle and technical 
vulnerability is also explored. 
3.1 TECHNICAL VULNERABILITY 
A technical vulnerability is a weakness that occurs due to absences or deficiencies of 
controls in components of the hardware, software, data or communications environments 
of an information system. 
Technical vulnerability occurs as a matter of course in most computerised information 
systems, and only careful attention to overall security during the entire system lifecycle can 
minimise its presence. Nevertheless, some latent level of technical vulnerability must be 
accepted as an inherent part of operational systems. This chapter explores some of the 
reasons why this is the case. 
Technical vulnerabilities generally fall into four of the vulnerability classes identified in 
Ruthberg [64, Appendix E). These classes are uncontrolled system access, application 
errors, operating system flaws, and communication system failures. 
• Uncontrolled system access 
Uncontrolled system access occurs when weaknesses in technical security safeguards 
fail to establish controls over who can access components of the system, or when those 
controls fail to adequately regulate legitimate system access and use. Uncontrolled 
system access vulnerabilities can occur m hardware, software, data, and 
communications services. 
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• Application errors 
Application errors may occur if an application, through design, implementation, 
documentation, production or maintenance flaws fails to protect the integrity, 
confidentiality or availability of the system. 
• Operating systemflaws 
Operating system flaws may occur m the same fashion as application errors, since 
operating systems are in essence another form of application. Additionally, inadequate 
configuration of operating system services and controls, deliberate penetrations 
resulting in operating system modifications, and errors during system installation may 
also lead to flaws. 
• Communication system failures 
Cotmnunication system weaknesses include accidental failures, such as undetected 
transmission errors or accidental emanations, and failures to protect against intentional 
acts, such as unauthorised monitoring, compromise of intermediate network nodes, 
corruption of data, modification of data en-route, and unauthorised use of network 
servtces. 
3.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Although vulnerabilities may be created at any point in the system lifecycle (examined 
further on page 37), several general factors can influence the overall expected level of 
technical flaws a system contains. These factors are discussed in this section, and include: 
• The size and complexity of the system. 
• The distribution of components. 
• Poor security practices. 
• Technology gaps. 
• Operating environment. 
• The level of system trust. 
SYSTEM SIZE AND COMPLEXITY 
The size of a system can be measured in the number of components (hardware devices, 
software modules, files or communications subsystems) it contains. Each component may 
increase or decrease overall system security, and as more components are added to a 
system, the probability of technical vulnerability increases. 
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Large systems typically contain a greater number of inter-component interactions. These 
interactions tend to increase the overall complexity of the system. While size and 
complexity in themselves are not immediate problems, some difficulties may anse, as 
detailed below: 
• Understanding 
Large and complex systems are less likely to be understood in their entirety by any one 
person. Where there are large numbers of components, it may be impossible or 
impractical to become familiar with the entire system. This lack of understanding, 
especially by those responsible for managing the system, can lead to configurational 
difficulties or incompatible usage problems. 1 Problems understanding large systems are 
compounded by inadequate documentation, which may be rendered inaccurate as 
system components are added and maintained as part of the normal system lifecycle. 
• Administration 
Large systems containing many file system objects, software modules, hardware 
devices, and user objects, are more difficult to manage. Some production systems may 
contain thousands of users, and many gigabytes of file system data. Detecting 
configurational vulnerabilities within such systems may be difficult, simply due to the 
sheer number of objects and object interactions that must to be analysed. This is 
especially true if there are no automated tools available to assist the security evaluation 
process. 
• Obsfucation 
Large and complex systems may be ideal vehicles for obscuring intentional or low 
visibility vulnerabilities. If no one understands how a system works, then they are much 
less likely to understand or identify situations where technical vulnerabilities are 
compromising security. 
DISTRIBUTED COMPONENTS 
Early models of computer security relied heavily on physical security. By establishing a 
secure perimeter around a central computer installation, a general approach of "trust 
everything within the perimeter, and nothing outside it" was feasible. This paradigm meant 
that less emphasis on technical safeguards was required, and more attention could be paid 
to physical, procedural and personnel security aspects. 
1 Incompatible usage is disussed in more detail on page 42. 
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In modern computing environments, the physical security perimeter approach is frequently 
no longer applicable. Components of the system may be located in different parts of the 
country, or even in different parts of the world. These components are often connected by 
communications systems administered by external organisations, who may or may not 
practise good security. Hence, an increase in the range of possible vulnerability 
introduction points may be observed in distributed systems. 
The communications medium itself can sometimes act as an attack agent or accomplice. It 
may, for example, assist the proliferation of worms and viruses throughout a community of 
networked users. Additionally, the medium may be unreliable, or may be subject to 
eavesdropping by attackers. 
Another source of distributed computing vulnerability stems from the proliferation of 
workstations and personal computers throughout organisations. Often, these devices are 
connected to organisational computing networks with little or no attention paid to security. 
Consequently, lax security habits on the part of one networked workstation user can 
potentially jeopardise the integrity of the entire network (Anderson [ 1 ]). 
POOR SECURITY PRACTICES 
The way that security is practiced by users and managers can directly impact the expected 
level of vulnerability, technical or otherwise, within a system. Three security practice issues 
affect vulnerability: 
• Security policy 
A computer security policy is effectively a plan that details guidelines for the operation 
of the system. Amongst other goals, a security policy aims to prevent security. 
problems by providing a set of guidelines that ultimately drive security procedures and 
practice. 
In order for a security policy to be enforceable and accepted within the organisation, it 
should be endorsed by senior management, and should be created with substantial input 
from users, administrators and management. Setting security policy will usually involve 
making decisions about a number of issues, as shown in Table 3 - 1. 
While other organisational policies may make statements about required design, 
implementation, testing, documentation and maintenance standards, a lack of day-to-
day computer security policies may lead directly to vulnerabilities. For example, an 
organisation may lack policies regarding the selection of secure passwords. As a result, 
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Policy Issue 
1. Who is allowed to use system resources 
2. What is the proper use of resources. 
3. Who is authorised to grant access and approve usage. 
4. Who is allowed system administration privileges. 
5. What are the user's rights and responsibilities. 
6. What are the system administrators rights and responsibilities of the system 
administrator as opposed to those of the user. 
7. Who is responsible for auditing and reviewing system security. 
8. What happens when policy is violated. 
Table 3 - I Computer security policy decisions (adapted from [ 32, p./3] ). 
users may end up using short passwords, passwords that are some permutation of their 
login name, or passwords that are locatable in standard dictionaries. 
e Administration issues 
System administration practices can influence the presence of vulnerability. Where 
possible, administration dutie.s should include monitoring system use, reviewing system 
security, educating users about secure computing habits, and monitoring currently 
known system vulnerabilities. The level of skills possessed by the system administrator 
also directly influences system vulnerability: inexperienced or unskilled administrators 
are more likely to make mistakes that result in security mishaps. 
• User habits 
The activities of individual system users can potentially increase or decrease system 
vulnerability. For example, users who transfer confidential files across untrusted public 
networks, or who create world readable and writable files, increase the overall level of 
system vulnerability. 
One possible approach to user created vulnerability 1s to educate users about 
appropriate system habits and standards (see previous point). Another approach, 
examined in this thesis, is to periodically audit user habits and system objects, looking 
for potential areas of vulnerability. 
TECHNOLOGY GAP 
Neumann and Parker [51] define the technology gap as: 
... the [technological] gap that exists between what a computer is actually 
capable of enforcing and what it is expected to enforce ... 
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Level Featuring 
--··-···-----·--·-··-------------··-····---·-··--- ············-··-·-·····-----~·······----. --~---------------------------------------------···---·-·-
0 Minimal Protection 
C 1, C2 Discretionary protection 
Bl, B2, B3 Mandatory protection 
Al Verified protection 
Table 3 - 2 Orange Book security evaluation classes. 
A computer system may be expected to enforce certain policies regarding system 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, but due to deficiencies in its technical environment, 
may not be able to do so. For example (from [51]), discretionary access controls such as 
user/group/world protections are intended to limit file system access, but are incapable of 
enforcing copy protection. Such gaps create vulnerabilities within the system that could be 
exploited by an attacker. 
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
Systems operating in a benign environment are less likely to be attacked. On the other 
hand, if the environment is hostile, attacks may be more common. Note, however, that 
security standards in a benign environment may be lower than those of a system in a hostile 
environment; therefore it is likely that systems existing in a benign environment suffer from 
an increased probability of a successful attack. 
THE LEVEL OF SYSTEM TRUST 
The final general factor that influences the likelihood of technical vulnerabilities is the level 
of trust to which the system has been assured. The United States government's Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria (the "Orange Book" or TCSEC) [20] defines four 
broad divisions of security protection and trust, as shown in Table 3 - 2: 
Each evaluation level, from D through to A l, features an increase in the amount of trust 
that is inherent in the system. At the lower levels of the classification (Cl, C2 and Bl), 
assurance of correct and complete security is mostly provided by extensive testing of 
security features. At the higher levels (B2, B3), assurance becomes a design and 
implementation consideration, while at the highest level (Al), the design of the system is 
formally specified and verified. 
Technical vulnerability is less likely to exist in systems that have been certified at a level 
higher than B 1, and is almost certain to be rare in systems certified at A 1. Notwithstanding 
this, systems that have been evaluated to TCSEC standards may still contain vulnerabilities. 












those vulnerabilities that are still present require inordinate amounts of effort on the part of 
the attacker to exploit. 
TCSEC certifications are no assurance, especially in systems lacking mandatory access 
controls, that the usage of security mechanisms will be consistent with organisational 
security requirements. Even when mechanisms that implement technical security policies 
are extremely resistant to attack, improper or incorrect use of those mechanisms can still 
lead to weak security. These configurational vulnerabilities are discussed further on page 
43. 
Other classification schemes exist besides the TCSEC model. For example, the 
Harmonised ITSEC criteria [31], based on TCSEC and a number of European security 
classification documents, emerged in 1990. This criteria has seven increasingly stringent 
classes of assurance (EO-E6), and has been adopted by the New Zealand government as a 
national standard for evaluating government computer systems and products (Farquhar [24, 
p.lll]).2 
3.3 THE SYSTEM LIFECYCLE 
Besides the general considerations introduced in the previous section, technical weaknesses 
in system components may be introduced at any point in the system lifecycle. The impact 
2 For a number of reasons, the TCSEC criteria are considered mostly obsolete. They are due to be replaced 

















Figure 3- 2 System design vulnerabilities. 
and remedy of a technical weakness may be largely influenced by the lifecycle stage in 
which the vulnerability was introduced. The earlier in the system lifecycle a flaw is 
introduced, the greater the potential havoc that flaw is capable of generating, and the more 
expensive it will be to remedy. 
Some researchers (i.e. Myers [44]), as well as the TCSEC and ITSEC security criteria 
mentioned in the previous section, point to the need for attention to vulnerability to be 
given at every stage of the system's life - not just during the operational phase. This 
section focuses on the various stages of the system lifecycle, and summarises the nature of 
possible vulnerabilities that may be introduced at each of these stages. As shown in Figure 
3 - l, the introduction of technical flaws may occur in any of three distinct phases: the 
system design phase, the implementation phase, and the production phase. 
SYSTEM DESIGN 
The requirements and design phases of a system are crucial times in the system lifecycle. 
During this phase, key decisions regarding hardware and software specifications are made. 
Undetected vulnerabilities occurring at this phase of the system's life may prove impossible 
or inordinately expensive to safeguard once the system reaches the production stage. 
Vulnerabilities at the design stage, as shown in Figure 3 - 2, include: 
• Ill-defined requirements, 
• Deficiencies in design specifications, 
• Insufficient design validation, 
• Inadequate quality assurance, and 
• Deliberate design subversion. 
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As has been long understood by software reliability advocates, discovering and remedying 
problems in the pre-implementation stages of a system's life tends to be more economical in 
terms both of resources and time than attempting fix those same errors once the system has 
been implemented or is in production. One researcher estimated that fixing errors in the 
pre-implementation stages of system development costs about 1 per cent as much as fixing 
code once it has been implemented (Pfleeger [54, p.56]). In addition, the TCSEC and 
ITSEC standards (discussed earlier in this chapter) both make assertions about the security 
implications of decisions made at the design stage. 
Conceptual design errors or omissions are pmticularly dangerous, since unremedied flaws 
in system design usually become embodied in the implementation of a system. 
Safeguarding against vulnerabilities inherent in the system design is subject to three possible 
difficulties: 
• Fundamental design limitations. 
It may prove impossible to adequately "work around" a vulnerability. For instance, the 
MS-DOS operating system contains fundamental design limitations that prevent it from 
providing a secure computing environment. MS-DOS lacks file system access controls, 
file encryption mechanisms, memory protection, and a means to audit user activity. 
Safeguarding against some of these vulnerabilities can be achieved with additional 
(third-party) controls.3 Nevertheless, some inherent limitations may still remain. For 
example, the design of DOS precludes the addition of memory protection safeguards. 
• Dangers of retrospective safeguarding. 
Retrospectively adding safeguards may introduce new vulnerabilities. A system is 
usually designed with a particular set of objectives in mind. Adding to or changing 
those objectives may invalidate some of the original assumptions that were made during 
the initial design process. Dependencies between system components increase the risk 
that new vulnerabilities may arise from such changes due to unforseen interactions. In 
addition, if the safeguards involve additional coding, then this coding is subject to 
implementation introduced vulnerabilities (discussed below). 
3 For example, packages described in [16] (Cental Federal Systems Net/Assure) and [17] (Pyramid 
Development Corp Net/DACS) add improved access control, inegrity, auditing and authentication 














Figure 3 - 3 System implementation vulnerabilities. 
• Prohibitive costs. 
The costs, relative to the value of assets involved, of implementing changes to an 
original design can sometimes be so prohibitive that it effectively becomes cheaper to 
scrap the original system and redesign from scratch. 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
Once the system design has been completed and validated, the next major stage in the life 
of a system is implementation. During this phase, the design of the system is embodied as a 
working product. This includes the manufacture of hardware components, and the coding 
of software components. As Figure 3 - 3 illustrates, flaws may be introduced at this stage 
clue to: 
• Mistakes 
Simple mistakes during component implementation are a common source of 
vulnerability. Recently, Intel Corporation's Pentium CPU shipped with a serious 
floating point division flaw. 4 This flaw, which can potentially cause erroneous results to 
be encountered in high precision calculations, was the result of a simple error copying 
an internal table during chip manufacture. The mistake was missed during pre-release 
quality control checks, and eventually became a source of major embarrassment and 
expense for Intel. 
• Bad coding or manufacturing practices 
Vulnerabilities introduced in during the implementation of a design can sometimes be 
traced to a lack of coding standards and guidelines. There may be weaknesses in the 
quality control and testing environments or methodologies, and system implementation 
documentation may be inadequate or non-existent. 
4 See [59] for a discussion of this flaw. 
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For example, the Unix finger flaw, exploited by the Morris worm, exploited a buffer 
overrun bug in some versions of the Unix fingerd daemon. By providing more data to 
the daemon than its receive buffer had space for, the worm was able to rewrite portions 
of the fingerd internal program stack, altering its behaviour for its own purposes [ 61). 
This flaw existed because certain portions of the finger daemon code lacked buffer 
bounds checking - an example of bad coding practice on the part of the implementors. 
• Intentional insertion 
Vulnerabilities may be deliberately introduced into the system by implementors, either 
overtly, in order to aid the system testing process, or subversively, in order to set up 
some future attack. For example, during implementation and testing, an operating 
system programmer might insert a "convenience" trap-door that circumvents normal 
access control and authentication mechanisms. The intention may be that the trap-door 
remains in place until just before the system reaches the operational stage. 
Unfortunately, because of oversights or errors, the trap-door may not be removed, and 
may escape into production systems. 
More malicious vulnerabilities may be intentionally inserted. For example, a 
programmer may insert a destructive logic bomb into an in-house payroll application 
that is triggered when that programmer's name can no longer be found on the company 
payroll. 
Ken Thompson, in his ACM Turing Award Lecture Reflections on Trusting Trust [76], 
describes an intentionally inserted vulnerability in the original Unix login program. 
This vulnerability, which involved modifications to the Unix login program and C 
compiler, allowed Thompson to login into Unix machines with a special master 
password encoded as part of the login executable. The modifications to the compiler 
ensured that the vulnerability would persist between recompiles of both the login 
program itself, and of the C compiler that inserted the vulnerability. To complete the 
deception, Thompson took steps to ensure that no traces of the modifications were left 
in the source code. 
These vulnerabilities are very hard to detect, especially if they are carried out in a 
deliberately subversive manner. At the conclusion of [76], Thompson notes: 
The moral is obvious. You can't trust code that you did not totally create 
yourself (Especially code from companies that employ people like me). No 
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amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using 
untrusted code. 
Design and implementation vulnerabilities have implications for the operational use of 
systems. If such a vulnerability is found after the system has reached the production stage, 
then measures may be required to reduce or remove the possibility that such vulnerabilities 
are subsequently exploited by attackers. 
One of the roles of security audits during system production is to identify systems that 
contain (acknowledged) design defects, and assessing whether measures have been taken to 
correct or ameliorate the risks presented by those defects. For instance, in operating 
systems, such defects may be addressed by releasing patches for the affected components. 
Assessing the security of that system may involve determining whether or not such patches 
have been installed. 
SYSTEM PRODUCTION 
The production phase of the system begins when the system is installed and becomes 
operational. Once the system reaches this stage, the vulnerability emphasis shifts from 
design and implementation methodology issues to operational and procedural security 
Issues. As shown in Figure 3 - 4 on page 43, several factors could lead to vulnerabilities 
within operational systems: 
e Incompatible Usage 
Unforseen interactions occur when a system is assembled or configured in such a way 
that components interact in unexpected or undesirable ways. These vulnerabilities, 
referred to by Muffett [ 41] as "incompatible usage" flaws, are usually accidental in 
nature, and are often low visibility. For example, certain incompatible combinations of 
hardware and software may lead to random system crashes. 
The level of experience of the system managers can be an important factor in reducing 
the number of vulnerabilities that are introduced through unforseen interactions. The 
more experienced the assemblers and maintainers of the system, the less these will 
occur. 
As mentioned in the previous section, the size and complexity of a system can also 















Figure 3 - 4 System production vulnerabilities. 
e Inserted vulnerability (Art(fice insertion) 
CHAPTER 3 
Once the system is operational, attackers may exploit existing vulnerabilities in order to 
insert further flaws into hardware, software, data or communications components. This 
inse1tion may be perpetrated by a programmed attacker (for instance, a worm or viral 
attacker), or a .human attacker (for instance, an administrator making subversive 
changes to system data). 
• Maintenance Errors 
Normal system maintenance can lead to a possible increase in technical vulnerability. [f 
maintenance activity involves writing new code, or changing existing code, then 
implementation errors may be introduced. On the other hand, if maintenance involves 
reconfiguring hardware or software components, there is an increased risk of 
incompatible usage or configurational vulnerabilities being introduced. 
Other types of vulnerability may be introduced during maintenance activity. For 
example, system documentation could become outdated, or an attacker could take 
advantage of lapses in normal production security, and be able to insert vulnerability 
artifices. 
e Configurational Errors 
Configurational errors occur when the existing safeguards are incorrectly or 
incompletely set up. Configurational vulnerability is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
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3.4 CONFIGURATIONAL VULNERABILITY 
Most modern system safeguards, when used correctly, offer reasonably strong security. 
However, when those same controls are incorrectly used, or are not used at all, 
vulnerabilities will occur regardless of the strength of underlying mechanisms. 
Alternatively, the controls themselves may be flawed, but those flaws may have 
acknowledged and readily available safeguards. 
From these facts, a definition of technical configuration vulnerability can be derived: 
Configurational vulnerability is a technical system weakness brought about by 
the incorrect or incomplete application of existing system control mechanisms, 
or due to known, but unremedied, flaws in those technical controls. 
Flaws in configuration can account for a large percentage of the typical vulnerabilities 
exploited by attackers (numerous examples can be found in Stoll [75], [ 19], and Garfinkle 
et a/. [26], amongst others). This type of vulnerability includes errors in the configuration 
of hardware devices, system services, user accounts, file system permissions, and network 
subsystems. 
The presence of configurational vulnerability is influenced by most of the general factors 
discussed in section 3.2, and many of the lifecycle factors described in section 3.3. Vendor 
supplied defaults are also a rich source of configurational vulnerability. Farmer and 
Spafford [23] comment that: 
.. . Even machines that have come straight from the vendor are not immune 
from [procedural] security problems. Critical Jiles and directories are often 
left world-writable, and configuration files are shipped so that any other 
machine hooked up to the same network can compromise the system. 
As an example of configurational vulnerability, consider the following potential login 
mechanism vulnerabilities: 
• The mechanism is turned off. 
• The system has several non-disabled default account/password combinations. 
• Some user accounts do not have passwords, or have weak passwords. 
• The system supports encryption of passwords transmitted across networks, but these 
features are disabled. 
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• The login mechanism has a known bug that bypasses the authentication process when 
certain keystroke combinations are encountered. 
Configurational vulnerabilities are a central theme of this thesis. Tools for assessing the 
presence of these flaws are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has looked at the notion of technical vulnerability in some detail. General 
factors influencing the level of technical vulnerabilities within a system were described, 
followed by an analysis of how technical vulnerabilities may be introduced at various stages 
of a system's lifecycle. Appendix A examines some general methods that are used to locate 
vulnerabilities within systems, while the next chapter introduces automated tools for 
detecting the presence of configurational vulnerabilities. 
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This chapter introduces the concept of automated configurational auditing. 
The objectives of a configurational audit are discussed, followed by an 
examination of some specific policy issues that affect the deployment, use and 
implementation of configurational audit tools. Some potential hazards of 
configurational audit tool analysis are also discussed. 
4.1 CONFIGURATIONAL AUDIT 
A configurational audit is an exercise that is undertaken m an attempt to locate 
configurational vulnerability. Due to the size and complexity of many systems, various 
tools have appeared in the last few years that help to automatically search systems for these 
weaknesses. This part of the thesis discusses configurational audit tools in more detail, and 
is divided into three chapters as follows: 
Chapter 4 Focuses on objectives, policies and hazards of configurational audit tools, 
Chapter 5 Discusses how configurational audit tools are implemented, and 






Automated Vulnerablility Analysis 
Figure 4 - I Configurational Audit objectives 
TOOL OBJECTIVES 
There are three main objectives that automated configurational audit tools may strive to 
attain. These objectives are summarised in Figure 4 - 1, and are discussed below. 
• Locate known vulnerabilities 
The most common configurational audit objective is to locate known vulnerabilities. 
These vulnerabilities may consist of weaknesses in the configuration of otherwise 
secure safeguards, non-use of safeguards, or installed but flawed safeguards. Audit 
tools can additionally help to detect vulnerabilities that have been inserted into the 
system during a system attack. 
• Enforce standards 
Configurational audit tools may check system conformance to organisational security 
standards dictating accepted levels of security. "Accepted" standards often vmy 
between organisations and individual sites; for instance, academic sites have different 
security requirements when compared to military or commercial sites. 
Configurational audit tools, in conjunction with appropriate security policies, could be 
used as a device to assist the certification and accreditation of operational systems. 
Such tools can also be used to assess systems before they are used to process sensitive 
information, or before they are allowed to connect to potentially hostile networks. 
• Detect security relevant system changes 
A third possible goal of configurational audit tools is to assess the integrity of vital 
system objects, by detecting changes in object security state. Some security problems, 
such as viruses, worms, or other types of inserted or programmed vulnerability, may be 
detected as a change in the state of some system object (such as a binary system file). 
Alternatively, changes in the state of other system objects, such as a sudden elevation of 
privilege for a previously unprivileged user, may also indicate that a successful attack 
has occurred. 
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4.2 POLICY ISSUES 
Before configurational analysis tools are deployed within an organisation, some basic policy 
decisions must first be addressed. While configurational audit tools are quite often suitable 
for ad-hoc use, regular and systematic audits require planning and forethought. Some 
specific policy decisions are discussed in this section, including: 
• Which personnel are involved in configurational audits. 
• When tests should be carried out. 
• The scope of configurational audit. 
• The depth of system testing. 
• What to do about detected vulnerabilities. 
WHO TO INVOLVE 
There is a need for clear policy guidelines regarding which personnel are responsible for the 
various operational aspects of configurational audit tools. Personnel factors that should be 
addressed are: 
• Who is responsible for installing and configuring tools. 
• Who is responsible for scheduling and running tool analysis sessions. 
• Who is responsible for interpreting results and actioning changes required as a result 
of tool analysis sessions. 
The answers to these questions will depend ve1y much on individual site security 
requirements. In some organisations, all three of these functions will be performed by the 
system administrator. In others, an independent auditor may be responsible for instigating 
and performing configurational audits. 
WHEN TO TEST 
In order to provide effective coverage, configurational audit tools should be used on a 
regular basis. On most systems, the mix of system objects such as users, files and devices is 
constantly changing. As a result, access controls that protect those objects may not keep 
pace with this process of ongoing change. 
Audits periodically test those controls to ensure that adequate security is being maintained. 
Depending on the site, monthly checks may suffice. However, at sites where many 
configurational changes occur, weekly or even daily checks may be necessary. 
Audits should be carried out when the system is first installed, to counter the possibility of 




After a change in 
security policy. 
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Reason(s) 
A change in site security policy may mean that existing system controls are 
no longer adequate. Configurational audits assist detecting system objects 
that do not comply with the new policy. 
····································· ······················································· ············································· ·················· 
After major security 
state changes 
After an attack has 
occurred. 
Major alterations in the state of system security may occur because of 
additions, deletions, or changes to system components such as: files, users, 
groups, applications, operating system binaries, network services, hardware 
devices, and authentication systems. 
After these changes, checks may be required to ensure that the system is at 
least as secure as before the change occurred. 
The security state of a machine is always uncertain immediately following 
an attack. Doubts may exist about what (if any) changes have been made to 
system controls. This is especially true if attackers acquired privileged 
accounts during the attack. 
A configurational audit will help assess where possible subversive changes 
have been made to the system by the attacker. Change detection systems 
may help locate binary, configuration, or data files that have been altered 
during the attack. 
-----·-----·----------·----
Table 4- 1 When to perform an "unscheduled" configurational audit (from [55, 5.1]). 
analysis exercise (to assess the level of system vulnerability). There are three other 
extraordinary situations, summarised in Table 4 - l, which may warrant additional 
configurational security checks. 
TESTING SCOPE 
The scope of configurational audit activity needs to be considered as a policy issue. For 
example, if audits encompass factors external to the technical control environment (such as 
assessing physical workstation security), then additional manual information gathering 
methods will need to be devised. In this case, checklists may be used to record whether 
workstation locations are physically secure when authorised personnel are not present [55, 
5.1]. 
The scope and extent of testing within the technical arena should also be considered. For 
instance, policy should determine if isolated components of the system (such as user 
configuration files, or system binaries) are assessed, or alternatively if the vulnerability of 
the entire system is considered instead. This decision may again depend on individual site 
requirements. 
TESTING DEPTH 
Some systems may be more critical to organisational business continuance or security than 
others. Consequently, these systems sometimes require a greater depth of analysis than less 
"important" systems. 
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For example, systems that monitor or protect organisational computer security from 
external (network) based threats, such as firewall machines 1, require a greater depth of 
checking than other "non-critical" systems inside the organisational network perimeter. 
Since the integrity of the internal network is linked to the integrity of the firewall, the 
firewall system is an excellent candidate for deeper checking than "normal" machines inside 
the network. 
MANAGING DISCOVERED VULNERABILITY 
Once the configurational audit process has discovered a vulnerability within a system, the 
question of what to do with this information is posed. Two strategies for dealing with 
detected configurational vulnerabilities are available: 
• Ignore the vulnerability and manage the associated risk. 
The configurational auditor may decide that the discovered flaw does not present 
enough of a risk to the system to warrant attention, and that the probability of an 
exploitation of the flaw, or the impact of a successful attack, is minimal. 
Alternatively, the vulnerability may be an unavoidable side effect of a particular security 
setup. For example, users requiring access to files while using a particular application 
on a LAN may also have access to those same files while not running the application. 
While this situation may not be desirable, the security mechanisms of the system may 
not support any other alternative. 
~ Act upon vulnerability information. 
In other cases, the auditor may decide that the discovered vulnerability is serious 
enough to warrant immediate attention. Of special interest are vulnerabilities that when 
exploited could compromise the entire system, or where the impact of the exploitation 
is unacceptable. 
Some configurational audit tools may offer active repair features. Decisions regarding how 
these features are applied may also need to be made as a matter of policy. This is discussed 
further in Active vs. passive tools on Page 59. Assessing the magnitude of a vulnerability 
may be of some assistance in deciding how that vulnerability should be addressed. 
Vulnerability magnitude is discussed in Reporting policies on Page 62. 
1 A firewall system is a machine that protects internal networks from external threats, such as hackers and 
worms. Firewalls may implement policy regarding which external sites are allowed to access internal 
machines and vice-versa. In addition, firewall systems may disallow certain types of incoming connections, 
such as ftp or telnet services. 
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4.3 POTENTIAL TOOL HAZARDS 
Configurational audit tools are not without hazard. Two mam problems should be 
considered by tool developers and users: tool misuse, and tool subversion. These issues are 
discussed in this section. 
TOOL MISUSE 
There is a possibility that configurational audit tools may be used by an attacker to 
compromise the systems they were designed to assess. Running such a tool may reveal to a 
skilled attacker a multitude of potential attack avenues. 
Tools distributed in source form could also be modified by attackers for their own 
purposes. For example, an active checker may initially only check for the presence of a 
Unix system access vulnerability. An attacker may modify such a tool so that if it notices 
that the flaw is present, it automatically takes advantage of the weakness, and retrieves the 
system password file. This type of attack is possible with the ISS [37] tool. 
Tool misuse problems can be managed in four main ways: 
s Ignore the problem. 
The most simple approach to the problem of tool misuse is to ignore it. In this case, a 
conscious (or unconscious) decision is made that the risks of configurational audit tools 
being exploited by attackers to streamline the attack process are acceptable. This 
decision may be mitigated somewhat if the tool presents little risk to security. For 
instance, change detection tools are unlikely to be used during attacks, and hence 
making them publicly available presents little risk. 
• Provide as little information about vulnerabilities as possible. 
The second approach is to assume that the tool will fall into the hands of potential 
attackers. In this case, a damage control exercise is undertaken to ensure that potential 
attackers are not able to use the tool to learn of vulnerabilities of which they were not 
already aware. Instead of providing a comprehensive explanation of the vulnerabilities 
that have been found, such a tool gives terse messages explaining simply that a 
particular vulnerability exists in the system. From that starting point, it is up to the user 
of the tool to determine the nature and seriousness of the vulnerability. 
The problem with this "closed lips" approach is that attackers often have a better idea 
of system vulnerabilities than do system administrators. The administrator is placed at a 
disadvantage because he knows that a vulnerability exists, but is not sure how serious 
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that vulnerability is. Thus, the administrator is placed in a position where he or she 
does not know how urgently a flaw needs to be fixed, or even how to go about fixing it. 
The attacker, on the other hand, may have prior knowledge of the detected 
vulnerability, and may be able to inunediately exploit it. Alternatively, the attacker may 
have more time and resources than the system administrator to assess the potential 
exploitability of the vulnerability. 
• Secure the tool itself. 
The tool itself may implement safeguards against possible nususe. For example, a 
configurational audit tool may only allow itself to be executed by a privileged user, such 
as the system administrator or auditor. 
This measure may not be feasible where the tool is distributed in source code or script 
form, as such access controls may be removed by an attacker. Additionally, attackers 
may use the source code to learn about system vulnerabilities. 
Securing the tool itself also t'irnits its use by non-privileged users. For example, a site 
may want to actively encourage users employ such tools to check the security of their 
personal configuration. Limiting the tool so that only privileged users are able to use it 
may preclude this approach. 
• Secure the distribution of tools 
The last approach to the problem of tool misuse is to secure the distribution process. 
This is generally achieved by distributing tools only to trusted parties, and carefully 
tracking copies of the tool to ensure that only authorised parties receive it. 
As with all distribution arrangements, this method is only as secure as the people who 
take part. There is always the danger that if one copy of the tool "escapes" the secure 
distribution process into the hands of a malicious user, then that tool will quickly be 
promulgated throughout the computing underground. This may occur if one of the 
trusted parties on the distribution list is less than trustworthy, or if an attacker steals the 
tool from an unsecured site. 
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Safe FfP site Target FfP site 
Figure 4 - 2 Tool Subversion attack scenario. 
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TOOL SUBVERSION 
Where configurational analysis tools 
are publicly distributed, a risk exists 
that the tool may be subverted by an 
attacker. In an example scenario, 
shown in Figure 4 - 2, an attacker 
acquires a "clean" version of the 
tool from public archives, and inserts 
a Trojan horse, trap door or virus 
payload. The attacker then takes 
measures to obscure this addition, 
and redistributes the modified tool (perhaps at a different site). The victim subsequently 
downloads the tool from the target site and runs it, whereupon the subverted tool performs 
its attack with the victim's privileges. 
This approach may prove inordinately successful for the attacker, since configurational 
audit tools are often run with elevated system privileges. In addition, installations may not 
have good site polices regarding installation of publicly acquired utilities, and may not 
check the tool for programmed threats before it is run. Three guidelines may reduce the 
risk of these attacks. 
• Acquire configurational audit tools from trusted sources. 
Configurational audit tools (or indeed any publicly available tools) should only be 
acquired from trusted sources. For example, COPS is available on many ftp servers 
around the Internet. However, the best place to acquire it is from a ftp site that is 
known to be safe, such as cert. org (the Computer Emergency Response Team site). 
Where possible, tools should be distributed with secure methods. For example, public 
key/private key authentication and encryption schemes could be used to reduce the risk 
of subversion. Digital signatures are now a common form of authenticating publically 
distributed files, and so where possible, these should be used during tool distribution. 
• If possible, check the source before running the tool. 
Where the tool is distributed as a binary only, this measure is not available. However, 
where the tool is distributed in source form, installers of the software should take the 
time to become familiar with the components that comprise the tool. 
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• Where possible, do not run configurational audit tools with elevated privileges. 
Very few configurational audit tools need to run with super-user privileges, and hence 
this is a practice that should be avoided wherever possible. Possible exceptions may be 
where the tool requires complete access to the file system (such as during file-system 
searches). 
4 .. 4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced configurational audit tools. Three tool objectives were 
identified: locate known vulnerabilities, enforce security standards, and detect security 
relevant changes. Policy issues surrounding the operational use of configurational audit 
tools were introduced, and some potential hazards of such tools were discussed. The next 
chapter delves further into configurational audit tool design and implementation issues. 
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AN OVERViEW OF 
CONFIGURATI()NAL AUDIT 
TECHNIQUES 
This chapter examines configurational audit tool design philosophies and 
describes some of the implementation techniques commonly used by publicly 
available tools. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in previous chapters, configurational audit consists of analysing operational 
systems for known or recognisable flaws in existing technical controls. The techniques 
used to detect these configurational vulnerabilities usually consist of relatively straight-
forward tests. However, some underlying design philosophies influence the final form of 
tools, and the checks they perform. This chapter first explores those philosophies, and then 
considers a number of implementation techniques that are commonly employed by 
configurational audit tools. 1 
5a2 PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES 
The philosophical approach a configurational audit tool adopts in detecting vulnerabilities 
tends to have a major impact on the implementation and usage of the tool. General 
approach issues are described in this section, and include: 
• Security areas to check. • Depth of analysis. 
• General or platform or system specific checks. • Distribution of testing. 
• Passive or active testing. • Reporting policies 
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Typical Checks Performed 
• Assess strength of user account passwords. 
• Check general file system permissions (especially those 
protecting system configuration files and binaries). 
• Ensure network service authentication mechanisms are in place 
and correctly configured. Ensure that trusted systems really can 
be trusted. 
• Ensure user configuration files are protected against unwanted 
modifications. 
• Check contents of user configuration files for insecure settings 
(i.e. insecure PATH statements, risky default file permission 
masks, untrusted network hosts in .rhosts files, etc.). 
• Assess access permissions on user-owned files. 
• Check that appropriate file system protections are effective for 
application and system binaries, and that only authorised users 
can access sensitive system data. 
• Detect unanticipated changes to system binaries. 
• Search for questionable file system objects, such as hidden files 
or directories, objects with strange names, and security relevant 
files (such as Unix SUID scripts). 
• Assess configuration files for system services (especially those 
that run at elevated privileges) for appropriate settings. 
• Ensure that configuration files are protected from unauthorised 
modifications. 
• Check that latest bug free system binaries are installed. Check 
for presence of binaries with known flaws. 
Network services • Ensure network accessible public areas of the file system have 




• Ensure that only authorised clients can connect to network 
services. 
• Check that debug mode type vulnerabilities are removed. 
• Ensure log files are protected from unauthorised modification. 
• Check that logging programs are active. 
• Ensure application installation programs do not select vulnerable 
defaults. 
• Check file access permissions of applications. Check "out-of-
application user access". 
• Check ability of captive applications to "shell" out to operating 
system. 
Table 5-1 Summary of candidate check areas for configurational audit tools, and some 
typical checks petformed in each area. 
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CANDIDATE CHECK AREAS 
Configurational audit tools check a variety of system areas. Some tools are more 
specialised than others, and may only check a single isolated vulnerability area, while others 
may check for a range of diverse vulnerabilities. The general areas that are checked by 
automated configurational audit tools, and the types of checks that are performed in each 
area, are summarised in Table 5- 1 on page 58. 
Depending on the target platform, there may be substantial crossovers between checking 
categories. For example, some file objects, such as configuration files, require both 
protection from unauthorised modification, as well as a check of the file contents to ensure 
the settings they specify are secure. 2 
GENERAL OR PLATFORM SPECIFIC 
A configurational audit package may be implemented with a specific target platform m 
mind (i.e. a brand and version of the Unix operating system), or it could be designed to 
work with a wide range of platforms (i.e. any version of Unix). Tools that are designed to 
analyse a specific platform are generally able to perform more comprehensive checking for 
vulnerabilities that are peculiar to that particular system. Unfortunately, such tools are 
potentially difficult to port to other platforms, due to system specific nature of the tests 
performed. 
A workable compromise (adopted by both COPS [23] and TAMU [65]) is to base the tool 
around core generic tests, and then build in support for system specific tests. For instance, 
T AMU tests for generic Unix configurational vulnerabilities, but has additional system-
centric testing modules which test for specific vendor/version flaws in system binaries. 
ACTIVE VS. PASSIVE TOOLS 
As noted by Polk [55], configurational audit tools can adopt either a passive or active 
approach to system testing. Passive configurational audit tools (also called static audit 
tools) are those which make no changes whatsoever to the security state of the system. By 
examining the configuration of the target machine, passive tools attempt to infer the 
presence of configurational vulnerabilities [55, 3.1]. Furthermore, passive tools do not 
attempt to remedy those flaws that are detected. 
2 As an example of this, Unix's /etc/hosts.equiv tile requires protection from unauthorised 
modification, as well as a check of its contents to ensure that no unauthorised hosts are trusted by the tested 
machine. 
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Conversely, active tools test for the presence of system vulnerabilities by attempting to 
exploit them from an attacker's viewpoint. For example, an active checking tool may test 
for access control weaknesses by attempting to log into the system using standard user 
accounts and guessed passwords. Tools that reconfigure the system in order to reduce 
vulnerability can also be classified as active tools, since such changes alter the security state 
of the system. 
Active tools are potentially more dangerous than passive tools, as there is a chance they 
could be used by a real attacker to streamline the process of circumventing system controls. 
On the other hand, certain vulnerabilities may not be easily detectable without active 
testing. 3 Active tools may also be more system specific than passive tools, relying (for 
instance) on the presence of specific system version bugs. 
ANALYSIS DEPTH 
The cumulative effects of multiple vulnerabilities are sometimes an important 
configurational audit factor. Often, isolated system vulnerabilities do not present a large 
individual risk. However, when the effects of a number of these weaknesses are combined 
and then taken into consideration, the overall impact and hence level of risk may be much 
greater [55, 3.2]. Configurational audit packages can therefore be divided into those that 
check for single vulnerabilities, and those that check for multiple vulnerabilities. 4 
For example, a Novell NetWare file server allows users to log in as GUEST. This account 
is unprivileged, and given its limited access, does not represent much risk. However, on 
this same system, the SUPERVISOR account has an unprotected LOGIN script. An 
attacker using the GUEST account can insert commands in this script, which are executed 
when the SUPERVISOR next logs in to the server. These commands will grant 
SUPERVISOR privileges to the GUEST account. Hence, the combined effect of these two 
vulnerabilities is that an unknown attacker can gain total access to the file server. 
Single vulnerability checking is straightforward to achieve, and usually consists of 
individual checks for particular vulnerabilities. Multiple vulnerability checks, on the 
contrary, tend to be more complex to implement. Tool implementors need to model the 
implications of combinations of individual vulnerabilities, and how these cumulative effects 
might lead to greater overall levels of system vulnerability. This is an ideal candidate for 
3 For example, checking for NetWare user accounts for NULL passwords is most easily accomplished by 
attempting to directly verify the password on file server on which that account resides. 
~Polk refers to these as single and system vulnerabilities [55]. 
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mtificial intelligence techniques, such as expert systems. The COPS package includes an 
expert system multiple vulnerability checker, called Kuang. 5 
DISTRIBUTED TESTING 
Configurational audits may take place over a network of connected computer systems. 
Tool implementors may choose to approach the issue of testing from a network oriented 
viewpoint, or from an isolated individual system viewpoint. Networked systems have 
different requirements in terms of vulnerability checking, which are outlined below: 
• More points of vulnerability 
In a distributed system, there are more points of vulnerability to address. For example, 
as a file traverses a wide area network, it may be processed by four or five computer 
systems along the way. Each one contains potential vulnerabilities that may affect 
whether that file reaches its destination unaltered (or at all). 
• Trust relationships may be operative 
Configurational audit packages need to check that trust relationships between 
networked systems are acceptable. Trust relationships are conunon in Unix networks, 
and allow systems to share information and processing with a conveniently low level of 
authentication. 
The implications of trust are important for configurational audit tools. An analysis may 
be carried out of a system that provides access to another system via a trust 
relationship. Even though the analysis may reveal no vulnerabilities within the tested 
system, vulnerabilities may still occur because of security flaws in the trusted partner. 
In order to prevent these vulnerabilities, the tool needs to recognise such relationships, 
and recommend testing of the trusted partner on a concurrent basis. 
• More chance of external attacks. 
The connection of organisational computer systems may mcrease the population of 
potential external (non-organisational) attackers. Machines that are accessible from 
public networks may require especially stringent testing of network access controls and 
servtces. 
One possible advantage of networked configurational auditing is that computationally 
intensive processing can sometimes be distributed among networked systems. For instance, 
5 Kuang is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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the crack password cracker can be run concurrently on a number of hosts, effectively 
reducing the amount of time it takes to crack password files (see Muffett [42]). 
REPORTING POLICIES 
Configurational audit tools need to address the type and level of reporting that the system 
will support. Three issues are important: 
• Level of explanation 
Existing configurational audit tools differ in their approach to how much explanation 
the package should provide about vulnerabilities that have been located within a system. 
The package may provide a complete explanation of the vulnerability, including how to 
remedy it, or it may simply mention that a vulnerability exists. As discussed in Tool 
Misuse on page 52, terse strategies tend to favour potential attackers, rather than those 
responsible for system security. 
• Vulnerability magnitude 
Providing information about the seriousness of a discovered vulnerability is a very 
useful feature. Such guidelines help ·administrators or auditors filter tool output, and 
assist prioritising flaw safeguarding activity. 
o Fix or warn 
Some configurational audit tools may provide an automated fix feature. For example, 
the A TP change detection tool (mentioned in [34, p. 9]), incorporates a feature called 
action lists. On detecting a problem file, these can automatically change its ownership 
to root, thus preventing normal system users from accessing the file. 
As noted in [34], such active systems are not without risk. For example, the system 
may make mistakes that could disable the system, or could accidentally "fix" something 
that does not require fixing. 
LANGUAGE CONSIDERATIONS 
Most configurational vulnerability checks consist of relatively simple tests, which are often 
able to be implemented with system command scripts (such as Unix shell scripts or DOS 
batch files). In order to improve performance, or to gain access to information not 
available to shell scripts or batch files, some configurational audit tools may be partially 
implemented in a higher level language, such as C, C++, Rexx, Prolog, or Perl. At the 
most extreme end of the scale, some configurational audit tools are implemented entirely in 
high level languages. 
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Command scripts tend to be more accessible to the average system administrator, and lend 
themselves to easy modification, expansion, and portability. Conversely, tools written in 
languages such as C are harder to understand and modify, but offer vastly improved 
performance, and are able to accommodate more complex computations. 
Selecting a suitable language for configurational audit tool components depends largely on 
four issues: 
• Target environment. 
Some environments, such as Unix, store all security configuration information within 
human-readable text files. Provided these files are accessible, a large amount of tool 
analysis may be performed by scripts using relatively simple text processing utilities, 
such as Unix's awk, grep and sort. Some security information may be additionally 
available from system commands. In other environments, such as Novell NetWare, 
some security relevant information is only available via calls to system API' s. Hence, 
such information is only accessible from within applications (such as SYSCON), or 
courtesy of specially written '"helper" applets.6 
@ Tool pe!formance orjimctionality considerations 
Some checks performed by configurational audit tools, such as generating file 
signatures or cracking passwords, are computationally intensive. Both tasks require 
levels of performance (or complexity) not well handled by shell script languages. The 
type of check performed by the tool may also influence the selection of language. For 
instance, expert system components may be implemented in a language such as Prolog. 
lll Presentation requirements 
There may be a requirement for presenting security information or analysis reports in a 
graphical format. Graphical user interfaces are generally inaccessible to command line 
scripting languages. One possible approach is to write a graphical front end that drives 
the underlying scripts and programs that perform the data gathering and vulnerability 
tests. 
• Distribution requirements. 
Where a tool contains confidential or proprietary code, the only option available to the 
developer may be a compiled language, such as C. 
6 Helper applets are small applications that gather system information via standard API's, and then output 
this to a text file in a format able to be processed by other applications. 
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Figure 5- 1 Configurational analysis implementation technique overview. 
In practice most tools will use a combination of approaches, where whatever programming 
language is best suited for a particular task is selected. For example, COPS [23] contains 
components written in C, shell scripts, and PERL. 
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES 
The various implementation techniques used by configurational audit tools are summarised 
in Figure 5 - 1 above. These are discussed in more detail in this section. 
ASSESSING CONFIGURATION FILE OBJECTS 
Configurational files are used by systems to control core system servtces, user 
environments, network services, applications, and system startup behaviour. Weaknesses 
contained within these files, or of the safeguards protecting those files, may lead to 
vulnerabilities that are able to be exploited by an attacker. Both COPS and T AMU support 
configuration file checks. 
There are two varieties of configuration file object: configuration files, and configuration 
scripts. Configuration files contain setup information for a system service or application, 
while configuration scripts contain system commands, and are run when system services are 
initialised (such as at boot time). Configurational files and scripts are attractive targets for 
attackers, because scripts are often run at elevated (system or root) privileges, while files 
may contain settings that enforce security for system services. 
A configurational audit tool is concerned with three main configuration file issues: 
• Unprotected files 
Some configuration files may contain information that is sensitive, or which if 
compromised, could by used by attackers. For example, the AUTOEXEC.NCF file 
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used during booting of a NetWare file server may specify a password on the command 
line used to invoke the remote console utility. By obtaining this password, attackers 
may be able to remotely compromise the security of the server console. Configuration 
files of this nature should be protected against inadvertent disclosure.7 
Configuration files that are subject to unauthorised modifications present an even 
greater risk. For example, a Unix attacker who is able add entries to another user's 
. rhosts file will quickly be able to compromise that user's account. 
s Unprotected referenced Jiles 
Configuration files that depend 
on or invoke other files that 
may be subverted by attackers 
present the second source of 
configuration file vulnerability. 
Figure 5 - 2 shows a scenario 
in which a privileged 
configuration script calls three 
sub-commands: B, C and D. B 
Invoke C 
InvokeD 






Figure 5-2 Sample configurationjile 
interdependencies. 
in turn calls E and F. As can be seen from the diagram, configuration file E is not 
appropriately protected, and (in this example) has been modified by an attacker to insert 
a trap-door in the login binary. When the top level configuration file is executed, the 
attacker's additions to E will be executed at whatever level of privilege the top level 
script was invoked with. 
Configuration file interdependencies such as these are very difficult to detect without 
some form of automated tool that recurses such file dependency structures. 
• Configuration file contents 
While the two concerns above deal with the protection of file objects that contain 
configuration information, settings specified within file itself may also be a source of 
vulnerability. 
Under Unix, for example, most system services are configured vra commands or 
settings contained in standard text files. Incorrect settings in those files may cause 
7 An even better approach is to avoid placing passwords in configuration scripts or files. However, this 
may impede automated boot sequences. 
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configurational errors. For many years SunOS Unix machines were installed with a 
default+ + entry in the equi v. hosts configuration file. This entry allows any user 
on any machine to bypass authentication mechanisms during remote logins. 
A configurational audit tool can check to ensure that such defaults and weak settings 
are not present in the configuration of the machine. Settings files checked could include 
system services, network services, application resource files and user login files. 
Detecting unprotected file and referenced file vulnerabilities is a relatively straightforward 
process. Usually, such checks will involve a simple test of the access permissions of top-
level configuration scripts, and a recursive check of the files that these scripts reference (if 
any). This is a general process that can be applied where necessary to any configuration 
file. 
Assessing the implications of settings within configuration files is a more challenging 
problem. There are a vast range of configuration files on a standard Unix machine, and 
each one may control a different system. component. In addition, different platforms will 
have various configuration file peculiarities. 
In order to assess the security implied by these files, the configurational audit tool requires 
specific information about which settings in which files can affect system vulnerability. 
PASSWORD ANALYSIS 
Weak password choices on the part of system users are a common problem at many sites. 
Users may select passwords that are some permutation of their login name, their family 
name, the name of their cat or spouse, or a word that is available in any one of hundreds of 
on-line dictionaries. Such passwords may be either easily guessed by an attacker, or may 
be guessed with the help of a password cracking program. 
Factors such as: password length, frequency of change, the locatability of passwords in 
common dictionaries, and where passwords are stored, can all have an impact on the 
configurational security of the system. These factors are good candidate checks for a 
configurational audit tool. [55, 2.2.1]. 
Several password cracking programs exist, the most commonly available being Crack, by 
Alec Muffet [42]. Crack works by using words from standard dictionaries, as well as lists 
of commonly used non-dictionary passwords, to generate password guesses for each user 
account. The password guess is encrypted using the same method used to encrypt system 
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passwords, and the encrypted value is compared to the value stored on the system. If a 
match is found, then the guess was correct, and the password for that account 
compromised. Crack is perhaps one of the most sophisticated password checkers 
available, as it can generate an almost unlimited number of permutations of each password 
guess. Additionally, crack is able to distribute processing around a number of hosts on a 
network. 
Password cracking is a useful addition to configurational audit, especially considering most 
attackers will already possess such a tool. 8 
FILE SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
Discrepancies and errors in the configuration of file system access controls may lead to 
inadvertent modification or disclosure of information stored on the system. File system 
analysis may consist of two types of check: 
• Corrupt or suspicious file checks 
This check is performed by searching system and user areas of the file system in search 
of files and directories that may indicate that there are file integrity problems, or that an 
attacker has been active on the system. 
For example, the tool may check to ensure that configuration, binary and log files have 
not been corrupted. Alternatively, the tool may search for files and directories that 
have been intentionally hidden (such as a" ... " directory in Unix), or files that represent 
security hazards (such as a SUID root copy of the csh command shell). 
• Access control check 
Access control checks examine vital system and user directories to ensure that no 
unauthorised users are able to make changes to files within those directories. For 
example, checks may ensure that system binary files are only updateable by system staff. 
Tests may be expanded to include access control checks for application binaries, and a 
general check of user access and rights within the file system. 
Both COPS and T AMU include these checks as part of the system. 
8 Other approaches are not precluded by the use of password crackers. For instance, password changing 
programs that reject weak password selections are one option, as are shadowed password files, a feature 
available on some versions of Unix which hides password information away from unauthorised users. 
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CHANGE DETECTION 
A useful configurational audit technique is change detection. The reasoning behind 
adopting a change detection approach is relatively simple - many introduced vulnerabilities 
in systems manifest themselves as unexpected changes in system objects. Comparing a 
previously stored "snapshot" of a secure system to the current configuration, and checking 
the results of this comparison for unexpected changes, may indicate the presence of an 
intruder, a virus, or some other inserted vulnerability. Change detection systems can also 
detect when objects are added or removed from the system. 
An added advantage of change detection techniques is that after a system has been 
attacked, system administrators can determine which (if any) files were affected by the 
attack. In these cases, only those files need to be restored from backup media. In contrast, 
without change detection tools, the system administrator can no longer trust any system 
files, and is forced to restore the entire system from backup media. 
In order to be effective, change detection systems should be used and maintained on a 
regular basis. The Tripwire [34] package is based on change detection techniques, while 
COPS supports rudimentary change detection. 
Selecting signature algorithms 
A major step in implementing a change detection system is selecting a suitable method 
whereby changes may be detected. As noted by [34, 2.4.1] two approaches are feasible: 
• Compare the current object with a "known" saved copy. 
With this approach, a complete copy of the object to be compared is stored (preferably 
on removable or read-only media). During checking, a byte by byte comparison can be 
performed between the current version and the saved version. 
The main advantage of this technique is that if changes are detected, the auditor can 
determine exactly what the changes were by comparing the original and changed 
versions. The main drawback is the space that is required to store the saved 
information, which could potentially double storage requirements if entire file systems 
are tracked. 
Nevertheless, this may be an appropriate method if the amount of information that is to 
be tracked is small. For example, tracking user account configuration changes is 
possible using this method. 
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• Generate an object signature. 
For large system objects, such as binary files, a much more sensible approach is to 
record a "signature" of the original file, which is compared to the current signature. 
The advantage of this approach is that space requirements are minimised. The 
disadvantages are that if the signature is not secure enough, this approach may be 
spoofed. Additionally, this method can only detect that a change has occurred, and not 
the nature of the change. However, where space is at a premium, and large system 
objects are being tracked, this is usually the best approach 
The simplest form of signatures available are checksum algorithms. As an example, an 
algorithm could add the numeric value of bytes contained in the file, and then take some 
function (for instance modulo 256) to produce a single byte signature. 
Unfortunately, this algorithm is inherently insecure. All an attacker need do is calculate the 
signature before the change, alter the file, then calculate the byte value required to generate 
the same signature. This (brute-force) attack is surprisingly effective, even against more 
sophisticated signature algorithn1s such as CRC' s. For a signature 11 bits long, an average 
of 211 _, attempts will be required to find an appropriate offset value that would generate the 
required signature [34, 2.4.2]. 
Two different objects producing the same signature is known as a collision. Generally, the 
longer the key, and the more effective the signature algorithm, the fewer undesirable 
collisions will occur. Brute force attacks are more effective where the signature algorithms 
produce many collisions (as in the case above). 
Another approach may also be used to spoof the signature algorithm. By reverse-
engineering the signature algorithm, an attacker could create a reversed version of the 
function that could be used to generate an arbitrary file that produces the required signature 
[34, 2.4.2]. As mentioned in [34], CRC functions (often used in file integrity products) are 
not immune to this type of reverse engineering. Obviously, in order for change detection 
systems to provide an acceptable level of assurance, a stronger signature algorithm is 
required. 
Message digest functions are one such approach. These one-way hash functions are 
algorithmically difficult to invert, and produce few collisions. These two features make such 
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functions good choices for authentication signatures. Examples of such functions include 
MD-4, MD-5 and Snefru.9 
Storage and updating strategies 
When designing a change detection system, consideration should be g1ven to what 
information should be saved, how signatures are to be stored, and how such signature 
databases are to be updated. Signature databases need to be generated when the system is 
initially installed, and thereafter whenever authorised changes are made to tracked system 
objects. 
Signature databases may be stored as binary only, or in human readable form. The 
advantage of storing signature databases in human readable text files is that it is possible for 
the administrator to replace or remove individual entries. TripWire, for example, supports 
the use of an independent program to generate a signature, which is then manually placed in 
the signature database file. Binary databases, on the other hand, may offer better 
performance. 
Updating signature databases 
Given a large number of tracked files, generating signatures with computationally intensive 
algorithms such as message digests may take considerable amounts of time. An ideal 
solution is to enable signatures for individual files or sets of files to be generated, rather 
than having to regenerate them for the entire database every time a change is made to a 
subset of tracked system objects. 
As examples of update strategies, TripWire supports updates of specific files, or entire 
directory subtrees. This may occur on an ad-hoc basis, or as an update during a check. On 
the other hand, the crc_check program included with COPS requires that the entire 
database be regenerated when changes occur. 
With respect to the file system, the issue of whether to save directory structures or not is 
also important. In some cases, detecting the addition or removal of directories is just as 
important as detecting where files have been altered. 
9 References and collision comparisons for these algorithms can be found in [34]. 
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Signature database storage 
Storing the signature database in a secure location is also very important. Attackers who 
can modify the database can cover their tracks by surreptitiously updating the signature 
database after making a change. 
Storing signature databases on removable media, such as tape or floppy is a possible 
solution. Unfortunately, this may limit automation of the package, in that those media have 
to be available during checks. Ideally, a copy of the database should be stored on a read-
only media (such as WORM drives or read-only network file systems), so that it may be 
accessed, but not changed [34, p.4 ]. However, updates of signature databases stored on 
read-only media may involve temporarily storing the database in a secure writable location. 
Change detection drawbacks 
Although change detection is a useful technique to include in configurational audit tools, 
several possible drawbacks of using such systems exist, which preclude their exclusive use 
as a tool for detecting configurational vulnerabilities. Bontchev [5] identifies two possible 
problems: 
• Initial system state 
In order for change detection systems to effectively detect unauthorised changes, they 
must be installed on a secure system. If the system is not initially secure, then 
signatures of already compromised system objects will be stored as part of the 
supposedly clean change detection profile. 
• False-positive alerts 
False positive alerts may occur when the change detection system detects an authorised 
change to a tracked system object. For example, legitimate reasons for changes are 
software upgrades, reconfiguration of existing services, or natural changes in access 
rights of tracked users. These create noise which must be filtered out later in the 
reporting process. 
BINARY VERSION CHECK 
System binmy files may contain security bugs and shortcomings that have been addressed 
with vendor supplied updates. Useful additions to configurational audit tools are checks 
that confirm whether such updates have been installed, or alternatively, whether the version 
installed on the system contains known vulnerabilities. 10 Particular attention should be paid 
10 A slight variation on this theme are virus checkers, which examine executable code for recognisable 
virus signatures. 
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to "high risk" binaries, such as login authenticators, encryption utilities, and network 
service programs. 
By their nature, version checks are extremely platform specific. The T AMU system solves 
this problem by supporting a set of comprehensive system specific version checks for a 
variety of platforms. Three approaches to checking system binaries are available 
• Comparing file date stamp information 
This approach compares the creation date and time of the binary file to that of either the 
patched version, or of versions that contain known vulnerabilities. When an obsolete or 
vulnerable version is found, the program alerts the auditor. 
• Comparing file signatures 
The second approach involves comparing the targeted binary file's "signature" to that 
of updated or vulnerable binaries. The signature is an algorithmically generated 
function of the contents of the binary that, depending on the algorithm, is unique for 
most files. Signature algorithms employed include CRC functions, and one-way hash 
functions such as MD-4, MD-5, or Sriefru. 11 This is a more secure approach to that of 
comparing file dates, due to the ease with which these are changed by attackers. 
• Exploiting the vulnerability 
An active checking system may verify the existence of a known system binary flaw by 
attempting to exploit it. This will reveal whether or not the erroneous binary is 
installed, but unfortunately may also lead to unwanted side-effects, or may change the 
state of the system. 
USER CHECKS 
The security of individual user accounts may be of interest to configurational audit tools. 
Given the problems associated with poor user security habits, checking user settings may be 
an important facet of such a tool. Checks could include password strength tests, login and 
resource file checks, as well as other checks examining individual user access rights to file 
system objects, hardware devices, and network services. 
Especially important on Unix systems is checking that user PATH environment variables 
specify system directories before personal, public or the current directories. This helps 
reduce the risk of Trojan and "companion" type programmed attacks. 
11 These signatures were discussed in more detail on page 69. 
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Depending on the target system, these checks may be handled entirely by parsmg the 
contents of user or system configuration files (as is the case for Unix). Alternatively, they 
may consist of checks performed by applications interrogating the system for security 
relevant information (as is the case with NetWare). 
CONFORMANCE TESTS 
While the primary consideration of a configurational audit tool may be to detect 
configurational flaws, another goal (as discussed on page 48) may be to enforce security 
mechanism usage standards according to organisational polices. 
This may be achieved by comparing system objects to some ideal "baseline" or "template" 
object. For example, a template may specify that users in a particular group should not be 
granted access to certain portions of the file system. 
One advantage of conformance testing is that it can be used to customise minimum security 
standards on a site, or organisational, basis. These customisations can be based on 
perceived threats, site environments, or the organisational security policy. 
However, this configurability may also present problems. For instance, if insecurely 
specified, a baseline may not even offer an acceptable minimum level of security. Hence, 
attention to detail is required when assessing baseline requirements. 
EXPERT SYSTEMS 
Configurational audit tools may make use of artificial intelligence techniques in order to 
detect configurational vulnerabilities. Techniques that may be applicable include: 
• Expert systems 
Expert systems may prove to be particularly valuable. For example, the COPS package 
includes the Kuang expert system, which is used to assess account security. Given a 
user name, Kuang is able to assess whether that user account is able to be 
compromised. 
• Neural networks 
Neural networks may be trained to recognise certain configurational patterns that lead 
to vulnerability. The biggest barrier to using neural networks will be that of effectively 
training them to recognise such configurational errors. 
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5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined configurational audit tool design philosophies, as well as several 
specific implementation techniques that are used in such tools. As discussed, a number of 
philosophical issues must be considered before implementation of a tool can begin; these 
issues help shape the final form of the tool, and how it will be applied to systems. 
The majority of tests performed by configurational audit tools consist of relatively simple 
checks. The next chapter reviews a selection of existing tools that implement some of these 
techniques. 
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A SURVEY OF f'()OLS 
This chapter surveys some commonly available configurational audit 
packages. Included in the review are COPS, ISS, TAMU, and Tripwire. 
6.1 COPS 
The COPS (Computerised Oracle and Password) System, developed by Farmer et a/ [22, 
23] in 1989 represents one of the most mature Unix vulnerability checking systems 
currently available. Freely distributed around the Internet since 1989, the pmtability and 
availability of COPS has ensured its proliferation throughout the Unix community.' 
A general-purpose passive secur.ity checker, COPS features checking of the target host's 
system configuration, user account settings, compares system executable file dates to those 
mentioned in CERT advisories, and provides rudimentary file integrity checking. 
THE COPS PHILOSOPHY 
COPS was developed with two overall objectives in mind (Farmer [22]): First, to help 
foster and develop an understanding within the Unix community of the problems associated 
with Unix security, and second, to develop a tool that could be used to inform Unix system 
administrators of vulnerabilities present in their system. Some specific design goals of 
COPS, described in [23], are outlined below. 
• Configurability 
COPS is designed to be easily configured and extended to suit local conditions and 
security needs. Accordingly, much of the functionality of COPS is contained in Unix 
shell scripts. Where necessary, C programs are provided to speed up computationally 
intensive functions, such as password cracking, or to perform complex tasks such as 
determining writability of directories and files. 2 
1 Version 1.04 of COPS was reviewed. 
2 The current distribution of COPS includes PERL versions of the scripts (p-COPS), which are faster, and 
allow for more complex checking than a standard shell script. 
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• No changes 
As a passive tool, COPS makes no changes to the security state of the target system, 
nor does it attempt to repair security vulnerabilities that it finds. This allows most 
COPS components to run at non-privileged levels, reducing the attendant risks of 
subverted versions of COPS being used to attack systems. 
11 No Explanations 
COPS provides no explanations of vulnerabilities found in the target system. This is a 
conscious decision by the COPS designers to reduce the chances of alerting crackers to 
the existence of holes of which they may otherwise be unaware. COPS simply notes 
that the vulnerability is present, and issues a warning. 
11 No cracking assistance 
In order to reduce the risks of COPS being used to attack systems, the designers of the 
package ensured that it would contain no components that be of significant use to an 
attacker. Where possible, COPS uses tools and libraries that pre-exist on the target 
system. 
• Ease of use and comprehension 
A handful of easily understood Unix shell scripts provide much of the functionality of 
COPS. Modifications of these scripts supporting localisation requirements, or 
expanding the range of checks performed by COPS, are relatively straightforward. As 
an added advantage, scripts can be easily scanned for subversive code, and are 
particularly portable. 
Using the shell scripts is also straightforward, as in most cases the default script options 
should prove to be sufficient. The scripts are well documented, and can be called from 
a single 'super-script'. Each script can also be used for stand-alone checks. 
COPS IMPLEMENTATION 
Analytical components of COPS work by parsing system and user configuration files, and 
noting where the contents of those files may lead to security problems. As with many Unix 
programs, COPS is made up of a number of smaller, specialised sub-components that work 
in concert to check the security status of the system. The majority of COPS is implemented 
as shell scripts, although several C programs are included where performance is required. 
COPS components are summarised in Table 6- l on page 77. 
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· Actions Performed 
Performs architecture (or vendor) specific script to determine if any known security bugs 
are present in system executables. COPS uses information from CERT advisories to 
select executables to check. There is no established update strategy to maintain up-to-
date checks. 
cron.chk Checks cron configuration tiles for potential danger. Permissions of the cron files are 
(script) checked, and the contents of those files are parsed for world writable paths. 
·------ ·------~----------·-
dev.chk Check devices mentioned in letclfstab for world writability, and the directory 
(script and C) exports mentioned in I etc I exports for appropriate restrictions. Of particular 
interest are file systems that are exported without restrictions regarding which hosts may 
mount them. 
ftp.chk Assess ftp configuration, with a particular emphasis on the security of the anonymous ftp 
(script) service. Check protection of configuration files, and check for several common 
anonymous ftp configuration errors (such as writable ftp directories). 
is_able.chk Uses the is_able .1st configuration file to assess the world or group writability status 
(script and C) of important system files, directories, and other (user defined) areas of the file system. 
pass.chk 
(script and C) 
Attempts to guess user account passwords. A list of common passwords used for guesses 
are included in the COPS distribution, and standard dictionaries can also be used. This 
program uses an accelerated version of the Unix crypt () function to speed up the 
password cracking process. 
rc.chk This script parses rc. * files in the I etc directory for paths and filenames that are 
(script) world writable. Commands in these files are normally executed when the machine boots. 
root.chk Checks the root account for vulnerability. Checks root startup files for writability, 
(script) writable directories on root's path, non-root . rhost entries and assorted other items. 
............................................................................ . ........ ···············-····-········· ·············································-···-·················· 
suid.chk Searches the file system looking for changes in files with the SUID or SGID bits set. 
(script) Checks for unusual directory or tile names. A list of known SUID programs is kept in 
the COPS directory, and is used to determine when changes occur, which are detected by 
comparing directory listing information. COPS makes no attempt to algorithmically 





Checks that user home directories are not world writable, and that key files contained in 
home directories are not world writable. Files checked include .profile, .login, 
.forward, . rhosts, . emacsrc and . dbxini t . 
Table 6- 1 COPS scripts and programs. 
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**** ftp.chk **** 
Warning! root should be in /etc/ftpusers! 
ftp-Warning! /home/ftp/etc/group and /etc/group are the same! 
ftp-Warning! Incorrect permissions on "ls" in /home/ftp/bin! 
ftp-Warning! Incorrect permissions on "passwd" in /home/ftp/etc! 
ftp-Warning! Incorrect permissions on "group" in /home/ftp/etc! 
Figure 6- 1 Sample outputfrom theftp.chk COPS script. 
Reports produced by the COPS system are stored in a text ftle for perusal by the 
administrator or auditor once the run is complete. Sample output, from the .ftp.chk 
program is shown in Figure 6 - 1. 
The SU-Kaung expert system 
Included in the distribution of COPS is the SU-Kuang expert system. This system, 
described by Baldwin in [3], allows the COPS user to assess whether an account may be 
compromised, given access to a set of accounts or user groups on the target machine. 
SU-Kuang uses a set of rules that model Unix protection mechanisms. Starting with a goal 
(i.e. "compromise the root account"), SU-Kuang checks its knowledgebase for a rule (or a 
set of recursively called sub-goals) which would be sufficient for it to achieve that goal (ie 
re-write I etc /passwd). 
By checking the protection configuration of the target machine, and by using an initial level 
of user access, SU-Kaung can decide if it may apply a rule in order to achieve its goal. If 
the overall goal proves to be attainable, SU-Kaung can provide an explanation of the chain 
of events that could occur to compromise the target account. 
CHANGE DETECTION FEATURES 
COPS includes a component for checking system executables and configuration files for 
changes. The crc.chk script generates a database of file information, which includes 
directory list information and a CRC value based on the contents of each file. Files to 
include in the CRC database are specified in a configuration file in the COPS directory. 
Periodically, the user generates a new database, which is compared to the old CRC 
database by the crc_check program. Changes in the contents, date, or permissions of files 
are flagged for perusal by the system administrator. 
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COPS COMMENT 
Overall, COPS is a comprehensive package that covers a lot of areas. COPS benefits from 
extensive use and peer review within academic and commercial organisations around the 
Internet. Some aspects of COPS warrant further discussion: 
Vulnerability Explanations 
As discussed on page 76, COPS does not provide explanations of vulnerabilities that it 
finds. In contrast, the TAMU system (described in Section 6.3 on page 84 ), is able to 
notarise vulnerabilities detected with an explanation of the nature of the problem. 
The usefulness of such a "security through obscurity" policy as embodied by the COPS 
approach is questionable. In practice, it is often the cracker who is better equipped with 
system specific knowledge about vulnerabilities than the legitimate system administrator. 
The "no explanation" policy may simply serve to keep these administrators in the dark 
about the seriousness (or otherwise) of the vulnerabilities found by COPS. 
It is curious to note that the COPS distribution includes reasonably detailed explanations of 
COPS errors and warnings in a separate file. 
Problem Magnitude 
In COPS, there is no concept of problem "magnitude". When a configurational error is 
detected, it is simply flagged as a warning (see Figure 6 - l ). There is no indication of the 
seriousness or otherwise of a flagged problem. This could make prioritising administrator 
responses to COPS messages a difficult task. 
In addition, where there are a large number of "noise" warnings, it is possible to miss 
serious problems. An additional field for each message reflecting the seriousness of the 
problem would be a useful addition to COPS reports. 
Integrity Checking 
COPS integrity checking (see the crc_check discussion above) suffers from two mam 
problems. First, the choice of a weak check algorithm (a relatively simple CRC function) 
means that a determined attacker can remain undiscovered by ensuring that changes made 
to system files and binaries produce the same signature. As Kim and Spafford note in [34]: 
"... Reversing the CRC function to yield a desired signature is a well-
understood process, and tools to assist a potential intruder are widely 
ava i fable ... " 
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The second problem with the COPS approach to integrity checking (also mentioned in 
[34]) is that it is impossible to regenerate a single database entry without regenerating the 
entire database. For large databases, this could represent a significant amount of time. 
Bug Checking and file tracking 
Some of the checks performed by COPS use untrustworthy means of gathering data. For 
example, bugs.chk uses file timestamps to decide whether patched system binaries have 
been installed. Timestamps are again used to assess whether SUID and SGID files have 
been adjusted. This is an inherently insecure method of checking for patch installations or 
file changes, as timestamps are easily modified by an attacker. 
A better approach is to calculate a file signature from the contents of the file being checked, 
and then compare this (in the case of system binaries) to the known secure version. In the 
case of tracked SUID or SGID files, the comparison should be to a previously saved file 
signature. Algorithmic signatures were discussed in Change Detection in the previous 
chapter 
6.2 ISS (INTERNET SECURITY SCANNER) 
ISS is one of the few active vulnerability testing systems presently available. Developed by 
Klaus [37] circa 1991, ISS identifies whether a host has any one of several well-known 
network oriented vulnerabilities. ISS has been the subject of at least one CIAC bulletin 
since its release onto the Internet. 3· 4 
ISS PHILOSOPHY 
An active checker, ISS adopts a doorknob-twisting approach to vulnerability testing by 
simulating an attack by an external user. In the course of an analysis, ISS tests candidate 
network services in the same way a human attacker might. Thus, ISS attempts to telnet to 
the target, tests the setup of ftp, attempts to communicate with network services, and 
gathers information about the target host using standard Unix network utilities. With the 
appropriate tools, ISS can even attempt to acquire the /etc/passwd file from the target 
host. 
3 See [15] for CIAC security advisory on ISS. 
4 Version 1.21 of ISS was reviewed. ISS is available from several Internet sources, most notably the 
comp.sources.unix archives. 
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ISS is primarily a tool for assessing the network vulnerability of the target system, and all 
attacks take place using network services. Other issues, such as file system security, user 
account integrity and so on, are not considered by this package. Four other ISS 
philosophical issues are worthy of note: 
• Gathering Information 
ISS collects considerable amounts of information from the target system. In particular, 
lists of active users, exported file system information, network service availability and 
information about supported network services are collected. Much of the data gathered 
by ISS is useful to an attacker looking for obvious defects in the configuration of the 
target system. 
• An External Perspective. 
ISS checks vulnerabilities from the perspective of an external attacker. The ISS tool 
does not require that the attacker already have an account on the target system. ISS 
assumes an external attack methodology in each of the hosts it targets. 
• Generic NenvorkTests 
Some vulnerability analysis applications test for vulnerabilities that are specific to a 
particular version of Unix. ISS looks for generic Unix configuration errors that may 
lead to, or indicate, vulnerabilities. 
• Scanning For Targets 
ISS is able to scan a range of IP network addresses, specified by the user, in search of 
target hosts. Thus ISS may be used to check a network domain which may be 
unfamiliar to the ISS user. Additionally, this feature allows ISS to automatically test a 
large number of hosts. Both factors may encourage the use of ISS as a "blind" attack 
tool. 
ISS IMPLEMENTATION 
ISS is made up of a single C program, which performs all checks. Other standard Unix 
utilities, such as rusers, rep info, showmount and ypwhich are called during 
ISS's analysis. 
When instructed, ISS will scan a network domain sequentially for hosts. For each host 
found, ISS performs a series of checks. ISS uses command line options to specify which 
checks to perform, and to specify where to store ISS output. The checks and information 
gathering that ISS performs are outlined in Table 6 - 2 on page 82. Figure 6 - 2 shows 
sample output from the ISS package. 
81 
CHAPTER6 A Survey of tools 
Check Actions Performed 
-----·~-----------~-----






2. If a login prompt is acquired, attempt to log in as sync. 
3. If a sync login is successful, screen information from the login process will help 
reveal additional facts about the target system, such as the release version of the 








Attempt a connection to the SMTP port. If successful, log received information. 
This may include the host name, the type of operating system and (occasionally) 
the version of sendmail that is installed (Sample output from ISS's sendmail 
interrogation is shown in Figure 6- 2). 
Verify the existence of system accounts guest, bbs and lp using the SMTP 
VRFY command. (these should generally be disabled accounts). Log the results. 
Check if the mail aliases decode and uudecode (which may cause 
vulnerabilities if improperly configured) are enabled. Log the results. 
Try the wiz and debug sendmail commands. Log any results. 
Check if FTP is enabled on the host, and that anonymous Iogins are allowed. 
Log the results. 
If anonymous ftp is running, attempt to create (and remove) a test directory. If 
ISS can perform this step, then the ftp directory is world-writable, and the host is 
vulnerable to attack. Log the results. 
------------·---·--·--·-·-·--.. ------·-· ·---------
RPC Check I. Use the rpcinfo utility to gather information about the remote network services 
that the host provides. Log received information, and then parse it for common 
services such as ypserv, mount, rexd, rusers, etc. 
2. If ypserv is running, attempt to construct the domain name of the target host, 
based on the machine name, or from information from the smtp check. 
3. If the domain name address is correct, optionally try to take advantage of a 
ypserv bug to grab the password file from the target system. (This requires an 
additional utility not shipped with ISS). 
4. For other services, collect and log useful information. For example, if the mount 
service is running, use the showmount utility to show the file systems that the 
target system exports. If the rusers server is running, get a list of the currently 
active users. 
Table 6- 2 ISS Active checking strategies 
ISS COMMENT 
From the vulnerability analysis point of view, ISS is an interesting system simply because of 
its active approach to testing host vulnerability. Whether or not this active approach is 
better than passive vulnerability analysis methodologies is an open question. Certainly, it 
would be difficult to evaluate active testing methodologies based purely on data collected 
from the success or otherwise of ISS, because of the relatively simple nature of ISS attacks. 
Because of its active nature, ISS leaves traces of its activities that are detectable by alert 
system administrators. For instance, during testing of ISS, SMTP port attacks (see Figure 
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SMTP:220 cosc.canterbury.ac.nz Sendmail 4.1/SMI-4.0 ready at Mon, 2 May 
94 18:00 
550 tonysg ... User unknown (<--returned from VRFY guest) 
550 decode ... User unknown (<--try decode 
550 bbs ... User unknown (<--try bbs 
550 lp ... User unknown (<--try lp 
550 uudecode ... User unknown (<--try uudecode 
500 Command unrecognized (<--wiz Command 
500 Command unrecognized (<--debug Command 
221 cosc.canterbury.ac.nz closing connection 
Figure 6- 2 ISS SMTP port check output (author's conunents in brackets). 
6 - 2) were noticed by the system administrators here at the Computer Science department 
of Canterbury University. In this case, the departmental mailer-daemon automatically 
mailed a transcript of the failed session to the postmaster. 
Perhaps the most common Unix system administrator objection to ISS is that it is a 
dangerous tool in the hands of an attacker. A typical scenario would be an attacker using 
ISS to remotely locate and gather information about vulnerable Internet hosts in a domain 
address range. Once attack targets have been selected using ISS, more sophisticated 
methods could be brought to bear to further compromise those hosts. 
Another area of concern to administrators is that ISS attacks can be made from an external 
(and perhaps anonymous or remote) source. In contrast, COPS and the other packages 
discussed in this chapter need a valid account on the target system in order to function. 
Where other packages use methodologies revolving around prior knowledge and access to 
the configuration of the target system, ISS does not. 
What is less obvious is that the distribution of the ISS source code represents a greater 
danger than simply the ISS program itself. The code is mostly straight-forward, easily 
understood and easily modifiable. Although any reasonably competent programmer 
familiar with Unix networking could reproduce the functionality of ISS, this code still 
represents a ready-made skeleton for more advanced (and perhaps hostile) mutations. 
As a simple example, modifications could be made to ISS so that more default user 
accounts are tried during telnet port checking. More intelligence could be added to ISS to 
enable it to target specific versions of Unix, and to exploit known vulnerabilities in the 
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targeted version. Considering the ease with which the source code can be modified to 
include extra attack methodologies, it is perhaps surprising that more variants of ISS do not 
exist. 
Note that currently the only ways to protect against ISS attacks are to either limit the 
network services that hosts export to the outside world, or to use firewalls to regulate 
external or untrusted network traffic. Additionally, packages such as tcp_wrappers 
can be useful in detecting ISS type attacks. 
Chris Klaus, the author of ISS, is reportedly working on a commercial version of ISS that 
hard-codes the network address range of the customer's machines, and consequently 
cannot be used for ad-hoc attacks on machines. This version was not available for review. 
6.3 THE TAMU SECURITY PACKAGE. 
The TAMU Security Package (Safford et al.[65]) was developed at Texas A&M University 
after several machines at the university were compromised by coordinated attacks from 
Internet hackers. In response to these and other break-in attempts, Texas A&M University 
implemented a three-pronged strategy designed to improve overall campus network 
security. The T AMU "tiger" scripts, a static auditing system, comprise part of this 
strategy. 5 
THE TAMU PHILOSOPHY. 
The security of the Texas A&M University campus network came under review after 
several attacks from the Internet in August 1992. During these attacks, it was discovered 
that hackers external to the university had compromised an unknown number of TAMU's 
hosts, at that in one case had even set up a clandestine bulletin board on a local host. 
Faced with the prospect of investigating the effects of these attacks on a large number of 
Unix hosts, and a limited number of knowledgable staff, work was begun on a collection of 
utilities and scripts that could be used to automatically search for and report security 
problems on TAMU campus hosts. These become known collectively as the tiger-scripts. 
An overall approach to security was developed that was based around three fundamental 
tools. First, a filtering bridge (called drawbridge) was installed that filtered all incoming 
and outgoing Internet packets. This filter controls connections on a per-machine and per-
5 Version 2.2.3 of the TAMU tiger scripts was reviewed. 
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Error Class Description. 
ALERT A positive sign of intrusion was found. 
FAIL The problem that was found was extremely serious. 
WARN The problem that was found may be serious, but will require human inspection. 
INFO A possible problem was found, or a change in configuration is being suggested. 
ERROR A test was not able to be performed for some reason. 
----~--~~-----------------
Table 6 - 3 Tiger script problem classifications. 
port basis, with connection decisions made according to security policy and individual 
needs. Using this package, network administrators can control which machines are able to 
receive incoming Internet packets, and what ports on those machines are available to 
external users. 
Second, a set of specialised packet monitors was developed that attempted to detect 
intrusive behaviour or attempts to circumvent the Internet packet filtering mechanism. 
These monitors additionally log connection and packet information. 
The third part of the T AMU Security Package is based around the tiger scripts. After 
1992, development work on the scripts continued, to the point where the scripts are now 
used to certify machines for connection to the campus network and to test suitability for 
Internet access. A campus host wishing to gain access to the TAMU network must 
demonstrate that it successfully passes tiger configuration tests before it is allowed to be 
connected to the network, and hosts must periodically be retested to retain IP certification. 
The Tiger scripts. 
In many respects, the tiger-scripts are an updated and more closely integrated version of the 
COPS system discussed in section 6.1. COPS and T AMU share many common features, 
and perform similar checks. 
Like COPS, much of the tiger's vulnerability analysis is performed by script files. Where 
necessary, C programs are used to improve performance, or to perform functions that 
stretch the limits of script programming. Several aspects of the tiger scripts are of interest, 
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Checks 
Checks for passwordless accounts, home directory ownership and access 
permissions, ownership and access of configuration files and disabled accounts 
with .rhosts, cron entries or .forward files that execute a program . 
.. . ······························-·-·········································· 
If the target host supports anonymous ftp, this script checks the integrity of it. 
Ownership and permissions of critical tiles and directories are checked, as well as 
ftp accessible writable directories. 
Checks user 'cron' files, examining permissions and ownership of pathnames 
used by each cron entry. Executables with relative pathnames are also checked. 
Checks the configuration of NFS exported drives, and flags those tile-systems that 
are exported with root access. 
This script cross-references sources of information for group configuration for 
inconsistencies. 
Examines the /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services configuration tiles looking for 
mismatched Unix services, and services that have been added in addition to those 
set up in the standard distribution . 
. .... ·····-·· . ..... ... ........................... ... ..................................... . .......................... . 
Checks the system for signs of an intrusion. Checks include searching for 
unexpected files, and a check of directories (such as lost+found) that are known to 
be used by intruders. 
Checks the PATH variable in various shell startup scripts. In particular, the 
script checks for a "." path entry, and checks the access and ownership of 
executables in the path. This script usually only checks the root user, but can be 
configured to check all u·ser accounts . 
. . ......... ... .... ·········-·---········-·-···--.····-········-·-· .. ··---···-···--·-·····- ·····----.·-···········-····· 
Checks the ownership and permissions of system files. This script takes input 
from a system specific database that tells it which paths to check, and what the 
expected permissions are. 
............................. ······························· 
Checks .rhosts files in home directories. These files are checked for standard 
Unix problems (such as+ entries, or untrusted host entries). A PERL version is 
also able to verify that remote users specified in .rhosts tiles are the same person 
as the local user. 
check_signatures Validates system binaries. This check uses a database tile of stored binary 
signatures, to which it compares those binaries installed on the system. Any 
mismatches or obsolete binaries are reported. Signatures are calculated by the 
TAMU team, and are distributed in either MD-5 or Snefru format. Periodic 
updates are available. 
.......................................................... .. ........................................... .. 
findJiles Searches file systems for "problem" files, including: SUID executables, device 
files, symbolic links to system files, world-writable directories, tiles with an 
undefined owner or group and files with unusual filenames. 
check_embedded Examines tiles and extracts file directory paths which appear to be embedded 
in the script. These paths are examined for proper ownership and permissions. 
Embedded paths in these referenced files are in turn examined for proper 
ownership, and so on until the script reaches a user defined recursion level, or it 
runs out of files to check. 
Table 6- 4 Tiger scnjJt summary 
• Platform Specific Checks. 
Initially, the tiger-scripts were targeted at SunOS 4.1.x machines, but later vers1ons 
have included support for other versions of SunOS, AIX, HP-UX, IRIX, Linux and 
UNICOS. Where the target operating system is not recognised, tiger falls back to a 
"generic" check of the system. 
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• Signature Checks. 
The tiger-scripts take the Unix variant and version of the target host more seriously 
than COPS. One of the features ofT AMU that separates it from COPS is that it can 
algorithmically compare the system binaries against signatures for that particular 
operating system, and can detect whether the binary has been changed, or whether a 
particular security patch has been applied. Signatures currently exist for the platforms 
listed above, and are updated periodically. 
• Reporting 
Messages generated by the tiger scripts are classified according to the type of error 
detected during the analysis. This makes searching for serious problems in tiger-script 
output more convenient. These error classes, from [65], are detailed in Table 6- 3. 
• Explanation Policy 
Where requested, the tiger-scripts will notarise problems found with a full text 
description of the nature of the problem, and the risks that the problem may present to a 
system. 
• No Changes 
The current tiger-scripts are completely passive, and make no changes to the 
configuration of the target system. 
• Ease of Use 
The tiger-scripts can be invoked by a main script, or can be called individually. Minimal 
setup is required, and all site-specific and configuration information required by the 
package are stored in one or two configuration files. 
TIGER SCRIPTS IMPLEMENTATION 
The tiger-scripts are usually invoked by a main script (called tiger), although each script is 
a standalone module in its own right. The tiger scripts are surrunarised in Table 6 - 4 on 
page 86. 
TAMU COMMENT 
On the whole, the T AMU checker represents a more advanced, integrated, and streamlined 
checker than COPS. COPS is the result of a "committee" design, where dozens of users in 
various parts of the world have added components piecemeal. TAMU, on the other hand, 
has benefited both from experience gained from COPS, and from a smaller, more 
coordinated design and implementation team. As a result, T AMU tends to be easier to set 
up and use. 
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Of particular interest are the efforts the T AMU team have made to incorporate detection of 
flaws and obsolete system binaries. The current release of the T AMU package includes 
specific version information for AIX, HPUX, Linux, NeXT, SunOS and UNICOS versions 
of Unix. TAMU is also more aware of networked environments than is COPS. For 
example, T AMU will interrogate multiple sources of information (i.e. I etc I pas swd, 
NIS, netinfo) to learn about user accounts. 
6.4 TRIPWIRE 
Tripwire was officially released on 2 November 1992 to Internet users. 6 Developed by Kim 
and Spafford, Tripwire as described in [34] and [35] is a passive Unix file system integrity 
checker. Tripwire works by comparing parts of the file system to previously saved file 
signature databases, alerting the system administrator to unexpected file system changes. 
These unexpected changes could indicate that intruders are active on the system, and that 
system security has been breached. 7 
TRIPWIRE PHILOSOPHY 
Tripwire adopts a different approach to security than the other packages reviewed here. 
Instead of checking individual components for security weaknesses, Tripwire works by 
detecting unanticipated changes in system configuration files, system binaries and other 
tracked files. 
The name "Tripwire" was coined when the developers realised that files with attractive 
names for intruders could be used as alerts. By watching such files for changes in content, 
access times, or other inode information, the administrator might be informed early of 
intrusive system users. 
A number of design goals are identified in [35, p.3]: 
• Ease of use 
In order for Tripwire to be widely adopted, the designers placed ease of use high on 
their list of design priorities. Ease of use is accomplished through a simple command 
line interface, and the separation of Tripwire data files into configuration files and 
signature database files. 
6 Interestingly enough, November 2nd is the anniversary of the Internet Worm. 
7 Tripwire version 1.1 was reviewed. 
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Tripwire configuration files specify which parts of the file system to include in the 
analysis. The files and directories to include are specified using a simple, but powerful, 
configuration language. Signature database files are generated from the configuration 
files, and are partially human readable. 
Tripwire is designed to allow Signature databases to be easily maintained. Individual 
entries or ranges of entries may be updated without having to regenerate the entire 
database. 
• Automated runs 
The designers of Tripwire intended that it be runnable by cron. This allows regular, 
unattended Tripwire comparisons to be run. Additionally, several different types of 
Tripwire runs can be performed automatically. For example, a supelficial check could 
be run every couple of hours, while a more computationally intensive in-depth 
comparison could be run on a daily or weekly basis. 
e Reuse of configuration information 
Tripwire is designed so that core parts of configuration files can be re-used by different 
machines. Configuration files may include preprocessor directives such as 
@@include, @@ifdef, @@ifhost, and @@define, allowing complex 
configurational files to be broken down into smaller, more reusable and scalable units. 
This is particularly useful in distributed environments. For instance, an organisation 
may have a number of networked machines running a standardised version of the Unix 
operating system, but with different applications and utilities installed on each one. A 
configuration file can be generated for standard operating system files to be tracked, 
and then @@included in customised per-machine files. 
• Easily examined output 
Tripwire can potentially produce large amounts of output when files are changed or 
updated as a normal part of system operation. To address this, Tripwire supports 
"noise" reduction by allowing the administrator to specify changes to ignore. For 
example, the administrator can configure TripWire to ignore various types of change to 
specific files or directories. For example, log files can be flagged so that changes in size 
or signature are ignored. 
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Figure 6 - 3 Tripwire high level operation (adapted from Kim et. a/. [ 34, p.l 0]) 
• Support for multiple signature regimes 
Each file entry in a Tripwire database may have up to ten signatures recorded against it. 
This allows different signatures to be used according to local conditions or time 
constraints, or for additional assurance. 
For example, CRC checks could be used as the signature for frequently run quick 
checks. For more complete testing, MD-5 signatures, which take considerably longer 
to generate, could be used. 
TRIPWIRE IMPLEMENTATION 
Tripwire consists of one main executable file (TripWire) that performs all checking. An 
additional program called s iggen is also provided so that individual file entries can be 
generated. 
Figure 6 - 3 gives an overview of Tripwire's operation. The tw. conf ig configuration 
file is used to decide which file system objects are to be included in the signature database. 
This is subsequently compared to an old database that has been previously generated, 
producing a list of changed files that are passed onto the select-mask mechanism for 
filtering. 
The select-mask, specified in the tw. conf ig file, allows the administrator to discard 
unimportant changes. These could include changes to log files, application data files, or to 
system configuration files that are dynamically changed by the operating system. 
Extraordinary changes are then reported to the administrator. 
The tw.config file 
The tw .config file is used to specify which file system objects are recorded in the signature 
database, and what select-masks should be applied when those files are found to have 
changed. Part of a tw.config file is given in Figure 6- 4 on the next page. 
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# file/directory selection-mask 
/etc R #all files under /etc 
D 
@@ifhost huia.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz #do this only for huia 
/usr/local/secure R #secure directory 
@@endif # 
D 
/etc/mtab L #dynamic files 
/etc/motd L # 
/etc/utmp L # 
Figure 6- 4 Excerpt from a sample tw.config file. 
The first field in the tw. config file specifies the file or directory. By default, all files in 
specified directories are included in the signature database, although prefixes can be used to 
specify pruning of directory trees. 
The selection mask is specified as the second field. The selection masks of L (log file) and 
R (read-only) above are templates for the underlying selection mask mechanism. 
Directives such as @@ifhost huia. cosc. canterbury. ac. nz allow configuration 
files to be centrally managed, but still used for a variety of machines on a network of hosts. 
However, each machine must still (for obvious reasons) have its own signature database. 
Tripwire modes 
Tripwire may be run m one of four modes: Database Generation, Integrity Checking, 
Database Update, and Interactive Update. Database Generation mode allows a new 
signature database to be generated, while Integrity Checking mode performs the actual 
comparison. Databases may be updated either automatically (Database Update mode) or 
interactively (Interactive Update mode). 
Signatures supported 
Tripwire supports a variety of algorithms for generating file signatures. Performance varies 
according to the algorithm; in general, the more secure the algorithm, the longer a signature 
will take to generate. The relative merits of these algorithms are discussed in detail in [34]. 
Those included with the distribution include: 
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• CRC-32 and CRC-16 
These two CRC algorithms produce a 32 bit and 16 bit CRC value respectively. These 
algorithms have long been used as standard error detection codes. Both are fast to 
compute, and are useful for generating a speedy signature. Unfortunately, both 
algorithms (especially CRC-16) are relatively easy to spoof. 
• MDS (MD4, MD2) 
The MD5 (Message Digest Algorithm) generates very secure 128 bit signatures. 
Promoted by RSA Data Security Inc., this algorithm is considered state of the art. It 
builds on the speedier, but slightly less secure, MD4 algorithm. MD4 and MD2 (also 
by RSA Inc.) are also included in the Tripwire distribution. 
II SHA 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is the proposed NIST Digital Signature Standard. 
Approximately one half the speed of MD5, it has been noted that SHA is based on 
MD4, but with several key enhancements [36, 6.7]. 
11 Snefru 
The Xerox Secure Hash Function (Snefru) was developed by Merkle at Xerox PARC. 
This algorithm is slower than MD5, but provides very strong authentication, and is the 
recommended MD5 backup. 
TRIPWIRE COMMENT 
As with any change detection package, the use of Tripwire is contingent on the 
configurational security of the tracked system being correct before Tripwire is installed. 
This can be achieved by re-installing the operating system from scratch, but this does not 
prevent difficulties with non-binary file configuration problems from occurring. 
In addition, Tripwire can only detect security breaches after the system has been 
compromised. How soon after depends wholly on how often Tripwire is run, and this is a 
strong argument for installing Tripwire as a process that is run on a regular basis as a cron 
job. 
Thus, Tripwire should be used in conjunction with other configurational audit tools, such as 
COPS or T AMU. This will ensure that the chances of an attacker successfully exploiting a 
configurational vulnerability are minimised, and that if they do, it will be detected. 
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6.5 OTHER TOOLS 
Several other tools exist, but not included in this revtew. Some of these tools are 
commercial, while others are public domain. These tools summarised below: 
NetWare: Novell's SECURITY.EXE. 
This tool is distributed with every version of Novell NetWare. It is described in more detail 
in Appendix B. 
NetWare: Kane Security Analyst (KSA) 
KSA checks NetWare 3.1X servers for security loopholes in password strength, access 
control, user account restrictions, system monitoring, data integrity and confidentiality [2]. 
No detailed information was available about the checks performed by KSA. 
Unix and VMS: The Security Profile Inspector (SPI) 
Available for use within the U.S. Department of Energy, SPI is distributed by the Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory and CIAC/CERT. A passive tester which assesses 
password strength and detects security relevant changes, versions are available for both the 
VMS and the UNIX platforms [55]. 
VMS:Ciyde Digital Security Toolkit 
A commercial package for VMS, this checker assesses user access, capabilities and rights, 
object access, controls and protection, network security and VMS auditing facilities. 
Optional additions include baseline checking, which can used to compare the current setup 
of the target system to site or organisational requirements [55]. 
6.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has surveyed four configurational audit tools. As has been discussed, COPS 
and T AMU are both configurational audit tools that use similar static audit techniques. 
ISS, on the other hand is a much more aggressive active checker. 
Tripwire, while not exactly being a configurational audit tool, is a good companion for the 
other tools reviewed, since it performs change detection functions that are important to 
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This chapter provides wz overview of NetAudit, an automated configurational 
audit package for tlze NetWare 3./x operating system. The objectives ol 
NetAudit are presented, follml'ed by a discussion of the NetAudit philosophical 
approach. This chapter concludes with a description of the NetAudit 
development process. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Assessing the security setup of NetWare LAN file servers requires that the auditor collect 
and analyse a large amount of file server configuration information. Currently, very few 
tools are available to facilitate this process. 
The NetAudit prototype, designed by the author, attempts to help alleviate some of the 
problems associated with configurational vulnerability analysis of NetWare systems. Using 
NetAudit, a skilled auditor can detect configurational vulnerability in NetWare systems, 
assess system conformance to organisationally defined security standards, and detect 
security relevant changes. 
7.2 THE NETWARE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
This section provides a brief overview some of the problems that NetWare administrators 
face in the process of administering security on these systems. For a more complete 
discussion of the NetWare operating system, see Novell NetWare 386 - The Complete 
Reference [71], Novell's CNA Study Guide [ 12], or The Novell NetWare 3.11 Concepts 
Manual [48]. For an overview and discussion of LAN and small system security concepts 
and issues, see Anderson [1], David [18], Salamone [67], and Seyfert eta!. l701. LAN 
virus infection issues are discussed in Wack eta/. [77], as well as numerous other sources. 
As noted in [81], Net Ware operational security tends to suffer from a number of problems 
that can be traced to both technical and non-technical causes. These problems are restated 
here: 
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• Network security is a complex issue. 
NetWare security controls are complex, and as a consequence of this, the potential for 
unforseen interactions or incompatible usage is substantial. Accordingly, the role of the 
administrator is similarly complex. Not only are administrators concerned with system 
availability issues, but they must also deal with a multitude of network clients, all of 
whom may need different levels of access to applications, files and devices. Due to the 
complexities of the controls, keeping track of network objects can be difficult, 
especially without appropriate tools. Additionally, ensuring that controls are used 
consistently in multiple server networks is a constant problem. 
• LAN systems mutate. 
NetWare systems seldom remam tn a static configuration for long periods of time. 
Over the lifetime of the system, devices, applications, users, groups, and various other 
NetWare objects are added, removed or changed. A system may enforce reasonable 
security when it is first installed, but changes in the population and configuration of 
network objects can erode this security_ over time. 
e Some programmed threats thrive in NetWare environments. 
Novell NetWare networks can be ideal places for viral infections to spread. 
Considering the typically insecure nature of workstations attaching to NetWare file 
servers, any slip in server security, especially where file system permtsstons are 
concerned, could lead to widespread virus attacks. 
• Network administrators may lack the appropriate skills. 
Many smaller PC networks end up being administered by people who lack the 
appropriate skills to recognise that potential security vulnerabilities are present in the 
system they are responsible for, or who are not aware of the potential risks associated 
with configurational changes that they make to the system. For example, an 
inexperienced NetWare administrator may see nothing wrong with granting every user 
account SUPERVISOR equivalence. 
• Network security may not be promoted within the organisation. 
The importance of network security may not be recognised by management or system 
administrators. This in turn manifests itself as a general lack of good security practice 
on the part of users. Day-to-day security policy usually defines standards for such 
issues as acceptable system usage, administration procedures, and system auditing. 
Vulnerabilities may occur due to a lack of such policy. For example, users may 
unwittingly create vulnerabilities within the network system by placing passwords in 
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batch files, leaving their unattended machines logged in, granting inappropriate file and 
directory rights to other users, or any number of other inadvisable, but common 
"problem" usage habits. 
• Net Ware network auditors lack the aptnopriate tools. 
The last problem that may lead to undetected NetWare configurational vulnerabilities is 
that there are very few, if any, effective tools available to detect them. 
In chapter 3, complexity, user habits, administrator habits, a lack of security policy, 
maintenance, and introduced flaws were all identified as contributing factors to the overall 
level of technical vulnerability within a system. As illustrated by the problems described 
above, these general factors map easily onto the NetWare security environment. 
Other life cycle issues discussed in chapter 3 can also be applied to NetWare. For instance, 
some vulnerabilities present in the NetWare operating system can be traced to design 
defects. The NetWare NCP packet spoofing attack described in Appendix B (see Spoofing 
of LAN traffic, Page 218), exists because of original design weaknesses in the way that 
NetWare performed packet authentication. Safeguards to address this vulnerability are 
available, but these must be retrofitted to the system, and when installed extract a 
significant performance penalty. However, without these safeguards, NetWare's entire 
security mechanism may easily be subverted. 
Making an assessment of operational NetWare security will need to take the possibility of 
such an attack into account. For example, a configurational audit package could determine 
if the appropriate patches are installed and configured correctly. 
Other NetWare vulnerabilities can be traced to implementation 1ssues. For example, the 
cleartext password of a newly created bindery object, such as a print server, can be seen in 
the long identification field of that object (see Object Reuse, Page 209 in Appendix B). 
This is the result of an implementation oversight, where the network or application buffers 
used during the object creation process are not cleared after being used to set the 
password. 
Clearly, NetWare suffers from the same general and lifecycle problems that beset other 
computing environments. The security of NetWare can thus potentially be improved by 
implementing a configurational audit tool that draws upon some of the philosophies and 
implementation methods that have been described previously in this thesis. With this in 
mind, the objectives of NetAudit are discussed in the next section. 
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7.3 NETAUDIT OBJECTIVES 
Defining the objectives of the NetAudit tool involved drawing on three main sources. The 
first was A Vulnerability Analysis of Net Ware 3.11, which is included in this thesis as 
Appendix B. This analysis systematically examines NetWare's security mechanisms, and 
the configurational issues that influence the observed strength of Net Ware security. 
Appendix 8 highlights a number of possible weaknesses in the operational use of NetWare. 
These were to become important in the subsequent definition of the initial objectives of 
NetAudit. 
Talking to NetWare administrators provided another source of ideas about the nature and 
particular features of the package. Administrators lamented the lack of tools for verifying 
the use of security mechanisms, the lack of information provided by NetWare utilities about 
the bindery database, and the difficulties of assessing file system access. 
The final source of objectives was the analysis (in chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this thesis) of some 
existing configurational analysis tools. Some of the design and implementation 
philosophies from those packages influenc.ed the final form of NetAudit. However, given 
the differences between Unix security mechanisms, and those implemented by NetWare, 
only certain types of checking methodologies were applicable to NetWare. The main 
objectives of NetAudit are as follows: 
• Vulnerabilities 
Provide a means of detecting outright security vulnerabilities in the system being 
audited, and prioritising those vulnerabilities in order of seriousness. NetAudit is 
particularly concerned with errors that arise from incompatible usage with respect to 
security mechanism use, security administration oversights, and inattention to the 
overall security of file server controls. 
• Conformance 
Provide a means of assuring that minimum levels of security are being maintained in the 
audited system, and that these levels conform to auditor, site, or organisationally 
defined standards. NetAudit provides a configurable baseline mechanism that is used to 
describe acceptable standards in the use of NetWare security controls. This mechanism 
is used to check conformance to those standards. 
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Figure 7- I NetAudit main dialog 
• Change Detection 
Provide a means of storing the security state of system objects so that changes in these 
objects can be detected. NetAudit currently detects changes in file system and user 
account settings. 
e Browsing 
Provide a means of interactively browsing the security configuration of the target 
system. This helps the auditor visualise the security setup of that system by graphically 
representing certain relationships in security settings. NetAudit includes browsers for 
all major NetWare security relevant objects. 
• Reporting 
Provide a means of creating reports that summarise or detail the security setup of the 
target file server, as well as individual objects or ranges of objects on that server. 
NetAudit provides a number of security and informational reports. 
• Ease of use 
Provide a tool that is accessible to users, is intuitive, and that shields users as much as 
possible from underlying NetWare security complexities. NetAudit is a Microsoft 
Windows application that employs a graphical user interface to visually display 
NetWare security controls. Figure 7 - l shows the main NetAudit dialog, while 
Appendix D contains previews of other NetAudit interface components. 
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7.4 PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
The guiding philosophies of configurational audit tools were discussed in Chapter 5. These 
are important factors, as they influence the design and features set of the tool. The 
philosophical approaches adopted by NetAudit are as follows: 
• Passive checking. 
NetAudit works by examining the static state of the target file server. No attempts are 
made to alter the state of the target system, nor does NetAudit attempt to remedy 
discovered configurational vulnerabilities. 
• Technical controls scope. 
The configurational audit performed by NetAudit checks the technical controls that 
regulate bindety, userbase and file system security. NetAudit adopts a client-centric 
approach to checking NetWare controls, and performs only those checks that can be 
achieved through regular client access API' s. Thus, server console and NLM security 
settings are not considered in NetAudit's analysis of file servers. Additionally, issues 
such as the security of individual LAN workstations are not considered. 
• Single vulnerability checker. 
This version of NetAudit is a single vulnerability checker. That is, it does not attempt 
to assess the implications of multiple system vulnerabilities. However, insecure or non-
conforming objects detected by NetAudit are ranked according to the number and 
seriousness of configurational errors they exhibit. 
• Reporting regime. 
NetAudit incorporates magnitude indications in reports. For each message produced 
during an analysis, NetAudit indicates whether that message is a serious configurational 
error, or a warning. As mentioned in chapter 4, terse messages tend to favour 
attackers. The NetAudit user and bindery browsers include annotated explanations of 
discovered vulnerabilities. File system messages are considered reasonably self 
explanatory. NetAudit reports may also be exported to text files for further analysis. 
• Implementation language. 
As this application is targeted at the Microsoft Windows graphical environment, and 
needs access to NetWare API's, a high level implementation language was required. 
Script-based and interpreted languages are not commonly available for the Windows 
environment, and those that are available (such as Visual Basic) suffer from severe 
performance drawbacks. Consequently, Borland C++ 3.1 was selected as the 
implementation language. 
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• Tool Hazards 
Because the majority of information required for NetWare security analysis is only 
available to SUPERVISOR or equivalent users, NetAudit requires access to the target 
file server as such an account. Due to the risks noted in Chapter 4, this is undesirable; 
however, Net Ware 3.1 x offers no other alternative (such as an "auditor" type user). 
Since it is intended to be distributed in executable form only, the chances of code 
subversion are minimal. However, care must be taken to ensure that NetAudit is never 
run from a machine infected by a virus. Because NetAudit is run with SUPERVISOR 
privileges, the danger from viral infections must be kept in mind. 
NETAUDIT APPROACH 
NetAudit' s approach to testing configurational vulnerability is somewhat different to the 
other packages discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The main differences in NetAudit's 
approach are its reliance on graphical browsing facilities, and the baseline checking 
methodology used to assess system vulnerability and conformance. These are discussed 
below. 
Graphical facilities 
As discussed on Page l 0 l, NetAudit provides graphical browsers that allow the auditor to 
examine NetWare security mechanisms. While requiring substantial amounts of work to 
implement, these browsers promote the use of NetAudit as an investigative tool that can be 
used to interactively examine individual objects. 
Baseline checking 
Where other packages focus on specific system and technical vulnerabilities, NetAudit is 
based around the concept of baseline checking. Baselines are "ideal" object templates that 
are used as yardsticks against which objects residing on target servers measured. Objects 
that fail baseline tests may represent a risk to the security of the target server. 1 
NetAudit baselines have two objectives. First, by comparing file server objects to baseline 
settings, it is possible to detect where those objects vaty from organisational security 
standards. Thus, baselines can be used to assure the auditor that security settings of objects 
on the target server are consistent with organisational or site policy. Second, a correctly 
1 The concept of a baseline is not new; baseline approaches have been used to assess conformance in fields 
as diverse as configuration management, financial performance, engineering, and medicine. 
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specified and applied baseline can detect object settings that may lead to a vulnerability in 
the security of the target system. 
Currently, NetAudit supports separate baselines for user settings, bindery settings and file 
system settings. These baselines are fully configurable, allowing the security requirements 
of individual sites and organisations to be accommodated. Network auditors may have at 
their disposal a stock of pre-configured NetAudit baselines, each targeted at a different set 
of security needs. Pre-configured baselines may also be used as the basis of customised 
baselines for each site that the auditor assesses. 
Change detection 
In addition to baseline analysis, NetAudit can alert the auditor to security changes in server 
objects. By saving the security state of these objects, and then subsequently comparing 
saved objects to current versions, important state changes in object security can be 
detected. Where other packages concentrate on changes to the file system, NetAudit also 
allows the auditor to detect changes in the user population using the same techniques. 
7.5 NETAUDIT DEVELOPMENT METHODOLOGY 
The development of NetAudit was divided into four phases. Phase one involved learning as 
much as possible about NetWare security mechanisms. In phase two, a number of possible 
vulnerability exploitation scenarios were explored. Phase three was the design and 
implementation phase, while phase four was the testing and evaluation phase. These phases 
are outlined below: 
I. Review NetWare security controls 
Phase one reviewed general NetWare LAN security. This analysis included intrinsic 
NetWare security controls, as well as more general LAN environment controls. As 
mentioned previously, this study appears as Appendix B to this thesis. 
Two main benefits were derived from the security review of NetWare controls: First, 
the analysis provided a comprehensive overview of the system objects that reside on 
NetWare servers. Second, the controls that protect those objects were identified. 
2. Identify potential vulnerability scenarios 
In this phase, potential NetWare vulnerability exploitation scenarios were identified. 
Later, these scenarios helped form the basis of the checks that NetAudit was to 
perform. This phase drew upon the vulnerability analysis of NetWare given m 
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Appendix B, and used some of the techniques discussed in Appendix 
A. Phase two is discussed in more detail in chapter 8, Determining 
NetAudit Requirements. 
3. NetAudit design and implementation 
During phase three, results from the previous phase, as well as the 
philosophies and implementation techniques discussed in chapter 5, 
were used to design and implement NetAudit. Chapter 9, NetAudit 
Design and Implementation, provides an overview of NetAudit's 
design. 
4. NetAudit testing and evaluation 
The last phase of NetAudit's development had three objectives: The 
first was to assess how well vulnerability could be detected in 
NetWare systems using NetAudit. The second was to evaluate the 
value of the baseline approach; the third and final objective was to 
assess the effectiveness of NetAudit as security tool for NetWare. 
Chapter 10, Using NetAudit, describes a trial project conducted with 
NetAudit, and discusses how well the three objectives were met. 
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In order to arrive at a set of requirements for NetAudit, it was first necessary 
to determine how deficiencies in the controls of Net Ware could lead to 
vulnerability. This chapter summarises the major components of Net Ware 
technical security, and identifies potential vulnerability scenarios for each. 
8.1 ANALYSIS SCOPE 
The requirements analysis for NetAudit 
concentrates on those objects and controls 
that together regulate client access to the 
Net Ware 3.11 and 3.12 operating system. 
Factors such as workstation security, 
physical security, network media security, 
and application security, although important, 
were not considered as part of the NetAudit 
requirements analysis. 1 
As shown by Figure 8 - 1, this analysis deals 




Figure 8 - 1 Scope of NetWare Security 
Model Analysis. 
enforce NetWare bindery, user account, file system, and server security. 
NETWARE SECURITY MECHANISMS 
Many NetWare controls, and the objects that they protect, are internally managed and 
protected by the file server operating system. User and application access to such 
information is usually available only from standard NetWare utilities, or by requests made 
1 See Appendix 8 for a more wide-ranging discussion of these external factors. 
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directly to the operating system using the published set of NetWare API's (Application 
Programming Interfaces). 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, this arrangement is at odds with mechanisms found in other 
operating systems for which configurational audit tools have previously been deployed. In 
NetWare, for example, user group membership is recorded in a structure private to the 
NetWare operating system. In contrast, Unix operating systems record group membership 
as an entry in a human readable text file. Both types of mechanism are protected by access 
controls (file system controls in the case of Unix, and bindery controls in the case of 
NetWare), but the net result is that more effort is required with NetWare in order to firstly 
understand the mechanism itself, and secondly identify possible sources of vulnerability 
within the mechanism. 
In order to develop an automated configurational audit tool for NetWare, it is first 
necessary to build an understanding of how NetWare enforces security by identifying the 
crucial objects and controls of the operating system, and the interactions between them. 
From there, possible sources of configurational vulnerability may be identified. Once areas 
of potential vulnerability are known, the designer can assess what checks are necessary to 
detect these vulnerabilities 
This chapter discusses the main NetWare security objects and controls. These include 
bindery objects, user accounts (a special form of bindery object), file system objects, and 
miscellaneous server settings. For each of object or control area, potential vulnerabilities 
are identified and explained. 
8.2 BINDERY OBJECTS 
The most basic NetWare security object is the bindery object. Bindery objects are an 
abstract class, from which subclasses of physical or logical Net Ware objects (such as users, 
user groups, print queues, servers, and many other NetWare objects) are derived. 
Instances of bindery objects are stored in the file server's bindery, a flat file database of all 
bindery objects managed by the server. Each NetWare file server on a LAN has a unique 
bindery, and bindery information is not actively shared between servers. 2 As will be 
2 Although a server's bindery may contain references to "advertising" bindery objects that regulate services 
on other servers or devices on the LAN. 
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Figure 8 - 2 Bindery object entity relationship diagram. 
CHAPTERS 
discussed, the bindery database is the basis for NetWare login, access control, security 
equivalence, and group security. 
Figure 8 - 2 shows, in entity relationship form, the general structure of bindery objects. As 
illustrated, a unique Bindery ID number is assigned to each bindery object for identification 
purposes. A textual bindery name is also specified, as well as an identifier indicating the 
object's type (user, user group, server, queue, etc).3 A bindery object security field 
determines the level of bindery access required by other bindery objects to read or modify 
an object's bindery information. These levels are summarised in Table 8- l on page 110.4 
Each bindery object contains zero or more properties. Each of these properties is identified 
by a textual name, and is protected by a property security flag indicating the level of access 
required by other objects wishing to read or modify the property information. Property 
security levels are identical to those specified in Table 8 - 1 on page 110. 
3 The bindery name and object type data items are not shown in Figure 8 - 2. 
4 In the case of bindery objects, the object security flag controls what level of access is required to read, add 
or delete object properties. 
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Anybody can read the object, even non-
authenticated objects 
Determining NetAudit Requirements 
Anyone can modify the object, even 
non-authenticated objects. 
---·-. ---~~---------------~------·--·---------.-- ----------········-----------------------------------------------~------------------------···-·----------·····--------- ········-····· BS_LQGQED Only clients logged into the server can Only clients logged into the server can 
BS2I{INDERY 
read the object. modify the object. 
···················•········· ......................................................... ······························· ·············-·············-········· 
Only objects logged into the server Only objects logged into the server with 
with the object's name, type and the object's name, type and password 
password can read the object. can modify the object. 
Only SUPERVISOR or equivalent Only SUPERVISOR or equivalent 
objects can read the object. objects can modify the object. 
Only the NetWare operating system 
can read the object. 
Only the NetWare operating system can 
modify the object. 
Table 8 - 1 Bindery object security levels. 
Object properties are classified as either set or item properties. Set properties contain 
references to zero or more bindery objects, and are typically used to store group 
membership or access list data. For example, a bindery object seeking to act as a print 
queue operator requires membership in the target print queue object's Q_OPERATORS 
property. Such privileges are determined by the requesting object's bindery ID appearing 
in this property. If this is the case, then the queue operator access is granted; otherwise, it 
is denied. 
Item properties, on the other hand, contain zero or more data segments. The type of data 
stored in these segments depends entirely on the role of the property. For example, the 
standard property IDENTIFICATION may store a long textual name for the object it 
belongs to. Alternatively, the LOGIN_CONTROL property stores a structure that defines 
various object access control settings. 
Well formed standard bindery objects (such as users, user groups, print servers, etc.) are 
expected to contain certain properties. These properties vary according to object type, and 
according to the bindery relationships the object is part of. A badly formed bindery object 
may indicate that either an attack has taken place, or that the bindery database is corrupt. 
Table C - 1 (Appendix C, Page 227) summarises some of the more common bindery 
objects, and the expected properties of those objects. 
Many other bindery object types exist; some defined by Novell, and others defined by third-
party designers of NetWare services, applications, or devices. Some applications add 
additional properties to those that are standard for particular object types. For example, an 
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InsutTicient Bindery object information may Attacker may browse bindery 











. .............................. . 
Bindery object information may Attacker may change bindery 
be subject to unauthorised object data. For example, the 
modification. attacker may delete a property 
restricting access to some service. 
Property information may be 
disclosed to unauthorised parties. 
Attacker may 
properties. 
. . ...... ,.,_.. ···········-·········-·-·······-··········---·········-····-·-····-·········- ""''•··-···-········ .. 
browse bindery 
Property information may be Attacker may change property 
subject to unauthorised data. For instance, the attacker 
modification. may add an unauthorised bindery 
object to the list 
Table 8 - 2 Bindery object vulnerability scenarios 
email application may associate an item property with user objects, the purpose of which is 
to track the last message that user accessed from the mail server. 
ACCESS CONTROLS AND THE BINDERY 
The bindery regulates access to a wide variety of physical or logical objects. For example, 
bindery object access to the file server is regulated by a password property. This property 
stores the password required before a client is allowed to log into the server as that object. 
Objects may also store a list of other bindery objects that are entitled to access or manage 
the service that object represents. Print servers, for instance, specify a PS_ OPERA TORS 
property that defines which user objects or groups of users are entitled to perform 
administrative functions on behalf of the print server. 
Resource accounting can also be achieved with bindery based security. In NetWare, an 
object may store an account balance, which is depleted every time that object uses a 
particular resource, such as disk space, connection time, or printing services. Once the 
account balance has decreased below a certain point, service requests may be denied to the 
object until the balance is increased. 
The key to bindery security is the protection of the bindery database itself 5 , and the 
controls that protect objects and their properties. If these controls are incorrectly 
configured, through modifications by applications, privileged users, or an attacker, the 
security of the server could potentially be compromised. For instance, if an attacker is 
5 Protection of bindery database files is discussed in more detail in Important file system objects, on page 
122. 
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allowed to add an object that he or she controls to a list of privileged users of some other 
object, then the bindery security of that mechanism has effectively been circumvented. 
Detecting vulnerability within the bindery thus involves checking that bindery object and 
property controls are sufficient to prevent unauthorised reading or modification of such 
objects. Some potential bindery object vulnerability scenarios are described in Table 8 - 2 
on the previous page. 
8.3 USER OBJECTS 
Each user account on a NetWare file server is assigned a bindety object. This object is 
used to enforce user login security, for accounting purposes, and for user interaction with 
the file system. Detecting vulnerabilities in user accounts requires a different approach than 
that taken to assess bindery object security. In addition to the standard bindery security 
checks discussed above, the specialised nature of information held within user bindery 
objects warrants additional analysis. This section discusses that information.6 
USER FILE SERVER LOGIN CONTROLS 
The LOGIN_CONTROL property contains a structure that regulates user (or other object) 
server logins. This property represents one of the main repositories of login access control 
information for each user object. 7 Among the fields stored in this structure are: 
• Account expiration information. 
• Whether or not the account is disabled. 
• Password expiration information. 
• Grace login information. 
• Password length restrictions. 
• Concurrent connection restrictions. 
• Login time restrictions. 
• Bad login statistics. 
Table 8 - 3 describes potential vulnerability scenarios that may anse as a result of 
configurational errors in the LOGIN_CONTROL structure. Checks of the information 
held in this structure should ensure that settings regulating password use and expiry, as well 
6 It is worth noting that assessing the security of any special purpose bindery object will involve an analysis 
of the contents of that object's properties, in addition to any checks of object and property security levels. 
7 The fields contained in the LOGIN_ CONTROL structure are discussed in more detail in section B.3 of 
Appendix B. 
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·-----,.,.,.--, ·~-~-----.-------------~-------~--~-~---,..·----·--~---ContrQ!_~_ Setting_~-. WeakJJ.ess _____ ._Ex.Qlo,i!ation S~enario 
Require No. Account may not be password Attacker logs in without having to 






No. User may not be able to specify 
own password. 
Attacker learns of set password 
that user cannot change. 
Yes. User specifies weak password. Attacker guesses password. 
-······ --~----·-·····-··-··---- ···-··- ------·-·····--·-·-·~---------------------··-····-----··----·--·····---·-·-············----.. --- ...... ---·-····--····-·······--···- ············-···--····------~----···-···-
Minimum None User is able to specify a short, As above 


























No. User is not required to 
periodically change passwords. 
Attacker learns of old (but current) 
password. 
______ ,. _____________________ _ 
Too many 
days specified. 





Users can continue to use account As above 
password even after it has 
No. 
expired. 
Users can subvert forced 
password changes by re-
specifying old password. 
None specified Account may become dormant 
No limit. Account could be used by two 
different people concurrently. 
No Account could be used at 
restrictions. inappropriate times. 
··················•····· .............................. . 
No Account may be used from 
restrictions. insecure or unknown locations. 
As above 
Attacker exploits old or inactive 
accounts without arousing 
suspicion. 
············-········ ................................... ········•········ 
Attacker is able to log into account 
while it is in use. 
Attacker logs in after hours to 
reduce the risk of detection. 
Remote attackers log in to local 
servers from external (untrusted) 
networks. 
Table 8 - 3 Login_Control settings vulnerability scenarios 
as connection and time restrictions, conform to secure standards. This may be organisation 
dependant. For example, some organisations may require users to change passwords every 
month, while others may only force users to change passwords every six months. 
USER PRIVILEGE SETTINGS 
Users can gain additional privileges, either to NetWare devices and queues, or to the file 
system, in a variety of ways. The methods in which users gain additional privileges are 
discussed below. 
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• The Supervisor object. 
Every NetWare file server has a user special object with a bindery ID of 
OxOOOOOOOl. This object, known as the file server SUPERVISOR account, is 
subject to very few restrictions; once logged in, the SUPERVISOR account has 
unrestricted access all parts of the file system and most parts of the bindery database. 
The SUPERVISOR bindery object also contains properties that store certain file server 
configuration information. This includes a list of server workgroup managers 
(discussed below), and various file server defaults. 
• Workgroup managers. 
A workgroup manager is a normal user whom is also able to add users to the file server. 
Workgroup managers usually have limited SUPERVISOR control over users they have 
created. 
• Operators. 
An operator is an account that has been granted special privileges to monitor and 
manage devices and objects such as print servers, print queues, and file servers. 
Operator privileges can be assigned to either groups or individual user objects. 
• Security equivalence. 
As discussed in section 8.4 (Appendix B, Page 195) , a user can enter into a security 
equivalence relationship with another user object. In this relationship, users can gain 
access to file system permissions that are granted directly to other users. Other 
privileges may also accrue from such a relationship. For instance, a user who is made 
security equivalent to the SUPERVISOR user is automatically granted the same rights 
as the SUPERVISOR to manage user settings and control devices. 
• Group membership. 
Users are added to a particular NetWare group by making them security equivalent to 
the desired group's bindery object ID. Rights that are assigned to the group bindery 
object then become, via the equivalence mechanism, available to group members. 
Table 8 - 4 on page 115 summarises potential vulnerability scenarios that may arise as a 
result of excess or inappropriate privileges being granted to a user account. 
As illustrated, a configurational audit package needs to detect those users who are 
SUPERVISOR equivalent, those who are workgroup managers, and those whose group 
membership or security equivalence relationships are inconsistent with the security setup of 
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~ ·-G~·~Q~Ut2r~o~l ____ 1 _S~e~tt~in~g~-----~VV_e~a_kn_-_e_ss_· __ ~-·~----~---~~~·~E~x~p_lo_i_ta_t_io_n~S_ce_n_~a_r_io _________ _ 
Security SUPERVISOR Too many rights may be granted User may accidentally delete files 













May cause erratic behaviour or 
incompatible usage problems. 
Too many security equivalencies 
may cause unnecessary 
complexities determining actual 
user access to file system. 
User may be granted an 
inappropriate security 
equivalence to another user. 
User may be granted 
merpbership to a group that has 
file system access inappropriate 
for that user object. 
file server, or important to the 
organisation. Effectively no 
security for supervisor equivalent 
users. 
May be used to crash the fi Ie server, 
or to grant undesirable access to 
server or queue file system objects. 
Unforseen interactions with the file 
system may be exploited by 
attacker. Attacker may be 
inadvertently be granted 
undesirable access to certain parts 
of the tile system from security 
equivalence relationship. 
Attacker may be granted security 
equivalence to a user that has 
access to sensitive data or 
applications. 
User becomes a member of a group 
that has access to file system objects 







Too many rights may be granted Workgroup manager is a "sub" 
to user. supervisor, that has SUPERVISOR 
rights over groups of other users. 
Table 8 - 4 User privilege vulnerability scenarios. 
the server. The server configuration should also be checked to ensure that operator 
privileges are not granted to inappropriate user accounts. 
LOGIN SCRIPTS 
Clients logging in as users using the standard NetWare login program automatically execute 
the commands that are contained in the system login script (see Important file system 
objects, on page 122). Once the commands in the system login script have been executed 
and the script exits, the user's login script is executed. User login scripts are stored in the 
LOGIN file located in the user's mail directory. 
Because any user is able to create files in user mail directories, user login scripts should be 
checked to ensure that they exist 8 , that they are sufficiently protected against unauthorised 
modifications, that they do not call unprotected batch files or programs, and that they do 
not contain hazardous conunands that may compromise the account to which they belong. 
8 This vulnerability is discussed in more detail in Appendix B, Page 204. 
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-----------,-....,-----~---
Contro_l_""--1 Settihg · . Weakl1ess _______ Ex_eloitation Scenario 
Volume None specified User may consume all disk Attacker continually generates tiles 
Restrictions space on volume, denying other that consume disk space and 
users disk space. directory entries, until no more space 
is available . 
Too much 
space granted 
User may consume more than 
fair share of volume space, 
denying other users disk space. 
. ................. . 
Attacker generates tiles up to 
available limit. 
Table 8- 5 User file system restriction vulnerability scenarios. 
FILE SYSTEM RESTRICTIONS 
Restricting user object consumption of NetWare disk space may be an important facet of 
NetWare security. As summarised by Table 8 - 5, volume restrictions should be enforced 
to ensure that users do not unduly consume disk space, leading to denial of service 
problems for other users. 
User file system access should also be checked to assess whether users are granted to parts 
of the NetWare file system to which they should not have access. Such checking should 
take the complexities of multiple group membership and security equivalencies into 
account, as well as the effects of the rights inherited from parent directories. This is 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
8.4 FILE SYSTEM OBJECTS 
The bindery database and the file system act in unison to provide a discretionary access 
control mechanism for file system access. Assessing the configurational security of this 
mechanism is notoriously difficult, due to inherent complexities in its use. Consequently, 
side effects and inadvertent vulnerabilities are easily introduced into the file system, and 
difficult to detect. File system control mechanisms are described in this section. 
FILE SYSTEM OBJECTS 
The NetWare operating system has three subclasses of file system object. Afileqbject is a 
basic file containing information or executable code. Directories are container objects, in 
which are placed other directories or files. A volume is a special type of directory object 
which forms the root directory of a logical NetWare disk partition. There are no container 
objects for NetWare volumes. 
BINDERY AND FILE SYSTEM INTERACTION 
Figure 8 - 3 on page 117 shows in entity relationship form the main interactions that occur 
between bindery objects and file system objects. As illustrated, these interactions occur in 
four places: 
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Figure 8 - 3 File system and object interaction overview. 
• The Bindery Database Files 
CHAPTERS 
The bindery database is stored in three files. Since the bindery database enforces much 
of NetWare's security measures, protecting these files from unauthorised deletion or 
modification is very important. This is discussed further in Important file system 
objects on Page 122. 
~t Trustee Assignments 
Trustee assignments may be attached to file system objects. These assignments specify 
individual or group bindery object access to the file or directory to which they are 
attached. Calculating effective access, on Page 118, discusses how these assignments 
are used to determine effective bindety object access to the file system. 
• File Object Ownership. 
File system objects are owned by at most one bindety object (usually a user or a 
server). In some instances, a bindery object owning a file object may be deleted from 
the system, resulting in unowned files and directories. This is discussed further in File 
owner checks, on Page 121. 
• Usage Restrictions. 
Usage restrictions are assigned to individual bindery objects for either a volume or a 
directory. This restriction limits the amount of space bindety objects are allowed to 
consume within the file system object for which the restriction is effective. Restrictions 



















Figure 8- 4 Relationships encountered during the process ofcalculating a bindery 
object's effective access to a file system object 
In addition to the bindery and file system interactions introduced above, File object 
attributes, discussed on Page 120, influence the behaviour of file system objects regardless 
of the bindery object is requesting access. These attributes are purely a property of the ftle 
system object to which they are attached; however, they still have a significant impact on 
how bindery objects interact with the file system. Similarly, inherited right masks are 
attached to individual file system objects (usually directories), and modify the effective 
access that any non-supervisory bindery object would otherwise have to that file system 
object. 
CALCULATING EFFECTIVE ACCESS 
Figure 8 - 4 illustrates the entities and relationships involved in the calculation of a bindery 
object's effective access to a file system object. As shown, zero or more trustee right 
assignments are attached to each file system object. Each assignment describes the set of 
rights that a single bindery object, specified in the trustee assignment, has to that file system 
object. The bindery object specified in a trustee assignment can be either a single object, or 
a user group object. Where a user group is specified, the assigned trustee applies to each 
object that is a member of that group. The trustee rights available in NetWare 3.11 and 
3.12 are described in Table B- 5, on Page 198 (Appendix B). 
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The process of calculating a bindery object's effective access to a file system object 
proceeds as follows: 
1. Trustee assignment exists for the bindery-file object pair. 
If there is a file object trustee for the requesting bindery object, or any other bindety 
objects to which the requesting object is security equivalent, then the effective access 
granted to the requesting object (in this directory) is the logical OR of those trustee 
assignments. If any rights are effective for parent directories, then a logical AND of 
these parent rights with the target file system object's inherited rights mask is 
performed, and the results are logically OR' d with set of trustee rights already located 
for the target file system object. If a trustee assignment is located that contains the 
Supervisor right, or if this right is effective for the parent directory, then the access 
returned regardless of any other considerations, is always supervisory access. 
2. No trustee assignment exists for the bindery-file object pair. 
If no immediate trustee assignment exists for the requesting bindery object, or for 
objects to which it is security equivalent, then the file system object's parent directory is 
searched for effective rights. If effective rights are found in the parent, then the 
effective rights returned are the logical AND of the effective parent rights with the 
inherited rights mask of the target file system object. 
This process proceeds recursively until the volume root is reached. If the search for 
trustee assignments completes with no suitable trustee assignments having been located, 
then the effective access returned is no access. If a supervisory level trustee assignment 
is located in any parent directory, then the effective access returned is always 
supervismy access. 
Bearing this process in mind, Table 8 - 6 on the next page summarises potential trustee 
assignment vulnerabilities. Calculating effective access is a complex process. Not only do 
trustee assignments to the bindery object affect this access, but trustee assignments to 
security equivalent objects also have a bearing on the results. This, combined with the fact 
that trustee searches are performed from the directory in which access is requested back to 
the root of the volume, makes it very difficult to assess the results of trustee assignments 
and inherited rights. 
This complexity can create configurational vulnerabilities, mainly due to unforseen 
interactions, or through misunderstandings of the file system security by those who 
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--~--~~--~~--~~~~~~~----~~-------------~ Setting Weakness · . Exploitation Scenario 
~~----~~~~~~--~~~~--~~~------------------
Granted in Because of the inherited rights Attacker may access and/or 
volume root mechanism, root directory rights change parts of the file system for 













not used or 
incorrectly 
configured 
leading to unforseen 
interactions. 
May allow user to compromise As above. 
confidentiality or integrity of tile 
system objects. 
May allow user to compromise 
confidentiality or integrity of file 
system objects. 
Attacker is granted write rights to 
a directory conta1111ng public 
binaries, and exploits this to insert 
a Trojan horse attack. 
This right is unmaskable by Attacker may be granted a S right 
inherited rights mask at a high part of the directory tree, 
mechanism. and may consequently use this to 
mount browsing attacks on the file 
system below that point. 
............................. , ...................................... . 
This right allows the holder to Attacker grants access to 
grant trustee rights (even ones inappropriate bindery object, 
they do not have) to themselves resulting in unauthorised 
or other bindery objects to the modification or disclosure of file 
file system object to which the system objects for which the right 
right is grante~. is granted. 
··- ------- -~-----~-
File system object may not have The attacker makes use of 
been protected by an inherited unintended flaws introduced 
rights mask limiting the rights because of this weakness. For 
objects inherit from parent example, attacker may be granted 
container. rights in the root directory of a 
volume, and there may be no 
inherited rights mask active for the 
SYS:SYSTEM volume. Rights 
granted to the attacker at the 
volume root are thus inherited in 
the SYS:SYSTEM volume. 
Table 8 - 6 File system trustee rights vulnerability scenarios. 
available for calculating and displaying a particular user's effective access to a specified 
part of the file system, or alternatively, a list of objects and the effective access that they 
have to a particular file or directory. 
Thus, determining the presence of configurational vulnerabilities in file system trustee 
access controls will involve checking the effective access of each bindery object to 
interesting parts of the file system, and then deciding if that access represents a risk. 
FILE OBJECT ATTRIBUTES 
File object attributes may be applied to files or directories. These objects enforce an 
additional layer of access controls over and above those implemented by trustee 
assignments. For example, a read-only (Ro) file attribute could be applied to a file to 
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Rw setting on 
executable 
Ro setting on 
executable, but 
M trustee right 
effective for 
users. 
Executable may be infected by a Attacker modifies 
virus, or may be modified by program. 
attacker. 
....................... ···················-····· 
Executable attribute may be 
modified to Rw by the user, then As above 
infected by a virus or modit1ed 
by an attacker. 
executable 
. .......... ······----- ......... ······------·------------···-· -------···--·--······-· -------········-··-·····---·····--------------·-·······-- .. . 
X setting on Execute-Only (X) program can Execute-Only (X) program can be 
executable, no be renamed. renamed, and another program of 
rename inhibit the same name substituted 
setting. (companion style attack). 
-------------------------------------··- --... --------------------------------------------------------------- ·-·········-·······------------···· 
H flag File system object flagged as Attacker could hide tiles or 
hidden directories contammg stolen 
information or applications. 
Table 8 - 7 File system file and directory attribute vulnerability scenarios. 
prevent changes being made to it, regardless of the privileges of the bindery object 
requesting the change. Table B - 6 in Appendix B (Page 20 l) enumerates tile object 
attributes, while Table B - 7 (Page 202) summarises likely interdependencies between tile 
system trustee assignments and file system rights. 
The most important role of file system objects from a security perspective is that they help 
limit the spread of viral infections. Of course, if a virus is NetWare aware, and is logged in 
as a user that is able to change the attributes of a target file, then such protection is of 
minimal value. 9 
Table 8 - 7 outlines attribute vulnerability scenarios. Checking file system object attributes 
is concerned with detecting executable and device files that are not flagged as read-only, 
locating hidden files and directories, and checking that other flags, such as rename inhibit 
and execute-only, are used where appropriate. 
FILE OWNER CHECKS 
Checking ownership of files has two aspects. First file owners should be checked to ensure 
that they are entitled to own files in a particular directory. For example, the SYS: PUBLIC 
directories should contain only files that are owned by either the file server itself, the 
SUPERVISOR account, or another recognised administrator. Second, a search for tiles 
that have no owner should be performed. Ownerless files usually belong to users or other 
bindery objects that have been removed from the system, and may represent a drain on 
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Weakness 
Users with files in 
inappropriate areas of the tile 
system 
E~oitation Scenario 
Attackers hide files in unexpected 
locations, or use file space that they 
are not entitled to. 
Attacker owns tiles in public 
directories. 
File or No accountability for presence, Attacker could use unowned tile to 
directory has content or intent of file. Could cover own tracks. 
no owner indicate unaccounted for file Consumes disk space. 
left over from deleted user. 
Consumes disk space. 
Table 8- 8 File owner vulnerability scenarios. 
resources if there are too many of them present on a system. Table 8 - 8, describes possible 
file owner vulnerability scenarios. 
IMPORTANT FILE SYSTEM OBJECTS 
From a security perspective, there are several important file system objects that are worthy 
of additional attention during a NetWare configurational audit. Table 8 - 9, on Page 123, 
summarises vulnerability exploitation scenarios of special file system objects, which are 
discussed below. 
• System directories. 
There are several default directories, as identified on Page 203 of Appendix B, that are 
important to the operation and security of NetWare. Vulnerabilities may be introduced 
if the controls on these directories do not prevent unauthorised modifications from 
occurring. Checking the vulnerability of a NetWare server should include checks of 
which bindery objects are allowed modify access to these directories. 
• Bindery database files. 
The bindery database is divided into three file system objects: NET$ PROP. SYS, 
NET$0BJ. SYS, and NET$VAL. SYS. These files are located in the SYS: SYSTEM 
directory, and should be protected against modification by any user object. 
Additionally, old bindery files should be protected, as they may be stolen and analysed 
by an attacker. 
• System and user login scripts. 
System and user login scripts, executed as users log in, should be checked to ensure 
that they exist. In addition, such files should be protected from unauthorised 
modification, and should be checked to ensure that they do not call unprotected batch 
files or programs. 
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·---~-~------.,.-~-~~~_,_~......,~~-:"-------~----"-~"---~---------,--,-_,. 
FS Ob'ect(s) Setting.·· Weakness Exploitation Scenario 
SYS:SYSTEM Any access by This directory usually stores 
SYS:PUBUC 
SYS:MAIL 
normal user system files and configuration 
information that normal users 
should not have read or write 
access to. For example, some 
configuration files in this 








This directory stores 
executables and batch files that 
comprise the bulk of Net Ware 
utilities. Write access by any 
user apart from the supervisor 
could facilitate the spread of 
viruses and worms. In 
addition, users may be able to 
replace legitimate executables 
with their own, or modify 
system login scripts. 
These directories contain user 
login scripts. If normal users 
are allowed write access to 
other user mail directories 
(aside from the Create right), 
login scripts may be subverted. 
- -------~---------------~----------------------------------------·----·--· 





writable by stores the system login 
any user. program, as well as some other 
utilities. Allowing writes to 
this directory will mean that a 
viral infection in one of those 
executables will infect every 
user that logs in. In addition, 
users could replace login 






The database files store the 
system bindery, and should be 
protected against unauthorised 
modification by any user. 
Application directories should 
be protected against writes by 
normal users, but should allow 
read and file scan rights. 
Attacker has write access and 
replaces system NLM with 
subversive version. 
Attacker finds password to remote 
console service in configuration 
tile. 
Attacker replaces often used 
NetWare utility with subversive 
version. 
Attacker modifies system login 
script. 
Attacker modifies mail directory 
login script of another user. 
Attacker replaces LOGIN.EXE 
with their own version. 
Attacker infects LOGIN.EXE with 
virus. 
Attacker deletes bindery files, 
thereby denying access to the 
server. 
Attacker modifies or deletes 
applications. 






In order to protect data Attacker makes unauthorised "out 
integrity, shared data of application" changes to data. 
directories need protection from 
unauthorised modifications. 
Table 8 - 9 Important file system vulnerability scenarios. 
• Protected directories. 
Other directories may require protection from access or changes. For instance, there 
may be a directory on the file server containing confidential information. Checking 
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which bindery objects have access to that directory may be useful. In addition, there 
may be public directories containing applications, to which standard users should be 
allowed execute, but not modify, access. 
• System Binaries 
System binary files should be checked to ensure that the version installed does not 
contain known flaws. As of writing, there are few acknowledged flaws in NetWare 
3.11 or 3.12 binaries for which patches are available. Nevertheless, the utility of a 
configurational audit tool could be extended by including a component which detects 
when obsolete binaries are installed on the server. 
8.5 MISCELLANEOUS SERVER CHECKS 
This section discusses several miscellaneous checks of NetWare technical safeguards that 
do not fall into any of the categories already discussed. 
PACKET SIGNATURE PROTECTION 
The packet signature safeguards discussed in Section B.8 of Appendix B (Page 219) can 
significantly reduce the likelihood of attackers gaining unauthorised privileges to file server 
resources. It may be necessary to include a form of checking to assess whether or not these 
safeguards have been installed on target file server, and are operational. 
CONSOLE SETTINGS 
Some console settings can have an impact on the security status of the file server. For 
instance, the ALLOW _UNENCRYPTED_PASSWORDS variable, if set, allows clients to 
transmit passwords across the network in cleartext form. The risks of this practice are well 
know, and where possible, this console option should be set to OFF. 
Another check that may be performed is whether the console has been secured. This 
removes DOS from the file server's local memory, disables the internal debugger, and 
restricts programs that are executed at the console to the SYS:SYSTEM directory. 
Securing the console in this fashion reduces the risk that an attacker with remote console 
access is able to run a hostile NLM from his or her own user directory. 
A configurational audit tool may be able to check the Console settings to ensure that they 
are consistent with organisational security policy. 
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~C.:c..· ·-'on"-"-···t"-'Jo'-J~~~~~~~ing"'--____ W_ea_k_n_e_ss_ 
Detect No User accounts may be subjected 






Too many password guess 
attempts possible. 
CHAPTER8 
Exploitation Scenari_o ____ _ 
Attacker subjects server to 
continuous stream of password 
guess attempts. 
Attacker can check too many 
guesses in any one attack attempt. 





Too short a 
time period. 




Bad login not "remembered" for 
long enough period of time. 
Account is not locked even 
though there is enough evidence 
to surmise an attack is in 
progress. 
··························-·········· 
Attacker can exploit lockout to 
deny service to target account. 
Attacker can check many guesses 
over a longer period of time (waits 
between attempts, so as to not trip 
lockout). 
Attacker can continue attacking 
server even though the attack has 
been detected. 
Attacker locks out SUPERVISOR 
and equivalent users to mask 






Too Short a 
time period. 
User accounts may only be 
locked out for a short period of 
time before attacker re-
commences attack. 
Attacker locks out account, waits 
then starts again. 
Table 8- 10 Server intrusion detection settings vulnerability scenarios. 
INTRUSION DETECTION SETTINGS 
Intrusion detection settings are specified as a property of the file server bindery object. 
These need to be assessed by a configurational audit tool to ensure that they are active, and 
are configured to provide acceptable security. Table 8 - 10 describes possible intrusion 
detection vulnerability scenarios. 
ACCOUNTING 
The NetWare accounting servtce, while useful for tracking resources that user objects 
consume on the server, has more valuable security implications. With accounting active, 
the file server maintains more in-depth logs of user activity. A configurational audit tool 
should be able to inform the user when accounting is not active. 
NLM SECURITY 
NLM programs, as discussed 111 Appendix B, run at the maxtmum level of privilege 
supported by the operating system. Checking the protection surrounding NLM executables 
and configuration files should be an important issue. 
In addition, where an NLM offers services or access to the file system to external network 
users, the configuration and access controls of these services should also be assessed for 
security. For example, an FTP NLM should be checked to ensure that only authorised 
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users are able to log in, and that the areas of the file system that the NLM can retrieve files 
from is limited. 
Other examples of possible NLM vulnerability exist. For instance, placing the password for 
the RCONSOLE NLM module within server bootup files may represent an unacceptable 
risk for some organisations. 
8.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the main objects and controls that implement NetWare security 
mechanisms. As has been described, there are a number of possible areas of configurational 
vulnerability within the NetWare operating system. Thus, without some attention to 
configurational security issues, NetWare file servers may be vulnerable to attacks from 
skilled attackers, or from accidents made by legitimate users. 
Two aspects of the analysis deserve comment: First, the configuration of NetWare security 
can be a complex process. Bindety ol;>ject and file system object interactions can be 
extremely difficult to assess, because of the number of factors that influence object access 
to volumes, directories and files. Second, the way that administrators go about using the 
NetWare security mechanisms can have a marked effect on file server security. For 
instance, uncontrolled use of individual bindery object trustee assignments may lead to 
difficult to understand file system security structures. 
Irrespective of external controls and management issues, the configuration of individual 
NetWare objects can either add to or detract from NetWare security. Nevertheless, it is 
important to remember that different organisations have different security needs, an aspect 
that configurational audit packages need to take into account. 
The vulnerability scenarios presented in this chapter represent the output of this analysis 
process. These were further refined into baselines which were used in the implementation 
of NetAudit. Baselines are described in more detail in the next chapter. 
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lM'PLE·MENTATION 
OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter explained the process of deciding which checks were 
important for determining the extent ofNetWare configurational vulnerability. 
This chapter describes how this information was used to design and implement 
NetAudit, a vulnerability analysis tool for the Novell NetWare 3.11 and 3.12 
operating systems. 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
On completing the analysis of NetWare objects and controls (discussed in Appendix B and 
the previous chapter), design and implementation of the NetAudit prototype could proceed. 
As discussed in chapter 7, NetAudit's analysis revolves around a baseline checking 
approach. Sections 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 of this chapter describe how the analysis from the 
previous chapter was used to design NetAudit baselines assessing the respective areas of 
bindery, user and file system security. An introduction to the structure of the NetAudit 
package is provided in this section. 
NET AUDIT STRUCTURE 
The overall structure of NetAudit is shown in Figure 9 - 1 on Page 128. As shown, the 
tool is divided according to functional areas of security it addresses. The components of 
the tool are discussed in more detail below: 
Bindery browser 
This component provides an interactive browser that allows the auditor to v1ew the 
contents of the bindery (see Figure D - 1 on page 229). This browser can display the 
security settings of bindery objects, as well as view the contents and security settings of 
object properties. The auditor uses this browser to launch bindery baseline analysis 
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sessions of single servers. The bindery browser provides facilities to view, print or save 
bindery security reports. 
Bindery baseline 
analysis 
File system change 
detection 






Figure 9 - 1 NetAudit program structure. 
Userbase browser 
Server info browser 
This browser allows the auditor to examine the security settings of individual user accounts 
(see Figure 0 - 3 on Page 231 ). Facilities are provided for performing user account 
baseline conformance checks, and for saving user account information so that comparisons 
can be performed during subsequent audits. Reports produced from this browser include a 
user summary report, user details report, comparison reports, and security check reports. 
File system browser 
This browser provides a means of interactively viewing file system settings and information 
(see Figure D - 6 on Page 234 ). Facilities are also provided for baseline oriented analysis 
of file system objects, and for saving file system object state information for comparison 
purposes. Reports produced from this browser include volume usage and summary 
reports, disk space map reports, trustee reports, baseline check reports, and file system 
comparison reports. 
Server information browser 
The server information browser allows the auditor to collect general information about the 
target server (see Figure 0 - 7 on Page 235). Data available from this module includes 
server version information, accounting service status, intrusion detection status, and group 
and device information. In addition, configuration files and various log files can be viewed 
using this browser. This browser does not perform any baseline checks or comparisons; 
however, all information available from this browser can be saved as text files or printed. 
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·riif.~k item Exnlanation:•··.·· L "<···· 
Object security levels. Assess the security settings of individual bindery objects. 
Standard property security Assess the security settings of standard bindery object properties. 
levels. 
. ................. 
Object equivalence to Flag objects that are security equivalent to the SUPERVISOR. 
SUPERVISOR. 
Property count threshold. Flag objects that contain an excessive number of properties. 
·················· 
Notifiable property list. Flag objects that contain a "notifiable" property. 
Table 9 - 1 Bindery baseline summary. 
9.2 BINDERY ASSESSMENT 
Assessing bindery security requirements was discussed in Access controls and the bindery 
in Chapter 8 (Page Ill). As stated, checking the security of the bindery revolves around 
ensuring that the protections of individual bindery objects and properties are correct, in 
relation to the type of object being checked. Table 9 - 1 summarises the tests that this 
baseline performs. Figure 9 - 2 on Page 130 shows the bindery baseline edit dialog. 
The bindery baseline checks object and property security levels. For each type of bindery 
object, auditors can set the preferred read and modify security levels. Standard object 
settings, addressing common bindety object types, are included with the NetAudit 
distribution. Additional object type profiles may be easily added to the baseline. This 
allows NetAudit to accommodate third-party bindery object types. 
The bindery baseline can also be configured to check the security of standard object 
properties. When an object is encountered that contains one of these properties, NetAudit 
checks the property security settings against a standard profile for that property type. 
Currently, NetAudit recognises twenty-four different properties. 
In addition to object and property security checks, this baseline allows the auditor to locate 
objects that are security equivalent to the SUPERVISOR, objects that have an excessive 
number of properties, and objects that contain one of a set of auditor specified notifiable 
properties. This facility provides a means for the auditor to locate bindery objects that may 
have a special security significance. For example, the auditor may be interested in finding 
all objects containing a property that allows access to certain devices or services. 
During analysis of the target file server bindery, NetAudit retrieves individual bindery 
objects from the server, and uses the baseline to decide which checks to perform. If the 
retrieved object is a type that has been included in the baseline object security settings, 
NetAudit compares the security of the retrieved object against the baseline specification. 
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Non-conforming objects are flagged. Once a bindery analysis has been run, the auditor is 
presented with a visual indication of which objects passed the baseline test, and which failed 
(see FigureD- 2 on Page 230). Failed bindery objects are ranked according to the number 
and seriousness of problems that were encountered during the analysis. 
The NetAudit scoring system used is arbitrary, and is common to all baseline reports m 
NetAudit. Serious errors are awarded a score of 100 points, and marked in reports with 
-ERR-. Non serious or informational messages are awarded a score of 1, and marked 
with an - INF- flag. This mechanism allows the flagged objects to be ranked in order of 
seriousness. Objects that have serious errors, or a larger number of informational 
messages, end up with a higher score than those objects that have fewer, or less serious 
errors. 
Figure 9- 2 Bindery baseline editing dialog. 
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File System Access 
Figure 9 - 3 NetAudit user baseline checks. 
9.3 USERBASE ASSESSMENT 
Recall from the previous chapter that there are many security settings that influence 
individual user account security. As a result of the number of checks required, the user 
baseline is divided into seven more manageable sub-baselines. These are outlined in Figure 
9- 3, and are described below. 
User details 
The user details sub-baseline is summarised in Table 9 - 2. As illustrated, checks performed 
by this part of the user baseline are primarily aimed at detecting those accounts that are 
disabled, have not been used, or have no expiry date specified. In addition, the auditor may 
specify that accounts with no identification (full name) information are flagged. 
This sub-baseline allows the auditor to detect the presence of an active GUEST account. 
At some sites, GUEST accounts are acceptable. However, good security practice suggests 
that guest accounts should be discouraged, due to the lack of accountability associated with 
their use. 
User password settings 
Vulnerability scenarios related to password controls were discussed in Chapter 8 (Table 8 -
3 on Page 113). These controls are contained in the user LOGIN_CONTROL binde1y 
,_C_:_'h~ec~k_• ··-'-\1:-'-'ein~'''-'-"S-=-:':"'"'· ~-~'--- _EXQlanation 
Require full account name. Check accounts for full name . 
.. ... .. .. .. .. .. ····-·-···-··· ................................... . ...... ~---·- ............................................................ _.,,.. . 
Require account expiry date. Flag accounts that have no specified expiry date. 
----~---~- -------------
Flag disabled account. Flag accounts that have been disabled by intruder detection lockout, 
expiry or for any other reason. 
·················································- ·····························································-····· ......................... . 
Check inactive accounts. Flag accounts that have not been used for a certain number of days. 
Check dormant account. Flag accounts that have been set up, but never used. 
----------------------------·-------------·-··-·-· -----------------------·······------------------------------------------------------·········------------------------------------------- ·········--·-··-·-····--.. --
Allow GUEST account. Check for the presence of the GUEST account. 
Table 9 - 2 User details sub-baseline. 
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Check item 
····· 
····· .... 1 E:xvlaiiation ······ . .. ·· 
.. :c 
Require account passwords Flag accounts that have no mandatory password requirements. 
Allow user password changes Flag accounts that do not allow users to change their own passwords. 
Require unique passwords Flag accounts that allow users to re-use old passwords. 
Require forced password Flag accounts that are not subject to periodic forced password changes, 
changes or which have inappropriately long password lifetimes. 
Allow grace logins. Flag accounts allowing grace logins, or allowing too many grace 
logins. 
Minimum password length. accounts allow the user to specify a password that is too 
short. 
Table 9 - 3 User password settings. 
property, and regulate how users choose and change passwords. Table 9 - 3 details the user 
password settings sub-baseline used by NetAudit. 
The auditor can configure this baseline to detect those users that have insecure password 
controls. These include users that are not required to password protect their accounts, 
users that are allowed to re-use old passwords, and users that are allowed to specify short 
passwords. Additionally, this sub-baseline can specify acceptable password lifetimes, and 
grace login usage. Accounts not meeting or exceeding these preferred guidelines are 
flagged during the baseline analysis. 
A password cracker, although a useful addition to configurational audit, was not included 
in NetAudit prototype due to the difficulties of checking passwords via NetWare client 
API's. A third party NLM based password cracker, called SMARTPASS, is available to 
crack NetWare 3.11 and 3.12 passwords.' 
rh~~k item t:1if11~hcltion ···•···· .. ·•·••· • •··. 
Allow concurrent logins Flag accounts that allow more than one concurrent login session. 
Require Node restrictions. Flag accounts with no restrictions regarding which physical 
workstation nodes the account may be used from. 
Require Time restrictions. Flag accounts with no restrictions regarding the times that the account 
is able to be used. 
Table 9- 4 User account restrictions. 
User account restrictions 
User account restrictions vulnerability scenarios were discussed in Chapter 8 (Table 8 - 3 
on Page 113). The user account restrictions sub-baseline is summarised in Table 9 - 4. 
Auditors can use this sub-baseline to detect user accounts that are allowed more than a 
specified number of concurrent logins, or that lack node or time restrictions. This version 
1 SMARTPASS is available from e.g. Software Inc [62]. 
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Check item F:xnial1ation 
Check SUPERVISOR equiv. Flag accounts that are SUPERVISOR equivalent. 
Check Workgroup Manager. Flag accounts that are workgroup managers. 
Check equivalence to non-user Flag accounts that are security equivalent to non-user objects. 
objects 
Limit maximum number of Flag accounts with more than a specified number of security 
equivalencies equivalencies (includes groups). 
Check for equivalence to Flag accounts that are security equivalent to objects nominated as 
notifiable bindery objects. sensitive by the auditor. 
Table 9 - 5 User baseline security settings. 
of NetAudit simply tests whether such node and time restrictions are present. No analysis 
is performed to assess the security impact of the times that logins are allowed, nor of the 
station from which these logins are permitted. 
Security settings 
The security settings sub-baseline is outlined in Table 9 - 5. The auditor can use this 
baseline to detect SUPERVISOR equivalent and workgroup manager users. In addition, 
the following checks are performed: 
o Check equivalence to non-user objects. 
When specified, this check examines user accounts to determine the presence of 
security equivalence relationships with non-user or non-group objects. Any that are 
detected are flagged. As mentioned in Chapter 8 (Table 8 - 4 on Page 115), these may 
cause incompatible usage problems, or erratic behaviour on the part of the file server. 
o Limit maximum number of equivalencies. 
This check detects user accounts that have in excess of a (baseline specified) number of 
equivalencies. Again, as noted in Table 8 - 4, too many equivalencies can lead to 
complexity and unforseen interaction; this baseline item allows the auditor to detect 
such complexity. 
• Check equivalence to notifiable bindery objects. 
This check allows the auditor to specify bindery objects that are considered sensitive. 
A list of these bindery objects is specified by the auditor, and any user accounts that are 
found to be equivalent to these are flagged by NetAudit. 
This version of NetAudit does not include checks of user operator privileges (discussed in 
User privilege settings, on Page 113 in the previous chapter). Such checks will be added 




Check for access in volume 
root. 
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IE~-.· .......... ·.························-·· .. · ' accounts with trustee assignments in the root directory of any 
1 volume. ~~:~ocS:E~~~~:.. .••••. I"';g,~:;~;~:~:thS~i,:~~:Ri;~,,-,~,gh,; -~: -·······. ·····~·········· 
Check for access in Tagged 
Dirs 
I Check effective access in nominated directories, and flag those users 
I with rights in excess of those permitted. 
·-.... ,~"""""""""""'""""""""' ...................... ""'~"' ............. L ......... """""'""'--"" ............... , ...... ,....... """"''--""""""""""'""''-~'"'""'""""""""'' ............. ,~ 
Table 9 - 6 User file system access baseline. 
User login scripts 
User login script vulnerability scenarios were detailed in Chapter 8, on Page 115. There are 
two checks performed by the user login script sub-baseline: First, user accounts are 
checked to ensure that they at least have a login script file. Second, the file system 
protections of that file are checked for correctness.2 Checks of the contents of user login 
scripts do not appear in this prototype of NetAudit, although adding such functionality 
would be reasonably straight-forward, and will be added in a future version. 
User resource settings (volume restrictions) 
Vulnerability scenarios related to volume restrictions were discussed in File system 
restrictions (Chapter 8, Page 116). The user resource settings sub-baseline allows the 
auditor to detect users who consume more than a certain percentage of any volume. In 
addition, NetAudit will optionally detect whether user accounts have volume usage 
restrictions, or if such restrictions are over-size (larger than the total volume size). 
File system settings 
The file system. settings sub-baseline, shown in Table 9 - 6, allows the auditor to assess user 
trustee rights assignments. Two of the checks specified in Chapter 8 (Table 8 - 6 , Page 
120) are performed by this sub-baseline: checking for trustees assigned in the root of a 
volume, and checking for SUPERVISOR level trustees. 
NetAudit also allows the auditor to specify a list of tagged directories. A tagged directory 
is a directory for which a set of maximal effective rights are specified. For example, the 
auditor may specify that users are allowed a maximum of read and file-scan rights in the 
SYS: PUBLIC directory, and no rights at all in the SYS: SYSTEM directory. During an 
analysis run, NetAudit checks the effective access of each user account within tagged 
2 Alternatively, checking the permissions of user login scripts can be performed by setting up a tree protile 
on the SYS: MAIL directory specifying no write access for any user. For further discussion of file system 
profiles, see File system assessment, on Page 136. 
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directories. If this access exceeds the specified allowable rights, that account is flagged for 
attention by the auditor. 
Using this mechanism, the auditor can designate areas of the file system as off limits or 
restricted access, and can detect those users who are assigned inappropriate rights in the 
directories specified. A file-system oriented check of trustee rights is also available. This is 
discussed further in Directory tree profiles on Page 137. 
USER CHANGE DETECTION 
In addition to the user conformance and 
vulnerability checks described above, 
NetAudit allows the auditor to record user 
configuration information for comparison 
purposes. Using these change detection 
features, the auditor can determine the effect 
of changes that have been made to both 
individual user accounts, and the general 
user population since the last configurational 
audit. 
User comparison files are saved from the 
userbase browser. When directed to create 
a comparison file, NetAudit saves user 
configuration information for the currently 
displayed selection of user accounts. The 
comparison file is saved in binary format, 
and consists of the user account settings that 
are tracked by the user baseline. 
Performing comparisons 
Figure 9 - 4 illustrates the user comparison 
process. Once the auditor has specified a 














Figure 9 - 4 User comparison process. 
file and uses it to determine a set of user accounts to compare on the target file server. For 
each user account found in the comparison file, NetAudit retrieves the same account from 
the target file server. In the event that the user account no longer exists, NetAudit reports 
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Figure 9 - 5 Main file baseline dialog showing profiled directories. 
the account as a deleted user. If the user does exist, then NetAudit compares the current 
security state of the user to the saved version, reporting any changes that are found. 
Once the comparison file is exhausted, any users left from the original selection are 
reported as users that have been added to the system since the last comparison was 
performed. 
9.4 FILE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT 
Checking NetWare file system object security and conformance is achieved by the NetAudit 
file system baseline. The main file system baseline edit dialog is shown in Figure 9 - 5. 
There are two main components of this baseline: A SYS : volume check, and a directory 
tree check. These are described in more detail here. 
SYS: checks 
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are a number of important objects (from a 
security perspective) on the SYS: volume. This check assesses the security of a variety of 
these objects. These checks (currently) include: 
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Figure 9 - 6 File profile structure. 
• Search for ole{ bindery files 
This check searches the SYS : SYSTEM directory for old bindery files. These files are 
generated by BINDFIX. EXE, and are often left unprotected. 
• Inherited rights masks on standard directories. 
Security vulnerability scenarios related to incorrectly configured inherited rights masks 
were discussed in Chapter 8 (Table 8 - 6, on Page 120). The NetAudit SYS : volume 
check ensures that the inherited rights masks of the SYS: SYSTEM, SYS: PUBLIC, 
SYS :MAIL and SYS: LOG IN directories prevent rights granted in the volume root 
being inherited in these directories. 
Directory tree profiles 
Directory tree baselines, called profiles, are used by NetAudit to assess the security of file 
system objects. Profiles are applied either to single directories, or to entire directory trees. 
Figure 9 - 6 illustrates the structure of NetAudit file system profiles. Profiles are 
configured by the auditor to check file size limits, trustee access, file attributes, and file 
ownership. These items are described in more detail below: 
• File size limit; 
This profile item allows the auditor to specify a size limit for files that are found within 
directories covered by the profile. Files exceeding this limit are flagged, allowing the 
auditor to locate large files in inappropriate parts of the file system. 
• Trustee access. 
The trustee access profile item consists of a list of bindery objects and the maximum 
allowable rights of those objects within the profiled directory. Where necessary, a 
default profile can be specified that is applied to any object that has trustee rights in the 
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profiled directory. By specifying which bindery objects are allowed trustee assignments 
in particular directories, inappropriate trustee rights assignments can be detected. 
• File attributes and ownership. 
This profile item consists of a list of file name patterns (such as . EXE, . NLM, . DOC, 
DATA. TXT, etc.) to which are attached specifications about the kinds of owners and 
attributes that are permissible for files matching these patterns. If a file is encountered 
in a profiled directory matching one of these patterns, the owner of the file is checked 
for membership in the permissible owners list of each file type. Additionally, the 
attributes of the file are checked to ensure that they conform to acceptable standards for 
that type of file. 
It is important to note that using file name patterns to determine file types is easily 
spoofed by simply changing the name of the file. Future versions of NetAudit may 
attempt to more accurately judge file type from an analysis of the file contents. 
There are two types of profile available in NetAudit. Unless specifically excluded in a 
subdirectory, a tree profile applies to the directory it is specified in, as well any sub-trees 
located in that directory. Directory profiles apply only to the directory in which they are 
specified. In addition, the auditor can explicitly exclude from the analysis directories or 
trees that might otherwise be covered by a tree profile. 
Tree and directory profiles are a flexible method of assessing the security of sub-sections of 
the file system. By specifying a tree profile in a volume root, for instance, the auditor can 
specify standards that are to apply to the entire volume. If there are directories or trees on 
that volume with special security requirements, additional profiles can be specified for those 
areas. These additional profiles take precedence over any active tree profiles specified in 
parent directories. 
A typical profile tree setup for the SYS : volume is shown in Figure 9 - 7 on page 139. In 
this baseline, tree profiles have been set up in the SYS : volume root directory, the 
SYS: LOGIN directory, and the SYS: SYSTEM directory. The arrows indicate 
subdirectories where the tree profiles have been inherited, while the grey boxes indicate 
directory trees that have been excluded from the analysis. 
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Figure 9- 7 Typical SYS: volume file system profile setup (taken from NetAudit). 
In this baseline, the auditor has specified a set of defaults in the root of the SYS: root 
directory that are to apply to most of the volume. These may include specifications for 
acceptable file attributes and owners for executables on the volume, tile size limits, and a 
limit on use of the SUPERVISOR trustee right. The SYS: SYSTEM and SYS: LOGIN 
directories may have tighter restrictions specified, due to the sensitive nature of the files 
found in these directories. 
Other file system checks 
In addition to the checks described for the SYS: volume, and those carried out by directory 
and tree profiles, there are three other general tests that the auditor may specify. When 
active, these tests are performed for any directory that is not specifically excluded from 
analysis by the auditor. The checks are: 
• Hidden files and directories. 
This option allows the auditor to locate any files or directories that may have been 
flagged as hidden (see File object attributes, on Page 120). 
• Files with no owner. 
When specified, this option checks that files scanned during an analysis have a valid 
owner. Files that do not are flagged (see File owner checks on Page 121 ). 
• Owner not last updater. 
This option checks that files scanned during an analysis have identical owner and 
updater fields. Those files that do not are flagged. 
The directory profile mechanism described above can be configured by the auditor to 
address most of the vulnerability scenarios described in Table 8 - 6, Table 8 - 7, Table 8 - 8, 
and Table 8 - 9 in Chapter 8. Although a certain amount of effort may be required on the 
part of the auditor to specify the file system baseline, this mechanism is flexible enough to 
handle a wide range of site requirements. 
139 
CHAPTER 9 NetAudit Design and Implementation 
FILE SYSTEM CHANGE DETECTION 
NetAudit incorporates facilities for detecting changes within auditor nominated parts of the 
file system. By detecting alterations, the auditor can gain a better idea of how file system 
security has changed since the last configurational audit was performed. NetAudit can also 
determine where unexpected changes have occurred to file system objects. 
NetAudit comparison files can be used to check server conformance. A comparison file 
containing file signatures of the standard contents of the SYS: SYSTEM, SYS: LOGIN and 
SYS: PUBLIC directories could be used by an auditor to check that appropriate system 
executables are installed on the target server. 
Comparisons can detect the following changes: 
• Directory structure. 
File system comparisons can detect added or deleted directories. These include hidden 
and system directories. NetAudit will also detect where files have been added to or 
deleted from a directory. 
• Directory trustee assignments. 
Added, deleted or changed directory trustee assignments are detected. However, at 
this stage, the current prototype does not track file trustees. 
• File size changes. 
Changes in the size of files, and the magnitude of those changes, are detected. 
• File object owner. 
Changes to file or directory ownership are detected. 
• File object dates. 
NetAudit can detect changes to creation and modify dates of files or directories. 
• File object attributes. 
File and directory attribute changes can be detected during file system comparisons. 
• File contents. 
NetAudit can optionally calculate a file signature that can be used to determine changes 
in the contents of individual files. 
Saving comparison files 
NetAudit saves file system comparison files in human readable text form. This allows the 
auditor to manually examine entries in the file. Where necessary, entries can be removed 
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from these files with no ill effects. It is also possible to update individual comparison file 
entries, although this prototype of NetAudit does not currently support this. 
When directed to save a comparison file, NetAudit uses the current file system directory 
profiles to decide which portions of the file system to store. Any directory that has an 
active profile is saved as part of the comparison file. This allows the auditor to select only 
specific parts of the file system to track. NetAudit records directory, subdirectory and file 
information for each directory included in the comparison file. 
File signatures 
The auditor can specify whether signatures are stored as part of the comparison file. This 
prototype of NetAudit uses the RSA Data Security Inc. MD-5 message digest algorithm. 
This algorithm generates a very secure 128 bit signature based on file contents. 3 MD-5 was 
selected over CRC and other conventional hash codes because of the potential spoofability 
of these methods. 
Performing comparisons 
NetAudit uses the saved comparison file to decide which file system directories to include 
in the analysis. The comparison process is similar to that described for user comparisons in 
Figure 9 - 4 on Page 135. Directories and files that appear in the comparison file that do 
not appear on the file server are reported as deleted, while directories and files that appear 
in the profiled directories, but not the comparison file, are reported as new. 
Changes to any of the tracked items mentioned above are also reported. Comparison 
reports are exportable as text files, allowing further filtering or analysis to be performed. 
9.5 IMPLEMENTATION ENVIRONMENT 
NetAudit was developed in the Borland C++ 3.1 environment, using the ObjectWindows 
and Application Frameworks class libraries included with this compiler. 4 The target 
platform for NetAudit was the Microsoft Windows platform, an operating system extender 
commonly found at sites running the NetWare operating system. There were several 
advantages of developing NetAudit as a Microsoft Windows 3.1 application: 
3 The code implementing MD-5 in NetAudit was borrowed from the Tripwire package (discussed in 
Chapter 6). 
4 See Implementation language on Page l 02. 
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NetAudit 
Figure 9 - 8 NetAudit executable structure. 
• User interface. 
Windows makes it possible for developers to make extensive use of the graphical user 
interface metaphor. NetAudit uses makes use of graphics, fonts, and menus to present 
security information to the user. 
• Memory Management. 
Windows provides a more sophisticated form of memory management than does MS-
DOS. Large amounts of memory are handled automatically by Windows, easing the 
development process considerably. 
• Dynamic Link Libraries. 
Windows supports the concept of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL's). These modules 
export functions that are callable by other Windows applications. DLL's allow 
programs to be dividing into modules according to functionality, and facilitates more 
efficient use of Windows memory. 
There were also drawbacks to the use of Windows as a platform. Because NetAudit is a 
graphical tool, a significant amount of work was required to design and debug the user 
interface component. In addition, documentation for some parts of the application 
programming interface for both Windows and for accessing Novell NetWare servers, were 
inadequate. 
NETAUDIT EXECUTABLE STRUCTURE 
Figure 9 - 8 illustrates the executable structure of the NetAudit application. As shown, 
NetAudit is divided into five distinct modules. These are explained below: 
• NETAVDIT.EXE 
This is the main executable for NetAudit. This module implements the user interface 
for NetAudit, and contains code for the four main browsers of NetAudit. In addition, 
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this module includes baseline editing dialogs, server attachment and various other 
functions. 
• PRVIEW.DLL 
This module contains code related to the saving, printing, and display of text reports 
from NetAudit. In addition, it exports a control to other NetAudit modules that 
facilitates viewing of text files of any size. 
• FILEDLL.DLL, USERDLL.DLL, and BINDDLL.DLL. 
These modules implement data gathering, analysis and comparison functions for file 
system, userbase and bindery security respectively. There are no user interface 
elements in these modules, so they can be easily ported to other operating systems, such 
as Windows NT or OS/2. 
• NWCALLS.DLL 
NetAudit communicates with NetWare using NWCALLS.DLL. This DLL, distributed 
by Novell, exports the NetWare client API. 
9~6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the design and implementation of NetAudit, a prototype 
configurational vulnerability analysis tool for the NetWare operating system. The next 
chapter discusses how NetAudit was used in a trial analysis project. The results of this 





This chapter describes how NetAudit was used to assess NetWare system 
security at a production site. Results from this study are presented, along with 
an evaluation of the NetAudit package and approach. 
10.1 TRIAL PROJECT 
A NetAudit trial project was conducted at a major Christchurch academic institution. The 
campus-wide LAN of this organisation hosts a variety of shared computing resources, 
based around NetWare 2.2 and 3.11, IBM LAN Server, SCO Xenix, and Linux Unix. 
Several client operating systems are also used, including MS-DOS, OS/2 and Unix variants. 
While a central authority is r~sponsible for the overall administration and well-being of the 
LAN, individual departments are permitted to administer local systems connected to the 
network. NetWare 2.2 and 3.11 are commonly used by departments in a variety of roles, 
including staff, student, and support computing. With the cooperation of system 
administrators, NetAudit was used by the author to test several NetWare 3.11 systems at 
this site for configurational vulnerability. 
The objectives of these tests were as follows: 
• Assess the value of conformance testing as a vulnerability detection technique. 
A primary aim of this project was to assess how well NetWare configurational 
vulnerability could be detected by using NetAudit's baseline techniques. From this, 
several conclusions regarding the effectiveness of conformance testing as a means of 
detecting configurational vulnerability were made. Change detection was not included 
in this set of tests. 
• Assess the effectiveness of the NetAudit prototype. 
It was important to assess how effective NetAudit was as a tool. Indeed, during the 
project, a number of areas where NetAudit could be improved were identified. These 
improvements will be included in future versions of NetAudit. 
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Server Users Function 
A 247 Contained a mix of student and staff accounts. Most student accounts on this 
machine belonged to people enrolled In novice programming or computing 
courses. 
···!···· 
B 324 Contained student and some staff accounts. User accounts for more advanced 
computing students were stored on this server. 
c 532 This server held a large number of accounts used by students studying general 
subjects. In addition, a large number of guest account as well as many staff 
accounts resided on this server. 
........... 
D 162 This server was used mainly by novice users, using MS-Windows applications. 
1~--
E 87 This server was used as an experimental testbed for students learning about 
NetW are operating system. Co-administered by students, this server 
only student accounts. 
Table 10- 1 Trial project server swnmwy. 
• Assess the security of the target systems. 
The final goal of the trial project, and the overall objective of NetAudit, was to assess 
the security of the target systems. Analysis of data from NetAudit reports revealed a 
number of interesting observations about the security setup of the tested systems. 
Target server selections 
From a server population of about twenty file servers, five NetWare 3.11 servers, 
controlled by a single department within the organisation, were selected as targets. These 
systems accommodated a variety of needs, and supported a disparate mix of users. The 
servers selected are summarised in the Table 10 - 1. Of these servers, four were 
administered by department personnel. Server E was administered in conjunction with 
some of the organisation's students. 
BASELINE SETUP 
Initially, a suitable baseline setup was discussed with administrators at the site. This 
baseline embodied the site practices that were active at the time; however, the baseline that 
was defined by no means represented most secure settings that could have been employed 
for conformance testing. Rather, the resulting baseline was suitable relative to the security 
needs of that particular site. Baselines used during the trial project were identical for each 
server. This allowed configurational conformance to be subsequently compared between 
systems. 
Of particular importance to this analysis was the large number of guest accounts that were 
active on the systems tested. Guest accounts, while being inherently risky, are sometimes 
the only way to overcome technical security problems in NetWare environments consisting 
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of multiple servers. These guest accounts were to have an impact on the results of the trial 
project. 
For each file server, a set of standard baseline runs were performed for bindery, userbase 
and file system security. NetAudit reports generated from these runs were collected during 
the project test sessions, and immediately obvious security problems that were detected 
were pointed out to the administrators of the affected systems. Reports produced by 
NetAudit were later analysed by the author after the NetAudit session; tools used during 
this additional analysis included standard text processing tools such as grep, awk, sort, we 
and uniq. 
BINDERY ASSESSMENT 
An initial scan of the target servers revealed that most objects in the binderies of these 
systems were standard types. Thus, the baseline selected for bindery checking addressed 
standard object and property security levels. Apart from SUPERVISOR equivalent 
objects, no other notifiable bindery objects were specified. 
Bindery results 
Applying the bindery baseline to each of the servers in the analysis revealed no major 
problems. There was no evidence of tampering with any of the binderies tested. All 
objects that were flagged as SUPERVISOR equivalent were administrative user objects, 
with legitimate requirements for such access. 
Several print queue and server objects were flagged for inadequate object or property read 
security. In the case of flagged print servers, a bindery object read security level of 
ANYONE was specified. This turned out to be a requirement of a printer resource 
accounting package installed and in use at the site. Some print queue objects were flagged 
for inadequate Q_DIRECTORY property read security settings, although this read access 
did not present a threat to the security of the tested servers. 
USERBASEASSESSMENT 
The user baseline was a somewhat simplified version of the standard baseline distributed 
with NetAudit. Because of the particular security arrangements at this site, several items 
that would normally be included in the user baseline were omitted. The baseline items 
selected to take part in the analysis, and those omitted, are discussed below: 
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• Account inactivity 
Discussions with administrators revealed that accounts were considered inactive if they 
were not used for more than 14 days. This figure was used as the baseline specification 
for account inactivity. 
e Dormant accounts. 
Dormant accounts are a problem at the site, due to "batch" setup of default class 
accounts, some of which are inevitably not used. Detecting these accounts is 
important, as they can potentially be misused by users to gain access to additional 
printing and disk resources to which they are not entitled. 
• Disabled accounts. 
This baseline item checked for accounts that had been disabled. Most user accounts 
tested lacked expiry dates, as these were not in widespread use at the site. Accounts 
were generally only disabled through the intruder detection lockout feature (where it 
was active), or as a result of administrator actions. However, during the analysis a 
small number of accounts tested were. discovered to have expiry dates; some of these 
had in fact become disabled through account expiry. 
• Login scripts. 
The existence of login scripts is always an important NetWare vulnerability factor. 
Accounts without login scripts were flagged. 
·" Password settings. 
As per site practice, the baseline specified that users were allowed to re-select 
previously used passwords, and that a minimum password length of five characters was 
required. However, there were no site guidelines regarding password expiry (no forced 
password changes or grace logins). Consequently, these settings were not included in 
the analysis. 
e Account restrictions 
The only account restriction important to this analysis was a limit of two concurrent 
logins per account. Time and node restrictions were not used at this site, and were left 
out of the analysis. 
.. Account security settings. 
Accounts were checked for equivalence to SUPERVISOR, workgroup manager 
privileges, and equivalence to non-user objects. 
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A D E 
Total number of accounts 247 324 532 162 87 
Potentially vulnerable accounts 112 320 267 47 87 
Tag violations 28.8 98.1 0.0 10.5 58.6 
Dormant 9.3 35.2 33.8 5.6 12.6 
Inactive 14 days or more 9.7 2.8 10.0 7.4 85.1 
No password required 3.2 8.3 8.3 I I. I 31.0 
NULL password 3.2 7.4 4.5 11.7 31.0 
Less than min password length 1.6 7.4 7.7 2.5 32.2 
Disabled 0.4 0.0 7.3 0.0 27.6 
S trustee assignments 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 48.3 
No login script 1.6 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.0 
------·--""'""'"''"""""'"''"~""""'""'""''"' .... """-'"""""'"•"""""'"'-'"''""'"''""'-·"'"''"'""'""-"'"""'"-"'--·-·----------""""""'""""'~"·~-~-~~."""-'"-····· 
Table I 0 - 2 Trial project results from userbase analysis. 2 
• User resource settings. 
User accounts were checked for a greater than 10 percent usage share of any volume 
on the target server. The. site had experienced problems in the past with users 
monopolising disk space. Since that time, volume restrictions limiting user disk space 
consumption had been enforced. 
• User file system interaction. 
The ability of users to write to standard NetWare filesystem components was assessed 
as part of the user baseline. Specifically, rights in the SYS: SYSTEM (none), 
SYS: MAIL (Create), SYS: PUBLIC (Read and Filescan) and SYS: LOGIN (None) 
directories were assessed. 1 This baseline also checked for root and Supervisory trustee 
assignments. 
Userbase results 
The main results from userbase assessments of the test servers are shown in Table 10 - 2, 
and are summarised in graph form in Figure lO - l on Page 150. For each vulnerability 
category shown in Table l 0 - 2, the percentage of the total user accounts on each server 
with that particular vulnerability are shown. Legitimate administrative accounts (i.e. 
SUPERVISOR and equivalent users) were removed from the tagged directory and 
Supervisory trustee assignment analysis figures, as they automatically have access to the 
1 Trustee assignment checks in other directories were performed as part of the file system assessment, 
discussed on Page 152. 
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Figure 10- 1 Summary of NetAudit userbase analysis. These graphs compare the 
percentages of accounts with the various categories of vulnerability that were found during 
the analysis. 
entire file system. As these figures suggest, there were marked configurational variations 
between the servers taking part in the test project. 
The largest percentage of potential vulnerabilities shown in Table 10 - 2 are those 
associated with directory trustee tag violations. There was an inordinately high percentage 
of tag violations observed on server B. Examination of that server revealed that the 
EVERYONE group was accidentally granted Write trustee rights to the SYS: MAIL 
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directory, and Read/Filescan rights to the SYS: LOGIN directory. Since most user 
accounts on NetWare servers are members of the EVERYONE group, nearly every 
account on server B was flagged as potentially vulnerable. A similar problem existed on 
servers D and A, although in those cases different groups, containing less members, were 
assigned write access to mail directories. Site administrators were unaware that the 
writable mail directory vulnerability was present. 3 
Several other tag violations were noticed. On servers A and B, two staff member user 
accounts were granted Write access to the PUBLIC directory. Checking revealed that 
these assignments allowed the staff members involved to update login notices located in 
that directory. The accounts belonging to these staff members were otherwise secure. The 
large number of tag violations on server E were the result of users being individually 
assigned Supervisory rights to their own mail directories. 
The next most common problem encountered on the test servers were dormant accounts. 
Significant proportions of the total user account population on Servers B and C had never 
been used; subsequent investigation revealed that on these servers, a number of new 
accounts had recently been added in preparation for the coming term. Dormant accounts 
on the other servers were also of interest. Again, accounts had been set up for classes, but 
were never used. Some of the detected accounts had been present on the system for 
considerable periods of time, and were protected by default passwords. The fact that 
expiry dates were not used on these servers compounded the risks associated with these 
accounts. 4 
A number of inactive accounts were located on the test servers. Given that the baseline 
specification for inactive accounts was only 14 days, the number of accounts flagged was 
surprisingly small compared to the number of users tested. One exception was server E, 
where just over 85 percent of the user accounts were detected as inactive. This is 
presumably indicative of the experimental nature of that server. 
A number of accounts on each server were found to have NULL passwords. The main 
factor in this figure was site reliance on guest accounts, for which passwords were not 
3 In this case, granting Write access to users in the SYS: MAIL directory allows those users to open and 
write (but not read) an existing file. For example, an attacker could, with this rights assignment active, 
change the SUPERVISOR login script. Normally, only the Create right is granted in this directory tree. 
4 Although server C had previously implemented user account expiry dates, resulting in a relatively high 
number of disabled accounts on that server. 
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used. Nevertheless, a number of staff and student accounts on servers A and B also lacked 
passwords. A noticeable (but not surprising) relationship appears to exist between the 
number of accounts allowing users to specify passwords of less than 5 characters, the 
number of accounts not requiring users to specify a password, and the number of accounts 
with NULL passwords. 
Except for server E, Supervisor trustee assignments were not a common feature of the 
servers tested. Again, the high number of these assignments, combined with the relatively 
large number of (manually) disabled accounts on this server indicate its experimental 
nature. 
Accounts with no login script were rare, but there were still a total of 9 (from 1352 
accounts tested) which lacked such scripts. Fortunately, none of these accounts were 
privileged, or belonged to staff members. 
Other user security issues were also addressed during the analysis. The incidence of 
SUPERVISOR equivalence .encountered was low, with typically two to three such 
accounts on each server. Workgroup managers were uncommon, and there were no user 
account managers on any of the servers tested. Resource use did not appear to be a 
problem, with the only disk intensive account detected belonging to one of the 
SUPERVISOR equivalent administrators. All accounts tested had volume space 
restrictions enforced. 
FILE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT 
A standard baseline was devised for file system analysis of the test servers. This baseline 
included the standard NetWare system directories, as well as other directory structures that 
were common to each machine. There was enough similarity between the five servers 
tested that only minor modifications were necessary to adapt the standard baseline for 
server specific directories. 
Table 10 - 3 summarises the standard file system baseline that was used for each server. All 
profiles shown are tree profiles (applying to files in the directory specified, as well as files in 
sub-trees). 
The SYSTEM, LOGIN, PUBLIC, and PROGRAMS directory trees were profiled to ensure 
that executable files were protected by the Read only (Ro) attribute. These profiles also 
specified that the only allowable executable file owners were administrators 
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Profile EXEowners EXE,attdbutes Trustee Assignments Permitted 
····························---···· . ·····················-----········--····································· ......................................................... .. 
SYS:SYSTEM Administrators only At least Ro 
SYS:LOGIN Administrators only At least Ro 
SYS:MAIL Anyone Any 
SYS:PUBLIC Administrators only At least Ro 





Read and Filescan (anyone) 
Read and Filescan (anyone) 
Any exceptS or A. 
Table 10- 3 File system baseline used during trial project. 5 
(SUPERVISOR or equivalent), or the file server itself. Execute-only, Rename Inhibit, and 
Delete Inhibit attributes were not used at this site, and were left out of the analysis. 
Trustee assignments for the SYSTEM and LOGIN directories were disallowed, while 
assignments for the PUBLIC and MAIL directories were respectively set to the NetWare 
standards of Read!Filescan, and Create. The project site was conveniently set up with a 
standard directory nanling convention for user and program directories, regardless of the 
volume on which they appeared. As a result, the two standard tree profiles, PROGRAMS 
and USERS, were used for other volumes on the five servers tested. 
A variety of profiles were used instead of one blanket profile for the SYS : volume. This 
was because of differing trustee requirements for each directory tree in the analysis (i.e. 
SYSTEM vs PUBLIC directory requirements). A further consideration was that NLM and 
LAN files should only appear in the SYS:SYSTEM directory tree. Separate profiles 
allowed baselines to be set up to flag instances of these files appearing elsewhere within the 
file system. 
Finally, the file system baseline was configured to check for files with no owners, as well as 
hidden files and directories belonging to non-administrative users. SYS: volume checks 
were also enabled. 
Filesystem results 
Results from the file system analysis of the five target servers are summarised in Table 10 -
4 on Page 154. Depending on the server, file system sizes ranged in total size from about 
200 Megabytes to over 1.3 Gigabytes. Again, SUPERVISOR and equivalent users are 
removed from trustee assignment analysis. 
5 The * indicates any server volume containing this directory tree. 
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Total size of file system (K) 
Number of volumes 
SYS: Check 
Old bindery files 
Standard IRM's correct 
Hidden files and directories 
Hidden directories 
Hidden files 
File attributes and owners (standard dirs) 
LAN Files needing Ro 
NLM Files needing Ro 
EXE Files needing Ro 
COM Files needing Ro 
Inappropriate owner/type/location 
Trustee Assignments 
Trustee assignments in SYS:LOGIN. 
Trustee assignments in SYS:SYSTEM 
Write trustee access to SYS:PUBLIC 
Greater than C rights in SYS:MAIL 
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Table 10- 4 File system analysis results. 
These statistics show that there were a large number of executable files in the SYSTEM, 
PUBLIC, LOGIN and PROGRAMS directories of these servers that are not protected by the 
expedient of Ro attributes. In terms of human attackers, this is not a particularly major 
configurational flaw. However, as mentioned in Chapter 8, the Ro attribute is a last line of 
defence against file viruses, and its use can help prevent the spread of viral infections. 
There were no site guidelines regarding the use of file attributes; executables were simply 
left with the default installation attributes. 
Inappropriate file owner and location combination errors accounted for a large number of 
flagged files on servers A and E. On these systems, non-administrative users had at some 
stage installed a number of applications in shared program directories. The balance of the 
files flagged for this problem were attributable to NLM or LAN files residing in unusual 
(non SYSTEM) directories. 
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Hidden files and directories did not present a problem for this site. No hidden directories 
were found, and of the hidden files found, only a small proportion belonged to non-
administrative users. These were checked, and turned out to be lock file residue from a 
popular, but crash-prone, commercial word processing package. 
The SYS : volume check revealed that the inherited rights masks for standard directories 
were not set correctly on any of the servers present. Fortunately, no root trustee 
assignments were found on those servers. This check additionally revealed the presence of 
old bindery files on two of the five servers checked. 
Analysis of server trustee assignments showed that servers B and C both contained trustee 
assignments in the LOGIN directory tree. On Server B, this consisted of Read and Filescan 
rights being granted to the group EVERYONE for the LOGIN directory - not a serious 
problem, and previously noted by the userbase analysis. However, in the case of server C, 
EVERYONE was assigned Read, Write, Create and Erase to a LOGIN subdirectory 
containing executables. This was apparently a commonly accessed part of the file system of 
that server, and as such would represent an ideal place to plant Trojan horse attacks. This 
vulnerability was not noted by the userbase assessment, as tagged directories apply to a 
specific directory - not directory trees. 
There were several trustees assigned m the SYSTEM directories of the tested servers. 
Further checking showed that these assignments were to legitimate objects such as printer 
servers, queues, and counters. No user trustees were assigned to the SYSTEM directory of 
any of the systems tested. 
A sizeable number of user accounts on servers A and C were assigned Access control rights 
to home directories (in the USERS directory tree ).6 These rights were mostly assigned to 
teaching staff user accounts, allowing staff to grant trustee rights to students for specific 
areas of their home directories. Some students were also assigned Access control rights to 
their own home directories. Very few Supervisory trustee assignments were located in the 
USERS trees of the tested systems. 
The SYS: MAIL observations in Table 10 - 4 reflect the results from the userbase tagged 
directory analysis (see Page 150), where Supervisory rights (in the case of E) and Write 
rights (in the case of A, B, and D) were specified. 
6 These were not included in the tagged directory analysis in the userbase assessment. 
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A B E 
Intrusion Detection settings 
Attempts 10 Inactive lO Inactive Inactive 
Lockout retention time l day l day 
Lockout period 15 min 15 min 
Accounting Enabled Enabled Enabled Enabled Enabled 
SUPERVISOR equivalence 3 3 3 3 2 
Workgroup Managers 3 l 0 2 
Console operators 6 0 0 0 0 
Account defaults 
Expiry date None None None None None 
Minimum password length None None None None None 
Maximum concurrent logins 2 2 2 Unlimited Unlimited 
---· 
___ .......... , .... ---"'""--"'"""""""'"""""'' ________ "'"'''''---·---
Table 10- 5 Summary of the general server setup results. 
A final observation about the file system security of the tested systems was that there were 
significant quantities of ownerless files present on servers A and C. These reflected the 
number of accounts that had been created and destroyed on these servers over the lifetime 
of their respective file systems. 
GENERAL ISSUES 
A summary of other more general security information from NetAudit server reports is 
given in Table 10- 5. As can be seen from this table, there were inconsistencies in the use 
of the intrusion detection lockout mechanism, as well as the use of account setup defaults. 
Of the servers tested, only A and C enabled the lockout feature; the other three servers did 
not use this mechanism. This is understandable for server E, given its experimental nature, 
but is unusual for servers B and D. No reason was given by the administrators of these 
systems as to why lockout was disabled. 
That the account setup defaults were configured in this fashion was also unusual. Usually, 
accounts are generated automatically, with the correct password and concurrent login 
settings specified by the generating program. However, accounts that are setup manually 
(in SYSCON) will still use these defaults, which need to be overridden by the administrator 
creating the account to ensure conformance with site standards. 
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On a more positive note, Table lO - 5 shows that the accounting feature was enabled on all 
servers. In addition, this table shows that there were an acceptably low number of 
SUPERVISOR equivalent and workgroup manager accounts active. Server A was the only 
server that had users with console privileges. 
SUMMARISING TRIAL PROJECT SITE SECURITY 
The analysis of the test servers revealed little sign of past attacks or misuse. However, as 
discussed previously, a number of areas of configurational vulnerability within the userbase 
and file systems of these servers were uncovered. 
There was evidence of a lack of consistency in the use of NetWare security mechanisms 
between servers, particularly in the administration of user accounts. For example, some 
accounts had minimum password lengths specified, while some did not. Several non-guest 
user accounts on a var·iety of servers lacked passwords, or login scripts. On some servers, 
users were granted access controls to their own MAIL or USER directories, while in other 
cases they were assigned only minimal rights to these directories. 
File system controls were also not used to their full advantage; file attributes were not 
uniformly used, and trustee assignments for shared directories were sometimes insecure. 
Anomalies in the use of the intrusion detection lockout features, as well as account 
defaults, were also noted. 
A discussion with the administrators at the test site established that no formal site policy 
existed within the organisation outlining security requirements for servers connected to the 
organisational LAN. The results of such a lack of guidelines are reflected in this trial 
project, where many inconsistencies have been noted between systems. These results 
reinforce the notion that a formal or semi-formal site policy outlining acceptable use of 
system security mechanisms will almost certainly reduce the number of configurational 
vulnerabilities that are present. 
It is important to note that NetAudit baseline developed for this site was not optimal. For 
example, password and account expiry mechanisms, node and time restrictions, and 
detailed trustee assignment data confidentiality checks, were not used. However, the 
baseline did serve to both detect vulnerability where it existed, as well as compare all five 
servers to the same standard. 
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10.2 NETAUDIT EVALUATION 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the objectives of the trial project were not 
confined to simply testing the security of the selected site. Two other objectives of the 
project were to evaluate the value of baseline checking (discussed below), and to comment 
on the suitability and effectiveness of the NetAudit tool (see Page 159). 
BASELINE APPROACH EFFECTIVENESS 
On the whole, the baseline approach appeared to be quite successful. While the majority of 
objects tested in the sample project conformed to the minimum standards set by the site 
baseline, those that did not were detected, and were able to be further examined by the 
author for vulnerability. Often, it was found that objects not conforming to baseline 
standards in one area were also vulnerable in other areas. As discussed in the previous 
section, a number of outright vulnerabilities were also identifted. It is important to note 
that further study of this technique within other types of site is necessary before any 
concrete conclusions can be drawn about the effectiveness of this approach. Some general 
observations about NetAudit's baselines are discussed below. 
Overall, the most valuable aspect of the baseline approach is that objects not conforming to 
site security standards are detected. As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, such standards 
may vary quite significantly between different types of organisation, or even within different 
departments of a single organisation. Configurable baselines, such as those supported by 
NetAudit, can accommodate these varying needs. 
It is, however, possible to specify a baseline that ts inherently insecure. As a simple 
example, a NetAudit baseline may be configured to not check for NULL passwords. When 
used, such a baseline will not report any problems for those accounts lacking passwords. 
The importance of this point is that while NetAudit is puportedly providing assurance that 
the system conforms to a given set of standards, those standards are themselves insecure. 
Indeed, there may be a case for the creation of an analysis tool that checks the 
configuration of configurational audit tools. 
By ensuring inter-object and inter-server consistency and standards conformance, the 
auditor can be more certain that there are less opportunities for vulnerability to escape 
unnoticed. Systems conforming to a straightforward, yet secure, baseline setup are less 
likely to suffer from complexity in the use of security controls. In the case of NetWare, for 
example, the more trustee assignments and equivalencies there are, the greater the chances 
are that unforseen interaction within the file system will become a problem. By reducing 
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the number of individual object trustee assignments, and reducing the number of inter-user 
equivalencies, the security setup of the target system becomes easier to understand and 
administer. 
Baselines go hand in hand with organisational security policy. A clearly defined policy on 
the use of technical security mechanisms can be used as a template from which baseline 
configurations are extracted. At sites lacking such policies, such as that analysed in the trial 
project, inconsistencies in the use of these mechanisms are likely. 
NET AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS 
There were a number of problems encountered while using NetAudit. As it stands, reports 
produced by NetAudit from the trial analysis proved to be inadequate for post processing. 
This was obvious from the amount of off-line text processing that was required to massage 
these reports into meaningful statistics for the analysis given in the previous section. 
Several minor and not so minor bugs in the implementation of the package were also 
located and fixed during the analysis project. 
The simple ranking system for user account vulnerability reports proved to be very useful. 
By ordering vulnerable user accounts by the number and seriousness of the non-
conformities or vulnerabilities detected, it was possible to get a reasonable idea of the more 
seriously vulnerable accounts on each server. 
This mechanism could be extended to simulate multiple vulnerability checking. This could 
be achieved by adding a large figure to the total account "score" when particularly bad 
combinations of vulnerability for a single user are detected. 
Extensions to NetAudit to check the contents of login scripts and batch files in system 
directories are necessary. While not strictly a conformance test, such checks will certainly 
help detect some of the more subtle vulnerabilities that may occur when trusted 
executables, scripts or batch files reference unprotected publicly accessible components. As 
mentioned in chapter 9, these will be added to a later version of the NetAudit package. 
The NetAudit user interface needs to be redesigned to support automated and unattended 
scans of multiple servers. The browsers are useful for interactive testing, but the lack of 
unattended checking facilities proved to be quite a burden where there were several servers 
to check. 
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More complete checks are required for file objects. For instance, as mentioned in Chapter 
nine, NetAudit assesses file type based on the extension of the file. There are obvious flaws 
in this approach; a better method would be to attempt to discern the contents of the file 
based on its contents. Most executable programs have a fairly well-defined structure, as do 
graphics, wordprocessing and text files. 
Extending NetAudit to include checks of client workstations may be possible. By running 
an automatic agent as part of the system login script, every client could be subjected to a 
"mini-scan" as it logged in. Unfortunately, NetWare clients can easily bypass system and 
user login scripts during the login process - work needs to be carried out to ensure that 





For whatever reason, vulnerability is a common feature of many computer systems. Half 
the battle in the security process, it seems, is recognising that vulnerability can and does 
appear, even in systems with outwardly impressive controls. By assuming that vulnerability 
exists, one is in a better position to approach the problem of locating such flaws with an 
open mind. 
Although vulnerability may occur in any of the security environments discussed in Chapter 
two, this thesis has focussed on the configurational weaknesses that often plague technical 
controls. Such flaws occur easily, and yet can lurk undetected within systems for long 
periods of time before being discovered and exploited (or fixed, depending upon who 
discovers the flaw). From a risk analysis perspective, these weaknesses are extremely cost 
effective to safeguard against, simply because the costs of reconfiguring security controls, 
or installing vendor patches, are so low. 
Chapter three of this thesis presented a general overview of technical vulnerability, and 
showed that technical security weaknesses can occur because of a variety of both general 
and system life-cycle factors. Chapters four, five, and six discussed the techniques and 
philosophies of some existing tools designed to detect the presence of configurational 
vulnerabilities. 
Chapter seven introduced NetAudit, a tool prototype designed to address configurational 
vulnerability within Novell NetWare 3.lx systems. As established in this chapter, NetWare 
exhibits many of the same factors that lead to configurational weaknesses in other 
computing environments. Chapter eight provided an analysis of how configurational 
vulnerability might manifest itself within the NetWare environment, while chapter nine 
described how those results assisted the design of NetAudit. 
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Chapter ten presented a trial project, in which NetAudit was used to assess the security of a 
small number of Net Ware servers at a production site. A number of security anomalies and 
outright vulnerabilities were discovered within these systems, and major inconsistencies in 
how these servers applied NetWare security mechanisms were noted. These inconsistencies 
illustrate the importance of organisational policies regulating the use of technical security 
controls. The lack of such guidelines can mean that ad-hoc choices may be made about the 
use of these controls, resulting in potential mayhem at some stage in the future of the 
affected system. 
The evaluation of the NetAudit approach given at the end of chapter ten suggests that 
conformance and baseline checking are valid techniques for detecting configurational 
vulnerabilities. This is only a tentative conclusion; a wider range of sample sites are 
required to confirm these results. 
Nevertheless, common sense tells us that if the controls of a system conform to secure and 
uniform standards, then the chances of vulnerability are lessened considerably. Of vital 
importance, then, is deciding what constitutes a sufficiently secure standard for the 
purposes of a given target system. This is essentially a policy question, and NetAudit is a 
tool that uses such guidelines to confirm that system controls adhere to those policy 
standards. 
Some caution is also required. One should remember that configurational audit tools 
merely give an opinion about the presence of known vulnerabilities. As with any remedial 
approach to assessing computer vulnerability, NetAudit provides no guarantee that 
assessed systems are totally free of technical flaws. Configurational audit and conformance 
tools can only ever assess the presence of potential weaknesses that they are aware of, and 
new flaws in technical safeguards are discovered almost daily (although not necessarily in 
the NetWare environment). 
In summary, it is safe to say that the best way to deal with complex computer security 
mechanisms is to discipline the use of those controls, embracing simplicity and uniformity 
wherever possible. Configurational audit tools, especially those incorporating conformance 
detection components, cah help achieve this. 
FUTURE WORK 
As discussed in chapter ten, the NetAudit prototype does suffer from some implementation 
weaknesses. Some of these have been remedied, while others await further effort on the 
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part of the author. In addition, a number of possible enhancements were also suggested in 
NetAudit effectiveness, on Page 159. Two other issues, the application of NetAudit 
techniques to other LAN server environments, and the use of other configurational audit 
techniques, are discussed below. 
Other platforms 
In its current form, NetAudit is specific to NetWare 3.lx. Due to the differences between 
NetWare's security mechanisms, and those of platforms such as Microsoft's Windows NT 
or IBM's LAN Server, it is currently impractical to develop a tool that competently 
addresses all three. Nevertheless, these platforms face many of the same configurational 
security problems of NetWare systems, and so developing suitable configurational audit 
tools for each would be a worthwhile exercise. 
The NetWare 4.1 operating system, a considerably enhanced version of NetWare released 
by Novell in 1993, has many features in common with earlier versions of NetWare. File 
system controls are in some cases identical, and trustee assignments are still used. The 
biggest difference between the two is that NetWare 4.1 replaces the bindery database with 
a more scalable mechanism called Directory Services. This mechanism allows enterprise-
wide management of LAN resources, and is considerably more complex than the simple 
bindery mechanism described in this thesis. 
Due to the similarities between versions 3.1 x and 4.1, much of NetAudit' s analysis can be 
directly applied to the NetWare 4.1 environments. Extensions are required to address 
Directory Services configurational issues, but these would simply require the addition of 
another module to NetAudit. 1 Given the complexities of Directory Services, the need for 
configurational audit tools for NetWare 4.1 systems is just as pressing as it was for earlier 
versions of NetWare. Notwithstanding this, an analysis of NetWare 4.1 's controls, sirnilm· 
to that described in this thesis, will still need to be carried out to assess potential sources of 
vulnerability. 
Other techniques 
Currently, artificial intelligence techniques are not widely applied to configurational audit 
tools. The one exception discussed in this thesis was the Kuang tool, a basic system for 
1 NetWare 4.1 does offer a bindery emulation mode that allows 3.lx clients to use bindery services on a 
Directory Services server. Unfortunately, the emulation is not sufficient to allow the current version of 
NetAudit to accurately assess server security. In addition, there are many new NetWare services that are 
not dealt with by this bindery emulation mode. 
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assessing individual account vulnerability (see the discussion of COPS, in Chapter 6). This 
tool showed that there is a place for rule-based expert systems in configurational audit. 
More work is required to apply such techniques to the problem of detecting, in particular, 
multiple vulnerabilities. The relationships between individual vulnerabilities can sometimes 
be subtle; an expert system can encapsulate multiple vulnerability knowledge, and recognise 
situations that may otherwise escape attention during a conventional configurational audit. 
Work is also required to make such expert systems easier for auditors to access and use. 
Graphical visualisation of security controls could be an important factor in future tool 
designs. This visualisation could allow the auditor to build a more accurate mental model 
of system security configuration. Such tools may assist the auditor to quickly understand 
how security is enforced on the target system, and where vulnerabilities may be present. 
The NetAudit tool, for example, uses a limited graphical display to provide the auditor with 
a view of the file system from the point of view of a user. This concept could be expanded 
on to provide a "tour" of security mechanisms from the point of view of a particular 







This appendix presents a brief overview of some of the methodologies, 
techniques and sources of information that can he used to assess the presence 
of technical vulnerabilities within existing production systems. 
A.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to an early paper by 1\!"uemann [50], there are essentially two approaches used to 
deal with technical vulnerabilities within a system: preventative, and remedial. Preventative 
approaches attempt to reduce system vulnerabilities by avoiding (or identifying) them at the 
design and implementation stages. Remedial approaches are applied to existing systems 
that are in use - but which may contain vulnerabilities. Although Nuemann's paper was 
written in 1978, both approaches are, by and large, still valid today. 
The TCSEC [20] and ITSEC [31] evaluation criteria both note that systems must be 
designed in a secure fashion in order to receive a high assurance security classification. A 
system that has been formally specified and verified, for instance, is more likely to have 
been subjected to exhaustive tests validating its security model, and the mechanisms 
implementing that model. Conversely, systems that have been designed without the benefit 
of a formal pedigree lack the necessary design simplicity required to exhaustively test their 
security. Not surprisingly, these systems tend to receive lower classifications. [20, section 
6.4] 
Remedial approaches are applicable where security controls have been added to a system, 
rather than integrated as a fundamental design objective. Most modern commercial 
operating systems (i.e. standard Unix, Novell NetWare, MS-DOS, standard DEC VMS, 
etc.) fall into this category. Remedial approaches attempt to uncover system vulnerabilities 
by testing system controls or analysing system source code. 
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The best results obtainable from remedial approaches are that some existing vulnerabilities 
may be uncovered. After the first few vulnerabilities are discovered, successive flaws will 
become increasingly difficult to detect. An exhaustive examination of the security 
mechanisms is unlikely, due to a lack of a formal "roadmap" for those mechanisms. To 
make matters worse, safeguards implemented to remedy discovered flaws may themselves 
contain further vulnerabilities, complicating the entire process [50]. 
Nevertheless, remedial approaches are still useful. Even if such analysis fails to identify all 
system vulnerabilities, the net result is (hopefully) that the system will be more secure than 
it was prior to the analysis. 
A.2 THE FLAW HYPOTHESIS METHODOLOGY 
A classic approach to the problem of locating operating system flaws is embodied in the 
Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (FHM). First formalised by Richard Linde in 1975, the 
FHM reportedly enjoyed a penetration success rate of up to 65% on systems tested [38]. 
Flaw Hypothesis Methodologies are still commonly used to evaluate security (i.e. see [33, 
p.263]). An updated approach to FHM is given in Pfleeger eta!. [53]. 
Flaw hypothesis methods can be employed at almost any level of abstraction. For example, 
a penetration analyst might hypothesise that an access control flaw exists that allows an 
unauthenticated user access to confidential information. On a different level, an analyst 
might hypothesise that a certain system call, when passed a given parameter, will produce a 
kernel panic. While ostensibly testing for flaws introduced at the implementation or 
production stages of a system's life, vulnerabilities discovered during a flaw hypothesis 
analysis may also help reveal underlying weaknesses in system design. 
A basic assumption of the flaw hypothesis methodology is that certain types of generic 
vulnerabilities will exist on most systems. This assumption has proved reasonably 
successful, as indicated by the reported success rate in [38]. In the case of operating 
systems, the functional categories in which vulnerabilities will most likely occur are: 1 
• I/0 Control. 
• Program and data sharing. 
• Access control. 
• fnstallation management and operational control. 
1 A comprehensive list of common Haws is given in [38, Appendix A]. 
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Generate an inventory of 
possible tlaws 
Generalise about the nature of 
underlying system weaknesses 
Figure A- I The Flaw Hypothesis Methodology. 
• Auditing and surveillance. 
APPENDIX A 
Using knowledge of the system being evaluated, the penetration analyst hypothesises the 
existence of likely flaws, and then devises and executes a set of tests to support or refute 
each hypothesis. Hypothesises proved correct may lead to generalisations about underlying 
system weaknesses. Flaw Hypothesis Methodology steps are summarised in Figure A - 1, 
and are detailed below: 
I. Gaining knowledge of system control structures 
The first FHM stage involves gaining an in-depth knowledge of the system. This may 
include reading design manuals, implementation manuals, programming library 
documentation, system documentation, operations documentation and procedural 
documentation. 
The objective of this step is to build a comprehensive picture of the objects that are 
protected by the system, and the controls that protect them. Some objects may exist in 
both classes. For example, Unix I etc /passwd files exist as both a protected object, 
as well as a control object that protects other system objects (in this case, user 
accounts). 
The advantages of identifying important control objects within the system are twofold: 
First, during the flaw hypothesis generation step (see below) the penetration analyst can 
apply generic templates of "good" and "bad" system control object arrangements, in an 
effort to ascertain the absence or misplacement of safeguards. Second, identified 
control objects can be subjected to more rigorous testing. 
The level of abstraction at which penetration tests are carried out will dictate the type 
of information gathered at this stage. For example, if the analyst is interested in testing 
169 
APPENDIX A Identifying Technical Vulnerability 
flaws in an operating system's implementation, then data concerning internal system 
structures (i.e. process tables, kernel data structures, operating system calls) will be the 
most useful. Alternatively, the analyst may be interested in testing the effectiveness of 
system controls at the level of an untrusted user, and hence may collect information 
about how general users interact with these controls. 
Gathering information about control structures may or may not involve an examination 
of the system source code. In some cases, source for the system under investigation 
may not be available, and it will be necessary for the penetration analyst to hypothesise 
about the nature of internal system structures by examining published system interfaces. 
If source code is available, tools such as source analysers, cross-referencers, and text 
searching programs may be useful to help search and organise code. 
2. Generating an inventory of suspected flaws 
At some stage the penetration analyst will have gathered enough information about 
system control structures to begin generating a list of suspected flaws. Usually, 
comparing control objects to generic (but common) "bad" templates will yield a good 
number of hypotheses to work on. 
As noted by Muffett [ 4 l], the genealogy of the system may present other useful 
hypotheses. For example, the system currently under evaluation may be derived from 
an earlier system that was known to contain a flaw. In this case, a good hypothesis may 
be that the same flaw has made it unscathed into the system currently being evaluated. 
3. Confirming Hypotheses 
There are two ways that can be used to confirm or refute hypotheses generated in the 
previous step. The first involves "gerdanken", or thought experiments. In these 
experiments, the analyst works from the system documentation, source code, or other 
information and proves on paper that the flaw hypothesis is valid. 
The second method is a live test of the flaw hypothesis. This may be required if 
gerdanken testing proves inconclusive. For example, the flaw may involve 
asynchronous code problems that may only appear under certain system conditions. In 
cases such as these, there may be no choice but to go ahead and write a program or test 
suite to exercise the suspected flaw. 
4. Making generalisations about underlying system weaknesses 
The last step in the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology involves reviewing successful 
penetrations and identifications of flaws, and generalising about the strengths and 
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weaknesses of the system's security mechanisms. From these reviews, further flaws 
may be hypothesised and subsequently tested. 
DRAWBACKS 
While the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology is a useful strategy for finding vulnerabilities 
within systems, one major difficulty with the approach exists. Flaws hypotheses are 
generated by hand on an ad-hoc basis, and consequently systematic and complete 
exercising of the security mechanisms is not attainable using this methodology. 
The number of hypotheses generated are fundamentally limited by the analyst's level of 
knowledge of the system under evaluation, and by the quality of any "educated guesses" 
the analyst may make. 
In some cases, though, a more thorough method of generating hypotheses is required. 
Where source code is available, source code analysis may be used to generate and test an 
exhaustive list of hypothesis. This is sometimes known as "white box" testing. Examples 
and experiences of a source code· analysis tool are given in Gupta et al. [30]. 
Alternatively, where source code or detailed system information is not available, "black-
box" testing may be used. Black box testing assesses the relationships between system 
inputs and outputs. This analysis may reveal details of the internal system design, from 
which flaw hypotheses can be generated. Inconsistencies or vulnerabilities may also be 
directly revealed by this approach (Chorley [ 11, p.45]). Black box testing is generally a last 
ditch technique. 
As pointed out by [11], the results gleaned from black-box tests are at best speculative. In 
complex systems, black box testing may uncover some flaws, but is just as likely to miss 
many more. Nevertheless, as with most remedial approaches, black-box testing still retains 
some value simply because it may be the only applicable methodology. 
A.3 TIGER TEAMS 
Tiger teams are a useful, if somewhat controversial, method of assessing the security of 
computer systems. Tiger teams proactively attempt to penetrate the system in order to 
assess the effectiveness of security safeguards, and to detect vulnerabilities that may have 
been missed in regular risk analysis and audit exercises. 
Generally, tiger team projects may be initiated by one of three groups: [28] 
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e Upper management 
Upper management may be nervous about the security of their computer system, and 
may want an independent analysis performed to provide additional assurance. 
• Middle management or system auditors 
Occasionally, middle managers may commission a tiger team project in an effort to 
collect concrete information about system vulnerabilities in order to convince upper 
management to pay more attention to security issues. Alternatively, company auditors 
may commission a project as a way of assessing the vulnerability of company 
information systems, or to add weight to some other audit findings (the "I told you so" 
approach [29]). 
• Security officers 
The third group who may commission a tiger team project are those responsible for the 
security of the target system. Often, this may be to add a "real world" dimension to 
risk analysis exercises, or to confirm their opinion that the security of the system is 
adequate (the "Take your best shot" approach [29]). 
TIGER TEAM APPROACHES 
The general approach adopted by tiger teams vanes depending on the goal of the 
assessment. The goal may be to successfully gain access to some object (i.e. a specific file), 
or to some privilege (i.e. superuser privileges). A time limit of perhaps a few weeks is 
imposed upon the project. 
As the following excerpt (from [74, p.46]) illustrates, tiger teams tend to assess the overall 
level of system security, not just the technical security issues: 
... [the tiger team] was hired to prove that the security systems were weak at a 
U.S. government defence contractor. [The] tiger team electronically broke 
into the network in less than 10 minutes using a dial-up modem and left 
messages on the network to prove they were there. Through windows, the 
team also took photos of class(f!ed documents displayed on computer 
terminals. A11d a man dressed in a white uniform was sent in carrying a water 
bottle and was allowed to enter the building without a security check. Whe11 
inside, he infected computers with a fake virus. 
In the above example, the tiger team considered vulnerabilities in network access controls, 
physical access controls and protection, and access controls to workstations. 
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Initial viewpoint 
Tiger teams can assess security from two points of view: outsiders or insiders. When 
assessing security from an outsider's viewpoint, members of the team are told nothing 
about the system. From this limited vantage point, they then have to learn enough about 
the system to break into it. This viewpoint does have disadvantages, as pointed out by 
Goldis [28, p.S]: 
Only false comfort would be gained by having the tiger team conclude after 
two weeks of trying that they did not have the right modem or could not guess 
the right telephone number. 
From an insider viewpoint, the tiger team ts grven the access privileges and system 
information that is afforded a "normal" system user - for instance an employee. This is 
probably a much more effective method than the outsider approach, given the rather larger 
risks presented by inside threats. The emphasis therefore switches to determining that the 
internal safeguards protecting system assets are in place, and are functioning correctly. 
As noted by [29], several intermediate vantage points exist. For instance, the attacker 
could be an outsider who has a little information about the company that has been learned 
from ex-employees; or the attacker could already be a privileged user, such as the super-
user. Assessing security from these various viewpoints helps to build a better picture of 
overall system weaknesses. 
Covert or overt 
The decision over whether to operate the tiger team as a covert or overt operation is an 
influential one. If the operation is operated covertly, members of the system staff may 
become upset once it is revealed to them that people have been assessing "their" system 
behind their backs. On the other hand, the tiger team is likely to get a more representative 
sample of security practices if they are allowed to assess them secretly. If the operation is 
run overtly, system staff may increase their attention to overall security, and be more alert 
for potential vulnerabilities during the project. This is not necessarily a bad thing. 
Scope 
The scope of the tiger team project may take into account just the computer hardware and 
software, or it can take into account the entire security environment. For instance, during 
one tiger test exercise of the Multics operating system, penetration analysts sent a bogus 
system update tape containing a Trojan horse to Multics site. Due to lapses in procedural 
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security, the tape was duly loaded, and the team were subsequently able to access the 
operating system (Cooper [ 13, P.222]). 
Methods 
Tiger teams are able to use any of the techniques that a potential attacker might use. For 
instance, they may adopt a flaw hypothesis methodology and attack the system interface 
directly; they may use black box testing on system applications or utilities; they may employ 
network monitoring tools to capture unencrypted passwords; or they may employ 
subterfuges such as calling the system help desk and requesting a new password for a 
targeted user account. 
Goldis [28] mentions one other specific attack technique that may be employed by tiger 
teams: probing. Probing is where the analyst uses the standard privileges of a user, and 
browses the system for questionable access. 
DRAWBACKS 
There are several drawbacks to the tiger team approach. First, as noted in [74], tiger teams 
by their nature are haphazard approaches, and should not be viewed as a replacement for 
conventional security assurance tests, such as audits and risk analysis. 
The tiger team may not find any significant flaws in the security of the system within the 
allotted timeframe. This in itself does not prove that the system is secure, but that simply 
either the team did not have the level of skills required to penetrate security within the 
timeframe, or that any vulnerabilities present are well hidden. 
Tiger teams have received some negative reaction within the security community, especially 
when "reformed" crackers began offering their services as security experts to the wider 
business security2• Reputable providers of security services, such as Coopers & Lybrands 
and Price Waterhouse, avoid using ex-crackers because of the associated risks involved 
with cracker personalities[? 4]. 
Tiger teams must also be careful to avoid becoming so overzealous in their efforts that they 
interrupt normal system processing. For instance, proving that the system is prone to 
denial of service attacks from user created programs by creating and running a program 
that consumes all system resources is not a recommended strategy. 
2 Such as members of the infamous "Legion of Doom" hacking team. 
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A.4 OTHER VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY 
METHODS 
Apart the methods described in the previous sections, vulnerabilities may be discovered in 
production systems using a variety of less systematic means. This section discusses 
methods whereby an administrator can discover vulnerabilities within their own systems. 
These methods include: 
• Configurational Audits 
Configurational audits are discussed in this thesis. In a configurational audit, the 
underlying strengths and weaknesses of system control mechanisms are not considered; 
rather, these audits attempt to. assess whether system controls are configured to provide 
an acceptable level of security. Configurational vulnerabilities are one of the most 
common vulnerabilities exploited by attackers, and identifying them within a system is 
an important aspect of system security. 
• Monitoring 
Monitoring the activity of active computer attackers is a technique that can yield 
valuable information about vulnerabilities that are exploited during attacks, as well as 
the attack methodologies used. Bellovin [ 4] and Cheswick [ 1 0] both describe 
monitoring strategies that were employed to track the activities of attackers attempting 
to gain access to AT&T Bell's internal computer network. By observing attacker 
activity, both from system logs, and from within a specifically constructed fake 
environment, these administrators were able to build a reasonable catalogue of a 
number of standard, as well as more sophisticated, Unix attack methods. 
Basic system monitoring is another method of gathering such information. 
Unfortunately, as noted by [4], more sophisticated auditing mechanisms and data 
reduction tools are required to identify attack attempts and suspicious behaviour. 
Large systems may typically generate between l and 20 Megabytes of audit data per 
day, an amount impossible to analyse without the aid of tools. 
Intrusion detection systems3 are an emerging technology that may provide an answer to 
the problem of identifying attack behaviour from volumous amounts of audit data. By 
automatically analysing audit information, intrusion detection systems attempt to 
identify system attacks as they occur. Intrusion detection systems may also detect 
3 For a comprehensive overview of Intrusion Detecti~n, see Lunt[ 40] or Watson[79]. 
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usage anomalies, which may indicate that an attack is occurring using a vulnerability not 
known to system users or administrators. 
• Trawling 
A good approach for those interested in learning about system vulnerabilities is to read 
those documents and books from which crackers learn their craft. Many sources of 
information exist detailing specific system vulnerabilities, and information about the 
people who exploit them. These sources include underground electronic journals (such 
as Phrack, 2600 etc.), and security related net-news groups (i.e. alt.2600, camp. 
security.misc, comp.security.unix, and comp.risks). There are also many repositories of 
security related information around the Internet, such as spy. org, cert. org, and 
csrc.ncsl.nist.gov. 
• Vulnerability watchdog organisations. 
Organisations such as CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) and CTAC 
(Computer Incident Advisory Capability) periodically publish warnings about newly 
discovered vulnerabilities in various systems (see Scherlis et al. [68] and Schultz eta/. 
[69] ). These security advisories are available from the ftp sites mentioned above, or 
from various mailing lists. 
CIAC and CERT advisories are typically "terse" explanations, that purposefully do not 
give much information on the nature of the vulnerability discussed. The 8LGM list 
server, f i leserv@bagpuss. demon. co. uk., publishes more detailed advisories 
of common security flaws. Access to these advisories is subject to more controls than 
the public distribution of CERT or CIAC advisories. 
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VirJL.J;\lE.RAB I L I TY .AN.A.LYS IS 
VENOVELL NET'W"ARE 
VERSION 3.11 
This appendix presents an analysis of Novell NetWare Security based upon a 
Local Area Network Security architecture proposed by Lisa Carnahan of the 
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology. By applying this risk 
analysis framework to Net Ware 3.11 and 3.12 LAN security, a number of 
potential areas of vulnerability in NetWare systems are identified and 
discussed. 1 
8 .. 1 THE LAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
Local area networks pose a unique problem to information security. On one hand, it is 
difficult to deny the useful nature of the LAN architecture. By distributing computing 
functionality around an organisation, the network provides a flexible and easily expandable 
computing environment. Network users are able to share resources such as storage space, 
applications, database services, communications services and access to other host systems. 
The network also allows users to exchange messages and form work-groups of people 
working on related projects. 
On the other hand, a LAN architecture discourages centralised control. Security policies 
and mechanisms that work well on a centrally managed system may not be so effective in a 
networked environment. Networks typically allow a greater number of paths to 
information, and not all of these paths may be secure ones. Improperly managed networks 
are more likely to suffer exposure to threats both internal and external to the organisation. 
Poor controls or a lack of understanding of network security issues can lead to a computing 
environment that is vulnerable to a myriad of threats. 
1 This appendix was originally a technical report prepared by the author for the New Zealand GCSB. 
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Analysis Category· 
Unauthorised LAN Access. The threat of unauthorised parties gaining access to the LAN. 
Unauthorised Access to LAN The threat of unauthorised parties gaining access to LAN resources. 
Resources. 
··········································-·············· ··································-··· ·························································· ············································• 
Compromise of LAN Data. The threat of unauthorised parties gaining access to LAN data. 
Unauthorised Modification of 
LAN Data and Software. 
The threat that unauthorised changes are made to LAN data and 
software . 
........ ···············--·············································· ··········································• ................ ·································-·····- ... ····························•··············· ·····················································. 
Compromise of LAN traffic. The threat that LAN traffic is intercepted as it travels across the 
Modification to LAN traffic. 
LAN medium and is used to obtain unauthorised access to 
information. 
The threat that Data transmitted over the LAN is modified. 
···········----------------····-····-·······--~-·-··---···------·-·-·-----------·-·-·-···-·-····- ············--···· 
Spoofing of LAN traffic. The threat that LAN traffic is intercepted, by masquerading as either 
the legitimate sender of the data, or as the legitimate receiver of the 
data . 
..................................................................... ......................... .......................................... . 
Disruption of LAN functionality. The threat that LAN services are disrupted. 
Table B - I Categories of LAN vulnerability Analysis. 
Lisa Carnahan's Local Area Network Security Architecture ([7], [9]) provides a set of 
guidelines and procedures for analysing risk in LAN systems. As part of this risk analysis, 
the security analyst is required to identify individual threats to the LAN, the vulnerabilities 
in the LAN that may be exploited by the threat in question, and the safeguards that are in 
place or available to reduce the risk of those vulnerabilities. 
This report starts with a discussion of the general architecture of the NetWare LAN 
operating system, followed by an examination of the threat areas discussed in [7]. For each 
threat area, the relevant NetWare technical safeguards are identified; potential 
vulnerabilities that may be exploited by an attacker in order to realise threats are also 
identified. The threat areas examined (based on [7]) are summarised in Table B - 1 below. 
This report relates only to NetWare versions 3.11 and 3.12, and assumes that no Novell or 
third party security enhancements have been added. Certain problems with NetWare 
security that are outlined in this report may or may not have corrective patches available 
from Novell. 
In this appendix, items that are of importance to the overall security status of a 
NetWare network will appear in this font. 
8.2 NETWARE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
The NetWare 3.11 and 3.12 operating system runs on dedicated file servers attached to the 
network. Access to the operating system is granted to network users who satisfy 
authentication requirements. Programs running on the NetWare file servers, called NLM's, 
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provide core NetWare functionality, as well as additional network servtces. These 
processes are cooperatively multi-tasked, and run at the highest level of privileges that 
NetWare supports. 
Two NLM issues are important. First, because these programs run at elevated privileges, 
they represent an easy way for an attacker to subvert the security mechanisms. Second, 
because NLM's are multi-tasked cooperatively, a single buggy NLM that crashes without 
relinquishing control of the CPU will cause the entire file server to cease functioning. 
THE NETWARE BINDERY 
NetWare keeps track of network information in a structure known as .the bindery. The 
bindery is a flat-file database which contains information about the network operating 
environment, network users, network user security settings, restrictions and system 
accounting data. The bindery is composed of objects, properties and property data sets. 2 
Objects 
An object can be a user, a group· of users, a file server, print server or any other logical or 
physical entity on the network that has been given a name. Each bindery object is assigned 
a unique 8 byte bindery ID by the file server at creation time. By default, bindery IDs are 
not coordinated between servers on multiple server networks. 
Properties 
Each bindery object has a number of characteristics, or properties. These can include such 
data sets as passwords, account restrictions, account balances, groups that the object 
belongs to or a list of authorised clients (in the case of a network service). For instance, 
user accounts have a number of properties associated with them, such as a PASSWORD 
property, a SECURITY _EQUALS property and so on. 
Property data sets 
Property Data Sets are the values that are assigned to bindery object properties. Some 
bindery properties may have only one value associated with them, as in the case of a 
PASSWORD property; others, such as a SECURITY_EQUALS property may have a 
number of values. 
2 Objects, properties and property data sets are stored in the the system tiles NET$0BJ.SYS, 
NET$PROP.SYS and NET$V AL.SYS respectively. Together, these three tiles make up the bindery 
database. 
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Figure B - 1 Bindery database repre!'/entation of user object BOB 
(not all user properties are shown). 
As shown in Figure B - l, the bindery user object BOB has three properties: PASSWORD, 
IDENTIFICATION and GROUPS_I'M_IN. Associated with the property PASSWORD is 
the single value sesame (stored in encrypted form in the bindery), while the 
IDENTIFICATION property contains a full name for Bob. The GROUPS_I'M_IN 
property shows that Bob is a member of the Development, Accounting and Administration 
groups. 
BINDERY OBJECT SECURITY 
Bindery security is enforced by assigning security levels to bindery objects and properties. 
The security level dictates who may read or write a bindery object (using the Object 
Security Level or OSL) or an associated bindery property (the Property Security Level or 
PSL) for which the security level is effective. The OSL and PSL are stored within the 
bindery as a one byte value directly associated with an object or property. 
This value is further divided into two nibble sized fields (four bits each); the low order 
nibble controls read access, while the high order nibble controls write access. These fields 
can assume any one of five values, as described in Table B - 2. 
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I. · .. 
1 _.Binary>-• AcCess Description -~--:f.---~----------------~""""""~~;;.._~-----"'------
1 
0000 ANYONE Access is allowed to all clients that have attached to the file server, 
but have not logged in (ie have loaded the NetWare shell at a I 
r-o-oo! _______ -LOGGED ........ _______ --~~~;~rt~~~i_;~~~;i~ii.f~-;r~~;::~~~;~~;~~-:_i~_-g_:~;~1:o~~'~;l,~~ 
1:::~:~:1~----·--- ... -0BJECT--···-···--·----·· ~~t~e:~:::~~:~1e~~~a~e~l~~~;~~~;~-~~~~o~~~ged into the·-~-~~--~-~-r-~-~r ... l 
I 0011 SUPERVISOR Access is allowed only to those clients who have logged into the file i I server as SUPERVISOR or as a supervisor equivalent user. 
---l Ol 00 NETW ARE Access by the Net Ware operating system only is allowed. J 
Table B - 2 Bindery access levels for objects and properties. 
A client's bindery security level (BSL) may in practice assume only three of these levels: 
ANYONE, LOGGED or SUPERVISOR. This level is initially set to ANYONE when the 
client attaches to the network, and changes to LOGGED or SUPERVISOR once the client 
has successfully logged into the file server as either a normal user or a supervisor equivalent 
user. The system thereafter differentiates only between the LOGGED and SUPERVISOR 
levels. 
Access to bindery objects is possible only via NetWare's bindery servtces APis. These 
provide client workstations with regulated access to bindery information, maintaining the 
security of the bindery database. There are four main interactions that can occur between a 
client and bindery services. These are shown in Table B - 3. 
8 .. 3 UNAUTHORISED LAN ACCESS 
The threat of unauthorised LAN access occurs when an unauthorised party gains access to 
services of the LAN. Because resources such as disk space, printers, scanners, modems, 
Read access to a bindery 
object. 
Write access to a bindery 
object. 
Read access to a property. 
Write access to a property. 
Checks made. 
The low order nibble of the OSL associated with the bindery object is 
checked. It must be at least LOGGED for a client to be able to see it 
(assuming that the client is currently logged in). 
The high order nibble of the OSL associated with the bindery object is 
checked. Here, the value must at least be LOGGED before anyone can 
write to it. If the value of the OSL is SUPERVISOR, then the user 
must have a BSL of SUPERVISOR in order to write to the object. 
The low order nibble of the PSL is checked, and interpreted in the 
same way as above. 
The high order nibble of the PSL is checked, and processed as per 
objects. In this context, write access allows a value to be added to the 
item/set property. Interpretation of the values is accomplished in the 
same manner as previously mentioned. 
Table B- 3 Summary of bindery security level interactions (summarisedfrom Lamb 
[ 39]). 
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faxes and communications gateways are shared, some form of control must be implemented 
in order to regulate access to those devices and services, and to ensure that a basic level of 
resource accountability exists. 
The most common form of attack employed by an attack agent to realise this threat is to 
subvert or bypass the identification and authentication mechanisms. This approach can take 
many forms. In NetWare an attacker can take advantage of misconfigured or non-existent 
controls; can steal passwords directly from another user using fake login programs, social 
engineering, or "shoulder-surfing"; or in some circumstances can use a packet sniffer to 
scan the network medium for password bearing packets. 
The consequences of this threat occurring can be related to the value of the data and 
software stored on the LAN. For instance, if a file server is compromised 
Any of the following, discussed in more detail in this section, may contribute to 
unauthorised LAN access: 
• Identification and Authentication Mechanisms. 
• Password Management. 
• User Account Management. 
• Workstation Security. 
• LAN Device Security. 
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
Identification and Authentication mechanisms regulate access to network services. Full or 
partial failure of these mechanisms may result in unauthorised access to network resources. 
Essentially, for any networking platform, these mechanisms are a first line of defence. 
Identification and Authentication 
NetWare uses a username and password combination to authenticate network logins and 
attachments. Each NetWare user account is recorded as a user object in the bindety of the 
server that the account resides on. Associated with bindery entry are a number of 
properties that describe the user object to NetWare, including a unique object identification 
number, the user name and a password for the object. 
Identification and Authentication of users occurs during the login process. The user 
supplies a username and a password which is then checked against bindery information. 
Three possible events can occur during login: 
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• If a valid username and a correct password are entered, then the user is logged 
into the server. 
• If a valid user name but an incorrect password is entered, the connection IS 
refused and the server records the failed login. If the intruder detection account 
lockout feature is enabled, and the number of permitted password retries is 
exceeded, then the server disables the account for a pre-determined period of 
time. 3 
• If an invalid username is entered then the server requests a password as per 
normal, then refuses the connection. Note that this event is not logged in any 
way by the server. 
Since attempts to log into the file server with an invalid username are not logged, the 
system administrator can only detect attacks that target existing usernames (either 
through the intruder detection lockout feature or through reviewing error logs for 
lockout records). The scale of an attack may be underestimated by an administrator, 
who has no way of monitoring the total number of failed login attempts. 
PRE-LOGIN ACCESS TO NETWARE 
Prior to the login process, a non-authenticated user is able to interact with the server in two 
ways: via the SYS:LOGIN directory and through the bindery of the target server. 
The SYS:LOGIN Directory 
In order to make programs such as LOGIN.EXE and SLIST.EXE available to client 
workstations, the server makes the SYS:LOGIN directory publicly available to all 
unauthenticated network clients. This directory should contain only files related to logging 
into the server or for getting information about other services available from the server 
bindery. Users are granted READ and FJLESCAN rights to this directory, which allows 
them to list the contents of the directory and execute programs from the directory. 4 
Any program or data file that is placed in the SYS:LOGIN directory will be accessible by 
any unauthenticated user, and therefore care must be exercised when placing additional files 
there. Notwithstanding this, only privileged users are able to create or modify files in this 
3 The Intruder Detection Lockout feature of Netware is discussed in more detail on page 189 (User account 
Management). 
4 For a detailed discussion of file access rights, see "Access rights administration", on page 197. 
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directory, so it would be difficult for a viral infection or a Trojan horse program to take 
advantage of this directory. In addition, no other network directories are available to an 
unauthenticated user. 5 
Access to the server's bindery 
An unauthenticated user is able to examine bindery objects that have a security level of 
ANYONE. This allows network clients to use the SLIST.EXE program to get server, 
router and network information. This access also allows a workstation to perform certain 
authentication oriented bindery activities, such as checking the password of a bindery 
object (using the Verify _Bindery _Obj ect_Password call). 
It is possible, using this access, to create a password cracker that checks a list of passwords 
against a user object in the bindery. Fortunately, the Intruder Detection lockout feature 
(discussed on page 189) provides protection from programs that use this kind of brute 
force attack, but there is still potential for "low priority" password crackers that slowly 
check passwords over a long period of tin:e, while being careful not to invoke the lockout 
protection. 
Another approach by an attacker might be to create multiple connections from a single 
workstation to the target server, from which a "parallel" attack could be mounted. This 
would still need to run as a low priority attack, but would complete substantially faster than 
an attack from a single connection. 
THE LOGIN PROCESS 
When the appropriate NIC and network shell drivers have been loaded at the workstation, 
the client is automatically connected to the nearest (or preferred) server, with a status of 
NOT-LOGGED-IN. This grants the station access to the servers SYS:LOGIN directory and 
certain bindery information available at the ANYONE security level. 
On invoking the login program, LOGIN.EXE, the user enters the username and password 
of the account they wish to use. Optionally, they may specify the server that they wish to 
log into. In this case, the connected server locates and connects the login with the 
requested server. A step by step description of the login process is shown in Table B - 4. 
5 This may not always be the case, as a supervisor or supervisor equivalent user could unwittingly infect the 
LOGIN.EXE program with a virus under some circumstances. It is also conceivable that a trojan horse 
program could be planted here. These issues are discussed in more detail in section 8.6 (page 212). 
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I. The login program at the client workstation asks the user for a username (U) and a password (P). 
2. The client workstation issues a LOGOUT NCP request to the server, ensuring that any connection 
information from previous sessions is cleared. 
3. The client WS requests from the server the object ID (Uro) of the entered username and a log-key 
4. The client WS non-reversibly encrypts the [P, Urol pair to produce Pl6• a 16 byte password value. 
5. The client WS uses the same non-reversible algorithm and encrypts the [Pl6• LK] pair, producing a 
single 8 byte password value Pg, which is sent to the server for authentication. 
6. The server authenticates Pg by performing the same encryption process on the log-key that was 
given to the client and the password value (Bindery P 16 value) stored at the server for this account. 
If the passwords match, then the user is authenticated for this server, and login is completed. If the 
passwords do not match, then the connection is refused and the lockout counter is incremented. 
·------------· 
Table B- 4 The login process (adaptedfrom Lamb[39]). 
For versions of NetWare later than 2.15, at no time is a cleartext password value 
transmitted across the network. Unfortunately, If a pre 2.15 version of the network shell 
software is used by a client workstation, passwords will be transmitted in cleartext form. In 
this event, if the ALLOW UNENCRYPTED PASSWORDS file server console option is 
enabled, NetWare will allow the login to proceed. If this option is disabled, then an alert 
will be sent to the file server console and the request will be refused. As a matter of policy, 
the most recent versions of the Novell client networking software should be used on LAN 
workstations, and the ALLOW UNENCRYPTED PASSWORDS option should be 
disabled. 
The encryption routines used for the login process, according to [39], are "not publicly 
known and are non-reversible". Passwords are stored within the bindery of the server in 
encrypted form, providing protection against passwords being revealed by perusal of a 
backup of the bindery. Note that it is not always the case that an encryption algorithm is 
secure simply because the encryption algorithm is proprietary and unpublished. 6 
6 Recently, BYTE magazine published an article that included code to login to a netware server. This code 
implemented the "unknown" netware password encryption algorithm [45]. There are also various C 
implementations of the algorithm available, and Novell themselves make an object library available which 
will perform Netware compatible password encryptions. 
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Default Account Balance/Restrictions 
Account Has Expiration Date: 
Date Recount Expires: 
Limit Concurrent Connections: 
Maximum Connections: 
Creat e Home D it'ect ory f ot' User: 
Require Password: 
t11inimum Passt~ord Length: 
Fot-ce Periodic Passu1ord Changes: 
Days Between Forced Changes: 
Limit Grace Logins: 
Grace Logins Allowed: 
Require Unique Passwords: 
Account Balance: 
Allow Unlimited Credit: 













Figure B - 2 Default account settings (from the NetWare SYSCON utility). 
A second non-public, but reversible, encryption system is used during the password 
changing process. This is used so that the server may decrypt a new password sent from 
the workstation. Because of the infrequency of password changes, this also does not 
present a major risk, although if a station is monitoring the LAN for password change 
sequences, and somehow knows the encryption system used, that station may be able to 
collect passwords for accounts as they are changed. 
PASSWORD MANAGEMENT 
The effectiveness of system authentication and identification mechanisms is very much 
linked to the strength of individual user passwords. Passwords that are too short, or are 
easily guessed, present a risk to overall system security. The risk becomes more acute with 
the increasing level of privileges that a user account owns. Proper password management 
is vital to ensure system security is maintained. 
NetWare provides an extensive range of password options. In particular, NetWare system 
administrators need to be aware of the following issues (see Figure B - 2): 
Requiring passwords 
NetWare passwords are optional. By default, when an account is set up, no password is 
required. However, the system administrator is able to change the default settings so that 
password protection is mandatory. 
Minimum password length 
If mandatory passwords are specified, then the system administrator is able to set the 
minimum length of user passwords. Passwords that are too short (less than 5 characters) 
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are easily guessed, and NetWare allows password lengths to range from 1 to 20 characters. 
A setting of at least six is generally preferred, although this may vary according to local 
security policy guidelines. 
NetWare does some minimalistic checking of passwords when they are set. For example, 
the system will not allow a password to be the same as the username of the account. 
However, in common with many systems, NetWare does not enforce good password 
choices, such as insisting on a mix of numbers and letters, or letters and punctuation marks. 
NetWare is also case insensitive with respect to passwords. For example, under NetWare, 
the passwords SeSaMe and sesame are identical. 
Forcing periodic password changes 
NetWare allows the system administrator to force users to change their passwords from 
time to time. This can be done on a per-user basis, or applied as a default to every user on 
a server. Additionally, the system administrator can specify the date that an account 
expires. 
The time between password changes is expressed as a number of days. This defaults to 40 
days, but the system administrator can specify a longer or shorter period. Users are also 
granted a number of "grace" logins, which allow them to continue using the system with an 
expired password. When the number of grace logins has been exceeded, the system forces 
the user to change their password anyway. 
Requiring unique passwords 
To prevent users from reusing old passwords when a password change is requested, 
NetWare remembers the previous ten password choices. When the Require Unique 
Passvvords option is set, NetWare checks new passwords that a user enters against these 
previous ten passwords. If the new password has been used before, it is disallowed. 
Passwords need to be in effect for at least 24 hours before they are remembered by the 
system. 
USER ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT 
User account management is an important part of securing NetWare systems. These 
features allow the system administrator to limit the usage of user accounts to certain 
stations, times and numbers of connections. The system administrator is also able to set 
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Default Time Restrictions 
11111111112222 








Sunday 0:00 To 0:30 
Figure B- 3 Default time restrictions (from the NetWare SYSCON utility). 
attack the system. The features NetWare provides for user account management are 
discussed in more detail below. 
Account expiry date 
The system administrator is able to specify an expiry date for a user account. After this 
date, the account will be inaccessible to the user. The account may be re-instated by the 
system administrator by resetting the expiry date. This minimises the risk that old (and 
supposedly inactive) accounts are misused. This option is set on a per-user basis, and may 
not be applied to the SUPERVISOR account. 
Limiting concurrent connections 
By default, a user is able to open as many connections as they want. This is not always 
desirable, so NetWare allows the system administrator to define the maximum number of 
connections that a user is able to make to the file server. A limitation on the number of 
connections available to the SUPERVISOR account is possible. 
Login time restrictions 
As shown in Figure B - 3, NetWare allows the system administrator to specify the time of 
day that a user is able to log in and use the system. These times can be specified on an 
individual user basis or on a system wide default basis, and may be specified for each day of 
the week at half hour intervals. Login time restrictions are possible for the SUPERVISOR 
account. 
Login station restrictions 
Users can be associated with a physical station, by specifying the physical network address 
and the individual workstation node address that the user is allowed to login from. This is 
specified on a per user basis. Login station restrictions are applicable to the SUPERVISOR 
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Intruder Detection/Lockout 
Detect Intruders: 
Intruder Detection Threshold 
Incorrect Login Attempts: 3 
Bad Login Count Relent ion Time: 0 Days 12 Hours 0 tHnutes 
Lock Account After Detection: Yes 
Length Of Account Lockout: 3 Days 0 Hout'S 0 tH nut es 
Figure B - 4 Intruder Detection Lockout settings (from the NetWare SYSCON utility). 
account. Attempts to login out of the specified times or to login from an unspecified 
station are not recorded by NetWare. 
Intruder detection lockout 
NetWare includes an Intruder Detection Lockout feature (see Figure B - 4), which limit the 
number of login attempts that a user may make to an account. After the maximum number 
of login attempts is exceeded, the account is locked out for a pre-determined period of 
time. The system administrato~ is able to specify the number of login attempts that are 
possible, along with the period of time that bad login counts are retained. The Intruder 
Detection Lockout feature is set up on a default or individual user basis. The lockout 
feature may also be applied to the SUPERVISOR account. 
Once an account has been locked, a record of the intrusion 1s logged in the 
SYSTEM\ SYS$LOG. ERR file, and the account is flagged as inaccessible for the period of 
time specified in the Lockout setup menu. The account may only be manually reinstated by 
a system administrator. 
The intruder detection feature may be used in a denial of service attack against a 
specific user account. Consider an attack on the SUPERVISOR account. If this is the 
only supervisor level account on the targeted system, and it is locked out by an 
attacker, then for the period of time that the lockout is effective, there can be no 
supervisory access to the server. 
Even if there are SUPERVISOR equivalent users on the server, if these are known to 
an attacker, then they too are possible targets. If no supervisor equivalent users are left 
unattached, then there are no privileged users left to unlock the attacked accounts. 
For this reason, it is wise to keep a secret, emergency supervisor equivalent user on the 
system. 
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The intruder lockout feature of NetWare also leaks information from failed login 
attempts, because the mechanism only applies to existing user accounts. An intruder 
can determine whether or not an account exists on the server simply by noting if the 
account gets locked out after a number of failed login attempts. This may be of some 
value to the intruder if the lockout time of the account is relatively small, ie. ten 
minutes or so, or if the attacker wishes to deny service to a certain account (for instance 
the SUPERVISOR account). 
WORKSTATION SECURITY 
Although the system administrator is able to verify the security status of centralised devices 
on the LAN, this often does not apply to user workstations, which are frequently outside 
the scope of administrative control. Various vulnerabilities attributable to user foibles and 
malicious attacks can erode system security. Most of these vulnerabilities can be attenuated 
to some extent by the provision of good physical security for network stations. Some 
specific vulnerabilities, for which NetWare provides little or no protection, include: 
Workstation protection 
Access control schemes applied to NetWare network resources do not apply once 
information is transferred to a user's local system. Unless that information is specifically 
protected, anyone who has physical access to the target workstation will have access to any 
information stored on that machine. Information that is sensitive in nature should be either 
stored on floppy's and physically secured, or should be encrypted on the local machine hard 
drive. Wherever possible, workstations should be protected by CMOS passwords which 
control who may boot the machine. 
NetWare provides no in-built mechanisms to assist in securing workstations in any way. 
However, numerous third party solutions are available, both commercially and in the public 
domain. 
Workstation session protection and automatic network logout 
Users that leave themselves logged in while they are away from a workstation are also a 
potential system vulnerability. Once again, anyone who gains physical access to the 
workstation may use that user account, examining any information that the user account 
has access to, or propagating rights to their own or other accounts. 
The seriousness of this problem increases with the increasing privileges of the accessed 
account. For example, if the SUPERVISOR or an equivalent account was left unattended, 
then for the period of time that the intruder is active, any activity is possible. The intruder 
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might choose to create a new SUPERVISOR equivalent account that he may access at his 
or her leisure. 
The usual solution to this vulnerability is to implement software keyboard locking, in which 
users leaving their machines "lock" their keyboard with a password that must be typed 
before further access is permitted. NetWare provides no in-built mechanisms to provide 
this service, although most operating systems (for instance MS-Windows or OS/2) offer 
screen savers that provide password protection. 
Another approach to this problem is to have the network server monitor user activity. If a 
workstation has been idle for some period of time (ie. 30 minutes), then it is automatically 
logged out. Once again, NetWare does not provide an idle workstation connection 
termination program, but numerous examples are available in the public domain. 
Passwords stored in batch files 
Users who store login passwords in batch files on their own machine, or who store 
passwords in login scripts also· represent a risk to the security of the LAN. Those 
passwords may be compromised if physical access to the workstation is gained by an 
intruder. 
Net Ware does not provide services to counter this vulnerability, although physical security 
and education of end users about the dangers of storing passwords anywhere in their 
system is recommended. 
Trojan horse login programs 
Where NetWare workstations are shared, it is possible for a password collecting Trojan 
horse process to be loaded onto the machine. A Trojan horse of this nature will typically 
emulate the login prompts, fooling users into entering their user name and password. This 
information is then written somewhere that is secretly accessible to the perpetrator (ie. A 
hidden file) at some later time, and the real login process is then invoked, either with the 
captured username and password, or a message to the effect that the previous login attempt 
failed. 
NetWare provides no built-in security features that prevent or detect Trojan horse 
attacks; as a matter of policy, users should always cold-boot shared and public 
workstations. 
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LAN DEVICE SECURITY 
In order to fully secure the Network environment against unauthorised access, some 
thought must also be given to the protection of LAN devices. Improperly secured devices 
may result in a misuse of Network resources, or a denial of service. 
Physical security is an important aspect of achieving LAN device security. Critical 
components, such as file servers must be physically secured, and if possible, password 
protected at the boot and console level. 
File server console locking 
NetWare provides a mechanism whereby the tile server console may be password 
protected. This is invoked by starting the MONITOR program at the console, selecting 
Lock File Server Console from the main menu, and specifying a password to 
unlock the console. The console may be unlocked either with the specified l?assword, or 
with the SUPERVISOR password. Note that attempts to access the console with incorrect 
passwords are not logged. 
This feature, although useful, is also insecure due to a bug in NetWare. Any user who is a 
print queue operator can unlock the console by using PCONSOLE to down the print server 
running on the server that is locked. When this is done, not only is the print server task 
removed from the server, but MONITOR is unloaded, and the server is returned to the 
console command line. 
The SECURE CONSOLE command 
An intruder with physical access to a NetWare file server that has not been console locked 
is able to execute file server programs (NetWare Loadable Modules or NLM's) from either 
the file server hard drive's DOS partition (if it has one) or from a floppy disk. The 
SECURE CONSOLE command, if entered at the console, limits execution of NLM 
programs to those residing in the SYS:SYSTEM directory. 
Additionally, this command prevents use of the keyboard OS debugger, prevents the date 
and time from being changed (important for auditing and accounting features) and removes 
DOS from the file server (preventing an exit to DOS, which would allow subsequent access 
to DOS programs at the file server). 
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Password protecting the file server hardware 
If CMOS password protection is available for the file server machine, then it should be 
used. This will prevent an intruder booting from DOS and running a program that will steal 
data or alter file server information. 
Protecting server boot disks and the SERVER.EXE program 
File server boot floppy disks, if they are used, should be secured against physical access by 
anybody except the NetWare system administrator or console operator. If these are left 
unprotected, it is possible for an intruder to modify the SER VER.EXE program that is used 
to start NetWare 3.11 and 3.12 servers. 
With the help of a DOS disk editor, an attacker is able to modify the SERVER.EXE 
program references to NET$0BJ.SYS, NET$VAL.SYS and NET$PROP.SYS (which 
contain the bindery) to other filenames. This removes any protection normally 
afforded by the bindery, and once this is accomplished, the attacker is able to login to 
the SUPERVISOR account wi~hout a password. If this occurs, the file server is left 
completely unprotected. 
·Net Ware does not perform any integrity checks on the SERVER.EXE program file, and 
so an attack of this type is easy to execute if the perpetrator has physical access to a non 
boot-protected file server. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
In general, NetWare suffers from a lack of logging of security related events. As 
mentioned, NetWare only logs failed login attempts that are attempted on a specific 
account. The system administrator has no way of knowing how extensively the network is 
being attacked. 
There are also specific vulnerabilities that are associated with physical access to NetWare 
file servers. As a rule of thumb, NetWare servers should have as much physical protection 
as possible, as they may represent a m<Uor security problem if left unsecured. This also 
applies to other network devices, such as routers, printers and modems. The vulnerabilities 
that may result if these devices are left unsecured are discussed later in this report. 
In order to prevent cleartext passwords from being transmitted over the network, NetWare 
administrators should ensure that all users are using the latest versions of the NETX.EXE 
shell. Users should also be educated about good network security habits, such as not 
putting passwords in login scripts, not leaving themselves logged in at an unattended 
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ACCESS TO LAN 
Unauthorised access to LAN resources occurs when a legitimate or unauthorised user gains 
access to LAN resources that he or she should not otherwise be entitled to. This threat can 
be the result of improperly assigned access controls, or can be due to insufficiently granular 
access controls. 
The availability of NetWare LAN resources is influenced by three main factors: user 
security levels, access rights administration, and the NetW are default system configuration. 
User security levels determine what type of privileges a user is entitled to, while access 
rights determine which users are allowed access to which resources. The default system 
configuration can influence the amount a~d type of access that users have. The following 
subsections discuss these factors in detail, along with the security services that NetWare 
provides to control access to LAN resources. 
USER SECURITY LEVELS 
Limiting the activities of users is fundamental to maintaining good security in a networked 
environment. In order for the LAN to be administered, it is necessary to allow some users 
a greater variety of privileges than others. However, mismanagement or misuse of 
privileged user accounts can lead to vulnerabilities. 
NetWare supports the concept of End Users, who are subject to normal access controls, 
and Administrators, who are granted additional privileges in order to carry out specific 
system management functions. Of significance to NetWare security is that access control 
mechanisms (described in the next subsection) respond differently according to the security 
level of the user. Figure B - 5 shows the relationships that exist between users and 
administrators. 
The end user 
End Users are the normal, unprivileged user accounts that constitute the bulk of users on 
any NetWare server. These users are subject to the default access control mechanisms 
enforced by NetWare. End users may be granted additional privileges by being assigned to 
groups, or by having additional rights assigned directly to them. 
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End Users End Users 
Figure B - 5 User security level structure (adapted from Sheldon [71 ]). 
Security equivalence 
Any user account is able to gain additional privileges via a mechanism known as security 
equivalence. Security equivalence is a one-way relationship from one user to another. If 
user REN is security equivalent to user BOB, then REN has access to all information (and 
all the rights) that BOB has access to. BOB, on the other hand, does not have access to all 
REN's information. This relationship mechanism is useful for giving a user temporaty 
access to files that another user has. 
Use of security equivalence should be used sparingly, as carefully thought out access 
control schemes may be thwarted by users gaining rights they should not be allowed 
via an obscure security equivalence. In a sense, equivalence is a convenient shortcut 
that can nullify most of Net Ware's access controls mechanisms. 
NetWare administrators 
There are five different types of NetWare administrator, which fall into two categories; 
system administrators and user administrators. A system administrator, such as the 
SUPERVISOR or a supervisor equivalent user, is able to change NetWare system 
parameters, delete and create user and group accounts and assign overall rights to other 
users and administrators. A user administrator, such as a workgroup manager, carries the 
responsibility of managing end users. 
System administrator (SUPERVISOR) 
The SUPERVISOR account owns all rights to a NetWare system, and may make changes 
to object attributes. A System administrator may assign user account manager, workgroup 
manager and operator privileges to an End User. The SUPERVISOR account may not be 
removed from a NetWare system. 
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As NetWare does not allow the removal of this account, it is an obvious target for 
attack. NetWare system administrators should restrict use of the SUPERVISOR 
account to known, physically secured workstations (using the account restrictions 
discussed earlier in this report), and should limit the times that the account can be 
used. Additionally, limiting the number of concurrent connections to this account is a 
good idea. 
System administrator (SUPERVISOR equivalent) 
This is a user account granted SUPERVISOR level rights, with the NetWare equivalence 
function. This type of account has all the rights of the SUPERVISOR, and is able to 
propagate those rights to other user accounts. Supervisor equivalent accounts may delete 
this attribute from other supervisor equivalent accounts, but may not revoke supervisory 
rights from the original SUPERVISOR account. 
The SUPERVISOR and supervisor equivalent accounts are the most powerful accounts 
found on a NetWare server, and use of these accounts should be monitored closely. In 
particular, administrators should regularly run the SECURITY.EXE program provided 
with NetWare to ensure that only authorised users have the supervisor equivalence 
property see. 
User account manager 
A User Account Manager is an administrator that has supervisory level privileges for all 
user and group accounts assigned to them.· This manager can set account balances and user 
passwords, can create and assign users to groups, and can change security equivalence. 
Additionally, the User Account Manager can assign user and group trustee rights for 
resources to which they themselves have access. User Account Managers are able to delete 
accounts that they have created. 
Workgroup manager 
A Workgroup manager is able to perform the same tasks as a User Account Manager, and 
is additionally able to create new user accounts and create, manage and delete print queues. 
Workgroup managers are able to delete accounts assigned to them or created by them. 
7The SECURITY.EXE program is discussed later in this report. 
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Operator 
An Operator ts an End User that is granted special access privileges in two areas: 
FCONSOLE and RCONSOLE operation, which allows the operator access to remote file 
server console operation; and PCONSOLE operation, which grants the user special rights 
regarding the operation of NetWare print servers. 
NetWare administrators should carefully monitor who gets RCONSOLE and 
FCONSOLE access, as these privileges allow that user direct access to file server 
control functions. 
User groups 
End users and administrators can be made members of one or more User Groups. 
Directory access and trustee rights can then be assigned to groups of users, simplifying the 
administration process. By default, all users are added to the NetWare default group 
EVERYONE. 
The default user GUEST is insta!led with NetWare. This account is assigned to the 
group EVERYONE, and therefore has access to all the resources that this group has. 
It is recommended that this account be removed from the system, as it is another 
obvious target for attack. 
ACCESS RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION 
Access control management is necessary to prevent unauthorised access to LAN resources. 
The goal of access control mechanisms is to limit the resources that a user can access once 
they have logged in to only those files and directories that they need to use. 
NetWare controls access to files and directories by making use of two complementary sets 
of access control information: The rights that have been assigned to the user to access the 
files and directories; and the attributes that have been assigned to the files and directories 
themselves. 
Directory and file rights 
Directory rights control general access to directories and files, and may be applied to either. 
NetWare uses a total of eight rights flags to determine the information a user can access, 
and what the user is able to do with that information. Both the trustee assignment and the 
Inherited Rights Mask mechanisms use these rights for access control. The rights, and their 
effects when applied to either a directory or file, are shown below in Table B - 5 on the 
next page. 
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__1~~-~~~--------~--------•''h,pplied toDirectory j 1??..'~~1:~?.r_i~~ ....... ·-······················ 
Supervisory Grants all rights to the directory, I Grants all rights to the file. Users with this right 
its files and its subdirectories. i may grant others access to the file, and can 
This right oven·ides any Inherited i modify all rights in the file's Inherited Rights 
Rights Masks restrictions that may I Mask 
be placed on subdirectories, and ! 
may not be revoked at a lower I 
level in the directory tree · 
1--------------------------···-·--·-----·-----· ----------·-·····-
Grants the right to open files in the ' Grants the right to open and read the file. 
directory, read the contents of ! 
those files, and execute programs i 
in the directory. 
Grants the right to open and 
modify files in the directory. 
Grants the right to create files and 
subdirectories in this directory. 
Can be used to create a drop box 
directory that others can create and 
open files in but cannot read from. 
(ie mail directories). The C right 
automatically grants the W right. 
Grants the right to delete the 
directory, its files and its 
subdirectory files. 
Grants the right to change the 
directory and file attributes of this 
directory, to rename the directory 
or its files and subdirectories. 
Does not grant the right to change 
the contents of the file. 
Grants the right to see directory 
entries. 
Grants the right to modify the 
directory trustee assignments and 
inherited rights mask. Users can 
grant any right (except 
Supervisory) to any user, even 
rights that they do not themselves 
have. 
Grants the right to open and modify the file. 
Grants the right to salvage the file after the file 
has been deleted. 
Grants the right to delete the file. 
Grants the rights to change the files attributes 
and the file name, but does not grant the right to 
modify the contents of the file. 
Grants the right to see the file in a directory 
listing. Grants the right to see the directory tree 
path from the file to the root of the tree. 
Grants the right to modify the file's trustee 
assignments and inherited rights mask. Users 
can grant any right (except Supervisory) to any 
user, even rights that they do not themselves 
have. 
Table B - 5 NetWare file and directory trustee rights (from the NetWare Concepts 
manual). 
Determining effective rights within a directory 
The effective rights a user has in a directory are controlled by the rights that the user 
inherits from the parent directory, modified by the inherited rights mask, and by the set of 
trustee rights the user has for the directory. 
Trustee rights assignments grant a specific user or group the right to use a file or a 
directory in a particular way. Trustee assignments are generally carried out by an 
administrator, but may be carried out by end users if they have the Access control right. 
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A trustee assignment in a subdirectory automatically lets the user see the directory tree all 
the way back to the root directory. Other subdirectories may only be seen if the user has 
other trustee assignments in the directory tree. 
Trustee rights to a directory may come from an assignment made directly to the user, a 
trustee assignment made to one of the groups that the user belongs to, or from a trustee 
right assigned to another user with whom the user is security equivalent. 
Inherited rights masks control what rights a file or directory inherits from its parent 
directory. The default is all rights, but if this can be modified so that certain rights present 
in the parent directory are revoked at the current level. 
Inherited rights masks are applied directly to a directory or file. They can be used to 
revoke any or all of the eight file access rights shown in Table B - 5, except the supervisory 
right. If the supervisoty right is effective in a parent directory, then that right may not be 
revoked in any subdirectory using the inherited rights mask mechanism. This can be a 
particularly important consideration when granting a user supervisory trustee rights at a 
high level within a directory structure. 
If there is a trustee assignment for a directory, then that trustee assignment overrides the 
rights that would otherwise be inherited by the parent directory, regardless of the Inherited 
rights mask. 
The algorithm for determining the effective rights that a user has to a directory is 
summarised in Figure B - 6 on the next page. Note that if a SUPERVISOR or equivalent 
user has the Supervisory right (S) in a directory, then all access rights from that directory 
down are granted. This has implications for administering the LAN, as this right can not be 
revoked at a lower level, even with a new trustee assignment. It must be revoked at the 
same level that it was granted. Administrators must be sure that they do not grant this right 
at too high a level in the directory tree, as otherwise the user might gain too much access to 
the rest of the file system, in unauthorised access vulnerabilities. 
As the S right also implies access control, any rights access (except supervisory) may be 
propagated to other accounts. This may not always be desirable, as it could undermine 
carefully thought out access control schemes. 
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Is S the effective right I 
in the parent directory? 
-1, Yes ~ No 
Effective Is there a directory 
I Rights= trustee assignment? 
All Rights _0 Yes k No 
Effective Will the IRM allow all 
I Rights= Rights to be inherited? 
Trustee 0 Yes _0 No Assignment 
Effective Effective 
Rights= Rights= 
ER of parent Effective Rights of parent directory 
Directory minus those revoked with IRM 
Figure B - 6 Determining effective directory rights for Net Ware (from the Net Ware 
Concepts manual). 
Directory and file attributes 
NetWare security attributes are applied to. files and directories, and are enforced regardless 
of the security level of the subject that requests access. There are three types of attributes 
in NetWare: 
• File Attributes, which apply to files within a directory. 
.. Directory Attributes, which apply to the directory itself. 
• Directory Rights (the Inherited Rights Mask) assigned to the directorl. 
NetWare uses file attributes to assign special properties to files or directories. Attributes 
override effective rights and can be used prevent tasks that those rights might otherwise 
allow. The use of attributes increases the level of access control granularity available to the 
administrator; attributes are also useful in preventing certain types of viral infections. The 
Modify effective right is required to change directory or file attributes. 
Attributes for each object are indicated by the presence or absence of the flags shown in 
Table B - 6. Most of the flags apply only to files; those applicable to directories are 
indicated as such in the Directory column. 
8The Inherited Rights Mask dictates access allowed within the directory relative to access rights in the 
parent directory. Because it is applied irrespective of the rights of the user, the IRM can be viewed as an 
attribute of a file or directory. 
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Attribute 
· .. ·····' 
oirepforf 1 DesCription 
...!_:__ 
Archive Needed Assigned automatically by NetWare, and identifies files modified since 
. the last backup . 
Copy Inhibit Prevents Macintosh users from copying the file. Overrides read and 
. 
filescan rights. The Modify right is required to remove this attribute . 
'Inhibit y Prevents users from erasing directories and files. Modify right required 
to remove this attribute. 
Execute Prevents copying or backing up of the file. Attribute can never be 
removed. This attribute should only be assigned to executable's, and a 
backup of the original should be kept. Can only be assigned by a 
supervisor. 
---··-----------
Hidden y Hides directories or files from a DOS DIR tile listing, and prevents 
. 
them from being deleted or copied. Will be listed with NetWare's 
. · NDIR command if the user has the appropriate filescan rights . 
-------
Indexed Allows large files to be accessed quickly, and is automatically applied to 
files that have more than 64 regular FAT entries. Can be set, but has 
no effect. 
Purge y Purges a tile as soon as it is deleted if it has this flag or resides in a 
directory with this flag. Purged files may not be recovered with 
NetWare's SALVAGE command. 
Read Audit Not used. May be set but has no effect. 
Read Only/ . Indicates whether the file can be modified. All files are automatically 
Read Write · flagg~d as Rw on creation, and may be modified if the Ro attribute is 
not set. Assigning Ro automatically assigns Delete Inhibit and Rename 
Inhibit. The Modify right is required to remove the Ro attribute. 
Rename Inhibit y Prevents user from renaming directories and files. Modify right 
required to remove this attribute. 
Shareable Allows multiple users simultaneous access to the file. Modify right 
·.· 
required to remove. 
System y Assigned to system files and directories. Hides flagged files from a 
DOS DIR scan and prevents deletion and copying. Directories and tiles 
... 
will appear in the NDIR listing if the right fi I esc an rights are present. 
... 
Transactional···· Activates the Transaction Tracking System. All changes to a file with 
this attribute set will either be executed to completion, or will fail with 
. ·  no changes to the file . Used for database files. . · 
-
---------~ 
Write Audit > Not used. May be set but has no effect. 
Table B - 6 NetWare file and directory attributes (from the NetWare Concepts manual). 
Rights Required for user directory/file operations 
In order to manipulate directories and files, the user needs to have both the correct 
effective rights for the objects that are to be manipulated, and the necessary attributes 
cleared. The operations that are possible, along with the effective rights that the user must 
have to perform these operations, and the attributes that affect those operations are 
summarised· in Table B - 7 on the next page. 
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Operation ~-Effective Rights required for _ ,__ Attributes involved . 
. --- 1 the target directory or file. _____ ·----
copy a file into a I Create right. None. 
directory. j 
Create and write to th·~--1- c~~t~ right~-------------.. --.--.. - N~~;~-R;· (R~;d-W~lt~) i;-;~;g~~d-t~-t·h·~--
opened file. I file when it is first created . 
...... C ...... , • .:, .. ,................................... .. .. • .l.. ... -.... ....... ....................... .. ................................. . 
Read from a closed file. I Read right None. 
Supervisory right. Modify disk space 
assignments in 
subdirectories. J .. _ _ ....................... .. 
None. 
Seethe root directory ! Any right in a subdirectory. None. 
--C~p-y.a iil~r~~~;-;·---------.... i ____ R~~d··;~d"·ru~~~;~-;ighr~~----- .. -- .... sy~r~~-~ttt~ib~t~-~~~t-b~--~lea;~d.-;t~ct···it:·····---···-· 
directory ! the user is a Macintosh user, then the 
i Copy Inhibit flag must be clear. 
1-------~----------.. ------i-- ................. ,,,,, __ ,,, .................... _, ____ ,, ___ ....... , ___ , ___ ,............................................... .. .................................................................... . 
Delete a file. i Erase right Delete Inhibit must not be set. Delete 
Remove an empty 
subdirectory. 
:_i Inhibit automatically assigns Read only 
and Rename inhibit attributes. Neither of 
! t······· . 
Erase right. 
these attributes must be flagged for the 
deletion to work. 
Delete Inhibit flag must be clear. 
---------------------1----------------------------------
Write to a closed file 








I Access control right. 
The file must be flagged as Rw (Read 
Write). 
. ................... . 
None. 
None. 
ch~~-g~th~iRM,. - I ____ A_c_ce_s_s_c_o_nt_r_ol_r_.ig_h_r_:·_ ....._ ..... _ ..... _ ... _.....__N_o_n_e_. _ ..... _ ..... _ ..... _ ..... _ .... _ ..... 
t--....;.._--'-"--'-'------·.... -----·-------------------
Table B- 7 Rights and attributes required for user operations. 
Rights required for queue access 
Access controls are necessary to control who is allowed to utilise and administer NetWare 
print queues and job service processes. The rights to create and grant access to queues are 
limited to NetWare administrators. The system supervisor is automatically made a queue 
operator of any new queues that are created. 
NetWare allows users or groups of users to be granted Queue User, or Queue Operator 
effective rights. The Queue Server right must be explicitly granted by the supervisor to a 
specific server process. The effects of assigning a user rights for a particular queue are 
detailed below. 
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• Queue User Right. 
This Right allows the user to submit jobs to the queue it is effective for, to view to 
queue's job list and to view the status of the queue. This right allows the user to cancel 
any jobs that they themselves have submitted to the queue. The group EVERYONE is 
automatically assigned Queue User rights to all print queues, although this may be 
revoked. 
• Queue Operator Right. 
This grants the user special rights regarding the operation of queues for which it is 
effective. The right allows the user assign other queue operators, edit queue entry 
requests, change the order of jobs to be serviced, delete entries from the queue and 
modify the status of the queue. 
• Queue Server Right. 
The queue server right is granted to specific queue servers. A server is either a user 
starting a service process on a workstation, or the server process itself when it logs into 
the file server. This right grants server processes access to jobs in queues. Note that in 
order to service a particular job, the queue server will sometimes need to inherit 
security equivalence of the users whose job is being serviced, and thus the service 
process's effective access rights may be temporarily increased in the course of servicing 
jobs. 
NETWARE DEFAULT SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The default NetWare directories SYS: LOGIN, SYS: SYSTEM, SYS: MAIL and 
SYS: PUBLIC are set up at installation time. Access rights to these directories should be 
carefully controlled, as giving users too much access to the system or public directories 
could lead to vulnerabilities that result in unauthorised LAN access. The default installation 
directories, and the recommended maximum rights granted to users in those directories, are 
shown in Figure B - 7 on the following page. 
The SYSTEM directory 
NetW are stores all its security sensitive utilities, its NLM modules and its auditing log files 
in the SYSTEM directory. For this reason, no users apart ji-om supervisory level users 
should be allowed access to this directory. 
The LOGIN directory 
All users should have all rights to the LOGIN directory revoked, as once they have logged 
into the server there is no reason for them to access this directory. This reduces the risk of 
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\PUBLIC (R F ] 
\BOB [RWCEMF] 
\USERS (Trustee Right for BOB) 
Figure B- 7 A default NetWare directory configuration (the USERS directory has heen 
added subsequent to the original NetWare installation). 
a Trojan horse attack initiated by placing a subversive LOGIN.EXE program tn this 
directory. Only Supervisory access to this directory should be allowed. 
A viral infection of files in the LOGIN directory is still possible. See section 8.6, 
Unauthorised Modification to Data and Software, for more details. 
The MAIL directory 
The MAIL directory is not only used for mail, it is also used for storing individual user 
login scripts. When a user is created, a subdirectory in the MAIL directory is assigned to 
that user by the NetWare system, and is named using the user's bindery object ID. The 
user login script (stored in the login file) is placed by NetWare in this directory. 
By default, all users are granted Create rights in the MAIL directory, which has the effect of 
creating a "drop box" directory. Any user is able to open a file in another user's mail 
directory, and while that file is open, is able to write information such as a mail message, to 
it. A well-known NetWare vulnerability can result from this setup: 
NetWare administrators should ensure that a user has a login script in the file login, even if 
it is just one character long (ie. a space). Every user has the create right in the mail 
directories; If a user does not have a login file, then anyone can create a file called login in 
that user's mail directory. This login script would execute next time the victim logged in, 
and could contain commands that steal information or grant the perpetrator additional 
rights to see that user's files. This is especially important for users that may have 
supervisory level privileges that are able to be propagated to other users. 
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The PUBLIC directory 
Files and utilities that all users require in order to use the NetWare system are placed in the 
PUBLIC directory. Users should have all Trustee rights revoked to this directory, and the 
group EVERYONE should be given read and filescan rights. This will allow users the 
ability to execute the utilities, but will prevent them from deleting or modifying them. The 
NET$LOG.DAT file which stores the system login script is also placed in the PUBLIC 
directory. This file should be protected from modification by any user except a system 
administrator. 
The USERS directory 
This directory, shown as an example in Figure B- 7, is not specifically part of the NetWare 
default setup. It is, however, a recommended setup of user home directories. If the system 
administrator wishes to prevent users from granting access to files in their home directory 
to other users, then a Trustee right of all rights except the Access control and Supervisory 
right is necessary for that user's home directory. 
If copying of files between users is permitted, then additionally granting the Access control 
right to that user in that directory is required. In the example given in Figure B - 7, user 
BOB is able to use his files normally, but is prevented from granting access to those files to 
any other user. 
Application directories 
Granting users more access than they need to some directories is sometimes unavoidable 
with NetWare. This is mainly due to certain applications that try to open files in the same 
directory that they reside in. In cases such as these, setting the directory rights to only 
Read and Filescan will cause the programs to fail. For this reason, some applications will 
need to reside in directories with nominally more access rights available than should really 
be needed. 
In these directories, program files should be protected, if possible, with the execute only 
attribute, while read only data files should be flagged as such. If the program needs 
read/write access to a file, then granting such access to the program also effectively grants 
users access to that same file. This could create a security problem if the user makes some 
unauthorised modification to the program's data. NetWare does not have a Unix-like "set 
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user id" mechanism that can be used to overcome this limitation, except in the operation of 
. 9 pnnt queues. 
Unfortunately, setting the Execute only attribute on program files may also cause certain 
programs to fail. Where possible, these applications should be identified and isolated as 
much as possible from the rest of the system. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
During tests of Net Ware carried out by Cohen [ 14], it was found that by far the most 
pressing weakness in NetWare security is the complexity of the access control mechanisms. 
By way of illustration, to access a file in a directory, NetWare needs to consider 14 file 
attributes, 8 file trustee rights, 8 inheritance rights and 16 rights (8 inherited and 8 trustee) 
per parent directory back to the root directory . 
Changing one bit of protection at a high level in the directory structure can have major 
effects lower down in the directory tree. Similarly, granting a user any right in the root 
directory of a volume effectively grants. that user the same right to the entire volume. 
Granting the Access control right is especially risky, as this allows the user to grant 
themselves any right for the entire volume. 
Additionally, users may have security equivalence's that grant access rights to files and 
directories in unpredictable ways. Administrators using the security equivalence function 
may unintentionally grant a user access to resource's that they should not have access to. 
As stated, equivalence should be used sparingly. 
Another potential problem, discussed in [14], is that NetWare sometimes takes a while to 
make rights effective (most likely because of the complexity of the mechanism), and as a 
result windows of vulnerability may exist while rights changes are made. This may impact 
some MS-DOS programs, which are normally used in a more static environment, and could 
fail to take these (unpredictable) time lags into account. 
In NetWare's favour, access controls are very granular. User access rights can be 
restricted to individual files within a given directory, and attributes are set on a per-file 
basis. 
9 Of course, SUID script files and programs are a major source of Unix system vulnerability. 
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The SECURITY.EXE program 
The SECURITY.EXE program provided with NetWare can assist system administrators in 
finding a number of potential holes. When run, this program checks the bindery of the 
server for the following potential problems: 
• Users with no password. 
A user account with no password is an obvious security problem, as anyone will be able 
to login to that account without authorisation. 
• Users with insecure passwords. 
Users with passwords that are the same as their login account name, or with passwords 
that are too short are potential security problems. The SECURITY.EXE program will 
also check for user passwords that do not expire at least every sixty days, and for 
accounts that do not require a unique password. 
• Users that are security equivalent to the SUPERVISOR. 
The number of SUPERVISOR equivalent users should be kept to a minimum. The 
SECURITY.EXE program checks for users that are security equivalent to the 
supervisor. 
• Users that have privileges in the root directory of a volume 
As stated, granting users privileges to the root directory of a volume can lead to 
vulnerabilities caused by the propagation of that right to the entire volume. 
• Users with excessive rights in the standard directories. 
SECURITY.EXE will check to ensure that no users are granted more than the 
minimum set of rights recommended for the four system installed directories (as shown 
in Figure B - 7). 
8 .. 5 COMPROMISE OF DATA AND SOFTWARE 
Compromise of LAN data and software occurs when an individual breaks the 
confidentiality of data that they should not be privy to by accessing and comprehending that 
data. In addition, the software itself may be compromised by an attacker who seeks to take 
copies, or to search executables for sensitive data stored as part of the program. 
The factors that can influence compromise of data and software include: 
• File system encryption services. 
• Access controls. 
• Object reuse. 
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• Physical placement of output devices. 
• Security of system backups. 
FILE SYSTEM ENCRYPTION SERVICES 
Encryption of sensitive information stored on network devices is essential if that data and 
software is to remain confidential. Encryption services should be used in any situation 
where there is sensitive or confidential data stored on the LAN. 
NetWare provides no file system encryption facilities, apart from those associated with the 
transmission of passwords. Hence, if data is to be encrypted, then a third party encryption 
package is required. 
ACCESS CONTROLS 
The role of access controls in regulating access to confidential information is to keep those 
users who do not require access to that information from gaining access to it. 
Unfortunately, access control mechanisms themselves are subject to compromise, and 
should be seen as only a first line of defence. For a variety of reasons, discussed below, 
NetWare access controls may fail to prevent unauthorised perusal of confidential data: 
• Improper Access control configuration 
NetWare access control mechanisms, as discussed on page 206, are complex to set up. 
Administrators could inadvertently assign the wrong set of access rights, or could fail to 
take a security equivalence into account when assigning rights. 
• Malfeasance 
NetWare system administrators, such as the SUPERVISOR or an equivalent, are not 
subject to the access controls that dictate end user rights on file server volumes. A 
supervisor is able to access any data stored on the server they are a supervisor for. If 
that data is confidential, and the supervisor is a person who is normally not authorised 
to access that data, and if the data is unencrypted, then that data has been 
compromised. NetWare is particularly vulnerable to malfeasance attacks from 
supervisory users abusing their privileges. 
• External attacks 
An intruder that gains access to a user account, or even worse to a supervisory account, 
is able to access any unencrypted data that the account is able to access. 
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• No access controls at local workstations 
access control mechanisms may prevent compromise of data and software that is stored 
on a NetWare server, but once this data is transmitted to a local workstation, then that 
data has no access control protection at all. Any intruder who gains access to the local 
workstation is able to compromise that data if it is unencrypted. 
OBJECT REUSE 
Object reuse occurs when some item of data is, either through chance or design, 
accidentally included as part of the data set of some other object when that object is created 
or changed. This type of information compromise is often unpredictable, and usually is the 
result of improper initialisation of areas of memory before that memory is reused. 
For NetWare, object reuse concerns three main areas: file server disk storage, file server 
communications buffers and network interface card buffers [39]. In addition, some 
applications accidentally compromise information through internal buffer reuse. Each of 
these areas are covered in turn: 
• File Server Disk Storage 
When a user requests an allocation of disk space, and does not provide data for that 
space, NetWare pre-zeros the space allocated before giving access to that disk space to 
the user. This has the effect of ensuring that information that was previously stored on 
the allocated space is not available. 
• Communication Buffers 
NetWare servers process incoming and outgoing requests in separate buffers. If a reply 
includes data from the file system, then that data is directly packetised from the file 
system cache buffers (ie direct from the server disk volume). NetWare maintains a 
connection slot for each user. If the connection slot is re-used (ie one user logs out and 
another logs in and acquires the same connection slot), the fields of the connection slot 
are zeroed before the connection is reallocated to the new user of the slot. 
• Network Interface Card buffers 
In some cases, if a packet is generated by either the server or a workstation, and is less 
than the minimum packet size of the network topology in use, then the remainder of the 
packet may be padded out with space from the network interface card's data buffer. 
This can result in previous information used by the card being included in another 
packet, leading to compromise of the that data. 
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• Application buffer reuse 
It is possible that an application can accidentally leak information if its internal buffers 
are reused. Again, this results from a client application re-using areas of allocated 
memory that were previously used to hold some important item of data. 
An example of application buffer reuse was discovered during testing of NetWare 3.12. In 
the scenario encountered, a password protected object was created, a password specified, 
and a full name (NetWare's IDENTIFICATION property) of less than 35 characters 
specified. If carried out in this sequence, these activities cause the password text to appear 
in the IDENTIFICATION buffer (after the full name zero terminator). This information is 
retrievable by any user with a bindery examination tool. 
It appears that the applications involved (SYSCON and PCONSOLE) reuse an internal 
buffer, which accidentally includes the password text. Initially it was hypothesised that this 
reuse may be due to network interface card buffer reuse, but further investigation with a 
packet sniffing utility suggested that the fault probably lay with the Novell supplied 
applications rather than the network interface card and driver layer. 
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72 68 6E 74 20 53 65 72 
76 65 72 2E 00 70 50 66 
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Figure B- 8 NetAudit Screen showing bindery object reuse for object USERPS. 
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This reuse problem is illustrated in Figure B - 8. This diagram shows a snapshot of the 
print server bindery object USERPS immediately after its creation. The object was created 
with PCONSOLE, and the password ("SECRET") and full name ("User's Print Server") 
were specified immediately afterwards. 
The password text can be clemly seen at offset (hex) 27. Setting the full name field 
immediately after setting the password generally always produces the same result in both 
PCONSOLE and SYSCON. Once the full name is specified again, the password text is 
overwritten. 
PHYSICAL PLACEMENT OF OUTPUT DEVICES 
Sending sensitive or confidential information to a public printer may result in that 
information being compromised. Likewise, outputting the data to a screen that can clearly 
be viewed by an unauthorised person is also a vulnerability. The main way of preventing 
this type of compromise is to provide a physically secured area for printers that output 
sensitive information, and to provide physical shielding of screens that may display sensitive 
information. 
NetWare allows printers to be placed anywhere local or remote to the server, so physical 
protection of output should not present a problem. 
PHYSICALLY SECURING BACKUP INFORMATION 
Data and software may be compromised if an unauthorised party gains access to backup 
tapes or disks. NetWare does not encrypt backup information, so if physical access is 
gained to these backups, then a compromise of any confidential information stored on those 
backups may be the result. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
The main weakness of NetWare, as discussed above, is the lack of encryption services for 
data, both stored on the file server, and on local workstations. Add to this the potential 
problem of supervisory malfeasance, the complexities of assigning rights and the potential 
for compromise of backups, and NetWare becomes quite vulnerable to this threat. These 
problems can be alleviated to some extent by the installation of encryption software. 
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8.6 UNAUTHORISED MODIFICATION OF DATA 
AND SOFTWARE 
Unauthorised modification of Data and Software occurs when programs or files are 
subjected to unauthorised modifications, deletions or additions. Three main controls can 
reduce the likelihood of this threat: 
• Access Controls. 
• Detection of changes to system binaries and applications. 
• Integrity checking of data files. 
By far the greatest threat in this area comes from Viral infections. MS-DOS has a number 
of vulnerabilities in this area, and when files on a server become infected, especially those in 
public areas, the spread of the infection can be rapid. 
Other changes, if undetected, can cause software corruptions, can divert information to 
unauthorised destinations and can result in incorrect information being produced by systems 
that run on the LAN. 
ACCESS CONTROLS 
Access controls can be applied to program or data files to reduce the risk that unauthorised 
modifications will be made. Access controls may fail for any of the reasons given on page 
206, or because of some of the considerations given below. Again, for these reasons access 
controls should be considered a first line of defence in the prevention of unauthorised 
modifications. A proper regime of detecting changes to application files and binaries 
(discussed later) should also be in place. 
The execute-only flag 
NetWare allows the system administrator to restrict changes to executable files (.EXE or 
.COM files) via the use of the execute-only file attribute. This attribute restricts all access 
to execution of the program file only. The contents of the file are not able to be inspected, 
the file can not be written to, and the execute-only attribute can not be cleared, even by the 
system administrator. Note that with this attribute set, some programs will not run. 
The execute-only attribute by itself is inadequate for protection against so called companion 
viruses. A companion virus works by replacing the original program file with one that 
performs a different, possibly malicious task. To prevent detection by a comparison of file 
sizes, the companion virus is given the same file size and other external characteristics as 
the original file. 
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With NetWare, an execute-only program file can be renamed, and a companion vtrus 
substituted and flagged as execute-only. The only way to prevent this type of infection is to 
flag the original program file with the rename-inhibit attribute in conjunction with the 
execute only attribute. [ 14] 
Although the execute-only attribute is useful for preventing modifications to program files, 
its use presents another problem. Files that are flagged execute-only can not be scanned 
for changes, as this attribute prevents nomwl read access of the file. 
In general, users should not be permitted write access to directories containing program 
executables. Because the modify right allows the user (and consequently a virus) the ability 
to trivially change permission's, this right should also be revoked in these directories. 
Denial of write rights in a directory should always be accompanied by a denial of the 
modify right. 
The SUPERVISOR account and unauthorised modifications 
The NetWare SUPERVISOR account, is not subject to normal access control mechanisms; 
rather, this account has all rights in all directories, including the ability to write to files and 
modify attributes. 
For these reasons, if a SUPERVISOR user ever logs in from an infected machine, then the 
virus that has infected his machine automatically has access to the entire file server. The 
most obvious immediate infection would be of the LOGIN.EXE program. If this is 
infected, then all users logging into the file server would be infected. 
Extra care should be taken to ensure that Supervisory accounts never log m to a 
NetWare server from an infected machine. 
DETECTION OF CHANGES TO PROGRAM FILES 
Viral infections, Trojan horses and unauthorised (or unintentional) user patching of 
software fall into this category of vulnerability. In recognition of the fact that access 
controls may not be able to prevent all unauthorised modifications, system administrators 
should install software that helps detect any changes that have been made to critical files. 
Although NetWare does not provide either built-in detection of viral activities or automatic 
change control management, standard methods exist whereby changes and modifications 
are able to be detected. The most useful of these are Virus detection scanners, 
Cryptographic checksununing of executables, and third party packages that detect changes 
to critical files. 
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Virus detection scanners 
System administrators of Net Ware networks should have a policy regarding the compulsory 
use of virus detection software at user workstations. A convenient method of enforcing 
this policy is to place a memory resident (TSR) virus scanner in the system login script. 
This program will then be automatically run as part of the login process. The main goal of 
this protection is to minimise the threat of viral infections spreading from user workstations 
onto the file server. Note that some TSR virus protection programs will interfere with the 
normal operation of the workstation. 
Virus detection software should be used to periodically to scan all files on the file server. 
Some commercial virus detection packages that run as NLM's (NetWare Loadable 
Modules) on a NetWare server are available (see Salamone [66]). 
Cryptographic checksums 
Another method that may be used to increase executable file integrity is to encase programs 
in a Cryptographic checksum system. This works by using a secret key to calculate a 
cryptographically secure checksum of the contents of the executable. A shell is added to 
the program that is activated when the program is run. It requests the key and then re-
calculates the checksum and if the stored value does not match the original, then further 
execution of the program is cancelled. 
This may affect the normal operation of programs, and can not easily be used m 
conjunction with the execute-only attribute. 
Change detection 
System administrators should periodically check file information, such as stze, last 
modification date and attributes. This applies particularly to security sensitive areas of the 
file server, such the SYSTEM, LOGIN and PUBLIC directories, where changes should 
only be made by an administrator. 
Several third party change management packages are available to track changes to 
NetWare files. Where possible, a package should be selected that uses some form of 
cryptographical checksumming technique so that changes to the contents of files can be 
detected. 
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The effects of viral infections on user workstations 
Some work has been carried out to determine the effects that virus infections have on the 
NetWare IPX and NETX programs, most notably by David Stang, of the Virus Research 
Centre, International Computer Security Association.[73]. 
His studies have found that in a lot of cases, if a virus is resident when the IPX and NETX 
programs are loaded at the workstation, then that virus may be deactivated. This is mainly 
due to the way NETX "hooks" interrupts, which has the effect of denying some viruses 
access to the operating system features that they need in order to work. This does not 
always happen; certain viruses use different interrupts to the NETX program. 
This research also found that many viral infections will disable NETX or IPX entirely, 
which results in the user of an infected machine being unable to access NetWare file servers 
at all. However, the use of virus scanning software at the workstation is still 
recommended, as some virus infections are still able to operate after a user has logged in. 
ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF DATA FILES 
In the same way that program files need to be protected from unauthorised modifications, 
data files need to be protected so that the integrity of information in those files is preserved. 
If data is left unprotected, an attacker may be able to modify or destroy information. 
Access controls 
Access controls play a major part in protecting data integrity. NetWare administrators 
should ensure that users and groups have write access to only those directories where the 
data that they use resides. This may still represent a risk, as a malicious user with write 
access to a data file will be able to directly access that data outside of the application that is 
normally used to access it. This may result in corrupt or incorrect data being processed by 
other users of the application. 
NetWare has no mechanisms that limit access to data files to certain programs. If a user 
can access data within a program, then the chances are that they will be able to access that 
data outside of a program. The only exception to this is where programs operate as client-
server entities, where data access completely policed by the server process. 
Cryptographic checksums (described above) may be used to verify the integrity of 
information files. NetWare has no built-in services of this type. 
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The Transaction tracking system (TTS) 
NetWare does provide one mechanism that can be used to preserve the integrity of data 
files against corruptions ·caused by incomplete transactions. The Transaction Tracking 
System (TTS) ensures that modifications made to TTS data files are "atomic", meaning that 
these transactions are either completed in full, or have no effect on the data file. 
Modifications to files that are marked as being tracked by TTS (with the Transactional 
attribute), are thus protected from corruptions that may be caused by a workstation crash, a 
loss of connection to the file server, or a file server crash. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
NetWare has several vulnerabilities that may lead to unauthorised modification of data and 
software. The most serious of these is that the SUPERVISOR and equivalent accounts 
have total access to the file server, regardless of rights and attributes settings. As a result, 
use of these accounts can constitute a major security risk if the workstation that the 
supervisory user is working from has been subverted by an intruder, or has been infected 
with a virus. 
The execute-only flag may be used to prevent some kinds of unauthorised modifications, 
but its use is complicated by potential problems with application incompatibilities. 
Additionally, setting this attribute prevents the contents of the executable from being 
scanned for changes or from subversion by a companion type virus. Note that granting 
users modify or access control rights in directories where their access is otherwise 
restricted effectively cancels out those restrictions; the modify or access control rights can 
be used to change other rights and attributes settings in the directory. 
Again, the complexity of NetWare access controls and the unpredictability of security 
equivalencies can play a major role in unauthorised modifications. 
8.7 COMPROMISE OR MODIFICATION OF LAN 
TRAFFIC 
Compromise of LAN traffic occurs when an unauthorised person gains access to data as it 
travels across the LAN medium. Modification of LAN traffic is the threat that messages, 
including the content or addressing of those messages, are modified by an attacker. The 
likelihood of these threats can be influenced by two factors: Encryption of LAN traffic, 
and physical protection of the LAN medium. 
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ENCRYPTION OF LAN TRAFFIC 
While there may be extremely strict access controls at workstations and file servers, 
cleartext information that is transmitted over the network media may be compromised in a 
number of ways. 
An attacker using a protocol analyser can decode the contents of data packets. This type 
of device does not need to be a separate item of hardware: Any workstation on a broadcast 
medium (such as Ethernet) that has a network interface card (NIC) capable of promiscuous 
mode is able to capture packets as they are transmitted across the LAN. A promiscuous 
mode NIC is able to listen in to all traffic on the network segment that it is attached to, 
rather than only traffic addressed to that particular workstation. 
The main defence against data being compromised in this fashion is to encrypt data as it is 
carried across the network. Encryption can be carried out either by hardware or by 
software. Hardware encryption is typically faster, but is more expensive to implement as it 
requires expensive network int~rface cards. Software encryption, whilst cheaper than 
hardware solutions, is computationally intensive, and thus attracts performance penalties in 
terms of network response times at the server and workstation. 
Currently, both hardware and software encryption systems are available for NetWare. 
However, encryption is not supplied as a standard feature of NetWare 3.11 or 3.12. 
Hardware encryption solutions are available from several third party sources. Software 
encryption is available from Novell as phase two of their so-called two phase Security 
Enhancement Project . Phase two aims to encrypt all data that is transmitted across the 
LAN. (Phase one of the Security Enhancement Project deals with digital packet signatures, 
discussed in more detail in section B.8, Spoofing of LAN traffic). 
Not only do encryption services reduce the risk that information is compromised as it 
travels across the LAN, it can also prevent data being modified. In order to modify a 
message, an attacker will have to decrypt the packet as it arrives, change the information 
contained in the message, re-encrypt the message (with the correct key) and then retransmit 
it. 
The chances of this occurring m real-time are minimal. The nature of the Ethernet 
specification, which is very common in NetWare networks, is such that real-time 
modifications, even to unencrypted data, are very difficult to achieve without detection. 
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This may not be the case if the network has wide-area components, such as TCP/IP links 
between networks. Those links might be more easily compromised. 
Modifications to LAN data can also be detected through the use of LAN Message 
Authentication Codes (MACs), which are a type of cryptographic checksum. NetWare 
currently has no cryptographical means of authenticating cleartext LAN message content. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY OF NETWORK MEDIA 
Encryption services can help reduce the risk of compromised or modified LAN data; 
physical security of the LAN medium can help to reduce the risk even further. By limiting 
who has physical access to LAN cables, the system administrator is able to reduce the risk 
of undetected tapping (vampire taps or EMR inductive taps) of the media. 
Other solutions, including the use of intelligent hubs and wiring closets to route packets 
directly to their intended destination are also available. These systems, usually based on 
UTP (Unshielded Twisted Pair) Ethernet networks, act as a central clearing house for LAN 
packets. Each packet is passed onto its intended recipient as per normal, while other 
stations are passed a packet containing garbage information (this is necessary so that other 
network stations know that the network broadcast media is busy). Physical access to such 
hubs and wiring arrangements should be restricted. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
In summary, NetWare, in common with most other LAN systems that are based around 
broadcast media, is subject to a number of vulnerabilities that can result from the lack of 
standard encryption of network traffic, or from a lack of physical control of the network 
media. 
Packet capture and media tapping are an accepted hazard of broadcast LAN systems. If 
sensitive or confidential data is stored on the network, then encryption should be used. 
8.8 SPOOFING OF LAN TRAFFIC 
Spoofing of LAN traffic involves the ability to receive a message by either masquerading as 
the legitimate receiving destination, or by masquerading as a legitimate sender and sending 
a false message to a target LAN device [7]. By masquerading as a legitimate sender, an 
attacker may be able to gain access to privileges and information that would not normally 
be granted (unauthorised access to LAN resources). By acting as a legitimate receiver, the 
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attacker may be able to gain access to information that they should not be pnvy to 
(compromise of LAN data). 
To spoof the LAN, the attacker needs to convmce the device being spoofed that the 
workstation they are mounting an attack from is a legitimate address of some other 
privileged victim user, for whom the request that they are making is normal. 
This can be achieved in a variety of ways; the main prerequisite is that the victim is logged 
onto the network and is active during the data collection phase of the attack. The attacker 
might record a packet sequence that is part of a session between the victim and the LAN 
device, and then play that sequence back at a later time. The message may either be 
unmodified (playback attack), or may have a modified message content and workstation 
address (spoof attack). If no protection is in place, then the LAN device being spoofed will 
not know the difference between the legitimate user and the attacker. 
The factors that can reduce this threat are: 
~ LAN traffic encryption. 
"' LAN traffic integrity controls. 
• LAN message Non-repudiation services. 
LAN TRAFFIC ENCRYPTION CONTROLS 
One way to ensure that LAN devices are not spoofed is by implementing encryption 
schemes for LAN messages. These schemes, as discussed above, may be implemented in 
hardware or software, and may include encryption of certain parts of the message header, 
as well as the message itself. Net Ware encryption (phase two) is designed to encrypt both 
header protocol information and message content. 
Note that encryption will not prevent a playback attack, as encrypted packets may still be 
captured and subsequently retransmitted. 
LAN TRAFFIC INTEGRITY CONTROLS 
Another method to reduce the risk of a spoofing attack is to use MAC authentication of 
messages. As discussed on page 218, this provides a cryptographic assurance that message 
and message header data has not been tampered with. NetWare currently provides no 
security services to detect modification of message content, although once again, 
encryption services can limit this vulnerability. 
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NetWare does suffer from a major security vulnerability that is associated with a lack of 
integrity controls. Recently (late 1992) students at Lieden University in the Netherlands 
discovered a flaw in the way that NetWare handles NCP (Novell Core Protocol) requests. 
It is possible for a NetWare workstation posing as a more privileged client to send a forged 
NCP request to a NetWare server. With the right NCP request, the intruder is able to gain 
SUPERVISOR rights to the system, and consequently access to all network resources. 
[49]. 
The attack developed by these researchers takes advantage of NetWare's lack of 
authentication of NCP request messages. The only method that NetWare currently uses to 
check the authenticity of a user request is by examining the connection number that the 
request packet contains. If this connection number is changed by the attacker to that of 
another user (ie a SUPERVISOR user), then NetWare will process that request with the 
privileges of that user. A carefully crafted packet sent to a SUPERVISOR connection 
could, for example, request that the account that the attacker is using be granted 
SUPERVISOR equivalence. 
Novell's response to this vulnerability was the NetWare Security Enhancement Project, 
which consisted of a two phase approach to strengthening NetWare security. Phase one 
addressed the NCP forgery vulnerability discovered at Leiden, while Phase two (discussed 
elsewhere in this report) addressed the problem of providing encryption services for LAN 
traffic. 
Novell addressed the problem of NCP packet forgery by introducing a real-time NCP 
packet signature system. This system works by requiring the client and server to "sign" 
NCP packets. This signature, which changes for every packet transmitted, uses a 
cryptographically secure algorithm that uniquely identifies and verifies the sender of the 
NCP request. A number of verification combinations at both the client and server level are 
possible, ranging from no packet signatures being used, to a refusal on the part of the client 
or the server to complete a login if either do not provide the right level of packet signature. 
The fix is implemented as a combination of new workstation shell software, an updated set 
of login and attach commands, and a NLM that runs on the server. The addition of packet 
signatures to a NetWare system carries a performance penalty of around three to ten per 
cent in terms of server and workstation CPU utilisation, and thus may not be feasible in 
environments where the file server is already under heavy loads. 
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Packet signature should be used in environments where sensitive information is stored at 
the server, or where a compromise of the SUPERVISOR account is unacceptable. 
LAN MESSAGE NON-REPUDIATION SERVICES 
Non-repudiation ensures that the parties in a communication cannot deny having 
participated in all or part of a communication [7]. Non-repudiation is usually achieved by 
using digital signatures as part of the communications protocol. These signatures provide 
proof that a sender sent a certain message, and that the sender is who they say they are. A 
variation on this arrangement is to have the receiver provide the sending station with proof 
of receipt. 
NetWare does not provide non-repudiation services as a standard feature. However, phase 
one of the NetWare Security enhancement project, discussed above, can provide this 
service for NCP packets through its addition of a digital signature authentication 
mechanism to the NCP communications protocol. 
SECTION SUMMARY 
NetWare is vulnerable to spoofing attacks that take advantage of the NCP flaw described in 
this section. Although fixes are available to plug this hole, these may cause performance 
problems in LANs that are heavily utilised. 
NetWare enctyption services are not provided as standard, and if the Novell software 
solution is selected, this too may result in performance problems. NetWare only provides 
non-repudiation for NCP packets. Other types of communication may require third party 
protocols to be installed if non-repudiation is a requirement. 
8 .. 9 DISRUPTION OF LAN FUNCTIONALITY 
A disruption of LAN functionality occurs when for any reason, the LAN is unavailable to 
users. This threat may be caused by physical disruptions, such as hardware problems or a 
system shutdown, or by logical disruptions, such as heavy network loads, or problems with 
the network operating system software. 
Factors that influence unfettered LAN functionality are: 
• Power availability and quality problems. 
• Hardware Failures. 
• Network Unavoidability. 
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• LAN device security. 
• Network Operating System software problems. 
POWER AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY PROBLEMS 
Power cuts, brownouts and spikes can cause problems with the operation of the LAN. The 
most at risk device on the LAN is the file server. Because file servers may be servicing a 
number of users at once, any power fluctuations or outages are likely to affect large number 
of users, and an even larger number of files. Where possible, file servers should be 
connected to uninterruptable power supplies (UPS's) that provide enough time on battery 
power to shut the LAN down gracefully. Additionally, some UPS devices also provide 
power conditioning, which may be necessary in areas where the power is of low quality. 
NetWare supports the use of UPS devices for file servers. 
HARDWARE FAILURES 
Hardware failures can affect the availability and functionality of the network if they are not 
adequately prepared for. The most crit~cal hardware problem of a LAN is when a file 
server hard drive fails. Other components of the file server such as memory, network 
interface cards or keyboards may be quickly replaced, but since server hard drives contain 
information, that data must be preserved and restored before the LAN can continue 
operating. 
The obvious solution is to have replacement hardware ready and waiting for just such an 
occasion where the hard drive fails and availability of the LAN is critical. Usually, data and 
programs will have to be recovered from backups, although data may sometimes be 
recovered off a damaged hard drive. NetWare provides three options that can improve 
availability of Net Ware file servers: Hot Fix, Disk Mirroring and Disk Duplexing. 
Hot Fix 
NetWare's Hot Fix feature reserves roughly two per cent of the space on each disk that it is 
activated for. After each disk write to a sector, NetWare reads the sector just written back 
off the disk and compares it with the same sector in memory. This read-after-write 
checking allows detection of defective areas of the disk. If the verification fails, then the 
sector is re-written to the reserved hot fix area, and the sector identified as defective is 
removed from use by the server. 
In the event that verification of a sector written to the hot fix area of the disk fails, then 
NetWare will re-direct the sector to another part of the reserved hot fix area and try again. 
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The hot fix mechanism will attempt up to ten redirections before giving up and shutting 
down the hot fix mechanism for that disk. In this event, a console error message is 
generated informing the system administrator of the problem. 
By monitoring the number of hot fixed areas, a system administrator can determine the 
relative health of a disk drive, and hopefully, can replace it before it fails completely. 
Disk Mirroring 
NetWare provides a feature known as disk mirroring. This works by using two separate 
physical disk drives, each of which has the same information written to it. If the read-after-
write mechanism determines that a sector on one disk is faulty, that drive is shut down, and 
the other drive continues working. The inactive drive can then be removed for repair, 
without a loss of service. 
Disk Duplexing 
Disk duplexing involves installing two or more completely separate disk subsystems, 
including controllers and mirrored drives. In this case, redundancy is provided for defective 
drives, defective controllers, interfaces and power supplies. If any component in a disk 
channel fails, then the redundant channel takes over. 
Disk duplexing has the added advantage of increased performance. File service requests 
can be fulfilled by whichever disk subsystem responds first, resulting in markedly improved 
performance. 
NETWORK UNAVAILABILITY 
Failure of the network media itself or problems with network capacity overloading fall into 
this area. The network may fail because of incorrect configuration of cables, the placement 
of cables too close to fluorescent lighting, faulty network terminators or cable or because 
of a faulty device on the LAN flooding the network with noise. Devices such as protocol 
analysers and cable analysers can sometimes be used to track the source of such problems 
down. 
If network loads are too heavy, or if the LAN is unable to respond to changing traffic 
patterns, a loss of functionality may occur. NetWare provides the system administrator 
with information regarding file server utilisation and network loads. By monitoring this 
information, the administrator is able to plan upgrades to network hardware and perhaps 
plan reconfigurations of the LAN topology to remove bottlenecks and congested segments. 
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LAN DEVICE SECURITY 
LAN devices should be secured from physical access as much as possible. As mentioned in 
section B.3 of this report (page 192), NetWare file servers in particular should be 
protected. Other items such as modems, gateways, routers, bridges etc should be 
protected from both unauthorised access and unintentional accidents, such as tripping over 
a cord. 
NETWORK OPERATING SYSTEM SOFTWARE PROBLEMS. 
A potential problem area that can lead to a disruption of LAN functionality is that of the 
network operating system itself. If files that are critical to the operation of the operating 
system become contaminated with viruses, or are corrupted due to hardware problems, 
LAN service may suffer. For this reason it is particularly important to retain backups not 
only of user data, but a set of backups of the file server software, including configurational 
files. 
As mentioned at the start of this appendix, runaway or error-prone NLM applications may 
also disrupt the correct operation of the network operating system. 
8.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter has ~sed taken a detailed look at the potential threats to NetWare 3.11 and 
3.12 security, and the services that are provided to counter those threats. Within each 
threat area, a number of vulnerability factors were examined, and known problems with 
NetWare security were surfaced. As this report has discovered, NetWare does have a 
number of flaws that can make a good level of security difficult to achieve. 
There is a general lack of auditing carried out by the system. Amongst other things, failed 
login attempts to non-existent accounts are not recorded; failed access to expired or time 
restricted accounts are not recorded; failed access to files or directories are not recorded. 
A NetWare administrator is not well equipped with information about how often or how 
severely attacks are made on system security. 
The access control mechanisms implemented by NetWare are dift[cult to understand 
without a lot of practice, and are even more difficult to manage. Relatively minor changes 
to access rights at one level of a directory tree can affect major portions of that tree at 
lower subdirectory levels. NetWare rights and attributes do not apply in a uniform fashion 
to end users and supervisory users. 
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The NetWare security equivalence function, if improperly managed, can create major 
security vulnerabilities, due to the difficulty of determining its effects in some situations. 
An intruder armed with a DOS disk editor who has physical access to an unprotected file 
server is able to surgically remove the entire identification and authentication mechanism 
from the system, effectively gaining complete control of the server. In addition, a "locked" 
file server can be unlocked by any print server operator who requests that a print server is 
shut down. 
NetWare provides no encryption facilities, either for data stored at the server, or for data 
transmitted across the LAN. Additionally, NetWare is vulnerable to spoofing attacks that 
can give an intruder complete access to the file server. The only way to counter this 
vulnerability is to add NCP packet signature software, which may cause performance 
problems on heavily used servers. 
There are many other potential problem areas that have been discussed in this report. A 
large part of NetWare security' is dependant on the skills and attitude of the system 
administrator. In its favour, NetWare provides many more security features than some 
other PC LAN products, and a skilled administrator should be able to reduce NetWare 
vulnerabilities by recognising those problem areas and minimising system exposure to them. 
NetWare system administrators require tools that provide more auditing information of 
security related system events, tools that automate the assignment of access controls so that 
a consistent access scheme can be maintained, tools that provide a more in depth analysis of 
potential security problems, tools that provide encryption of user files at the server and 
change management tools that assist in the control of changes to critical files and 
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SVPERVISOR 
(as per user) 
the user. 
GROUPS_!' M_IN Set Contains a list of user groups to which the user 
belongs. 
SECURITY _EQUALS Set Contains a list of bindery objects to which this user 
is security equivalent. 
LOGIN_CONTROL Item Contains structure defining access control settings 



















Item Contains up to 10 network address masks from 
which this user is allowed to log in from. 
Item Contains the users encrypted password. 
Set Set of users or groups that are authorised to act as 
workgroup managers. 
Item Default access controls for user 
LOGIN_CONTROL property. 
Item As above. 
Set Contains a list of bindery objects which are 
members of the set. 
Item As above. 
Set Users or groups of users authorised to place entries 
in the queue. 
Set Users or groups of users authorised to act as queue 
operators. 
Item Server directory for queue data. 
Set Print Servers that service this queue. 
Item As above. 
Set Users or groups of users authorised to usc print 
server. 
Set Users or groups of users authorised to act as print 
server operators. 
Set Users or groups of users authorised to act as server 
operators. 
Item Dynamic item property contatmng current 
internetwork address offile server. 
Item Current intrusion detection lockout settings. 
Table C- 1 Sample bindery object types and their standard properties. 
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Figure D - I NetAudit bindery browser. 
INTERACTIVE BINDERY BROWSER 
The NetAudit Bindery Browser, as shown in FigureD - 1, allows the auditor to manually 
examine individual bindery objects. Objects may be selected on the basis of object type, 
and may be sorted according to either object type or object name. Using this browser, the 
auditor is able to examine the contents of item and set properties for any bindery object on 
229 
APPENDIXD NetAudit User Interface Previews 
FigureD - 2 Bindery analysis window. 
the target server. A list of objects referred to by set properties ts available, and the 
contents of item properties is displayed in 'both text and binary forms. 
Figure D - 2 shows the bindery security analysis subwindow of a failed object. The object 
that NetAudit has detected has an incorrectly specified object security setting, which allows 
any user (Logged) to make changes to its settings. The proper setting (Supervisor) is also 
shown. 
INTERACTIVE USERBASE BROWSER 
The userbase browser is shown in Figure D - 3 on the next page. This browser allows the 
auditor to interactively examine user objects that exist on a particular NetWare server. 
NetAudit permits the selection of users based on either the user account name, security 
equivalencies effective for the user, or based on the security assessment awarded to the 
account. 
When a user is selected by the auditor, each category displays the current information for 
that account. Due to the large number of settings that affect user account security, these 
settings are divided into the display categories detailed below. 
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FigureD - 3 Userbase browser. 
APPENDIXD 
This category includes the long name of the user, when the account was last 
used, the expiry date of the account, and the login state of the account. 
Login Script. 
This category allows the auditor to view user login scripts, as well as the creation 
date and file attributes of the login script file. 
Password Settings. 
This category displays user password security settings, including the minimum 
permissible length of the password, the password expiry date, whether unique 
passwords are required, and whether grace logins are allowed. 
Account Restrictions. 
This category displays the connection, node and time restrictions effective for the 
user. 
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Security Settings. 
The Security Settings category indicates whether a user is SUPERVISOR 
equivalent, or is a Workgroup Manager. This category also displays the group 
membership of the user, as well as any user equivalencies that the account has. 
Intrusion Detection Status. 
This category displays the intrusion detection lockout status of the user account. 
File System Rights. 
This category indicates trustee rights that are assigned to this user. It includes 
trustee rights from direct trustee assignments, as well as rights from group 
memberships and security equivalencies. 
File System View. 
The file system view category allows the auditor to examine the real access that 
the user account has within the file system of the NetWare server that the 
account resides on. This view takes into account the effects of direct, group and 
security equivalence trustee assignments, as well as access rights inheritance from 
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Figure D - 4 File system subview from within user browser. this view is 
showing the actual trustee access that the currently selected user has. Trustee 
assignments and inherited rights are shown as T boxes or arrows respectively . 
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Resource Usage. 
This category displays the user account's consumption of file system space on 
each server volume. 
Bindery Presence. 
This category displays the bindery object associated with the user account, and 
allows the auditor to examine the bindery properties that belong to that user 
object. 
Audit Trail List. 
The Audit trail list shows any entries that exist m the system log that are 
associated with this user. 
Security Analysis Window. 
This window displays the outcome of the baseline analysis for this user. This 
view is shown in FigureD- 5. 
FigureD - 5 Security Analysis sub-window of the userbase browser showing the 
results of a detected errant user. Note the explanation given in the comment 
box below the listbox. 
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FigureD - 6 File system browser. 
INTERACTIVE FILE SYSTEM BROWSER 
The NetAudit interactive file system viewer is shown in Figure D - 6. The window is 
broken into three main panes. The top pane is a directory and file browser, in which the 
file system of the target server is displayed. Below this is located the information pane and 
toolbar that is used to display additional information about the currently selected directory 
or file. The bottom results pane and toolbar display the results of file system comparisons 
or baseline analysis runs. 
NetAudit allows the auditor to select files to be displayed in the directory and file browser 
based on file wildcards, and supports sorting according to a number of criteria. 
The information pane displays volume, directory or file information, depending upon the 
currently selected button in the toolbar immediately above it. From left to right, these 
toolbar buttons specify volume information, current directory trustees, current directory 
effective trustees, current directory information, and current file information. 
This picture was taken just after a baseline run was performed, and as shown in the results 
pane, NetAudit has uncovered that the bindery files are hidden, and belong to a user that is 
not recognised as a supervisor of the system. This pane additionally shows several other 
executables (in this case NLM' s) that have inappropriate attribute settings. 
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connections supported 25 
connections used 1 
currently in use 1 
supported 64 
Server status of server STIHPY 
server ti:ae 
status 
Tuesday, 20 Feb 1995 21:10:33 
logins are allowed 
Accounting is enabled 
FigureD - 7 Server information browser 
The three buttons to the right of the results toolbar allow the auditor to jump to the next or 
previous directory where baseline or comparison results have been flagged. The open 
folder button synchronises the file and directory browser display with the results display. 
SERVER INFORMATION BROWSER 
The server information browser is shown in Figure D - 7. This browser allows the auditor 
to examine a number of miscellaneous server configuration items, such as version 
information, group and device information, and log files. 
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